Secure Multi-Purpose Wireless Sensor Networks by Jacobi, Daniel
Secure Multi-Purpose
Wireless Sensor Networks
Sichere, drahtlose Mehrzweck-Sensornetzwerke
Vom Fachbereich Informatik der Technischen Universität Darmstadt genehmigte
Dissertation zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Doktor-Ingenieur (Dr.-Ing.)
von Dipl.-Inform. Daniel Jacobi aus Wiesbaden
Tag der Einreichung: 03.02.2016, Tag der Prüfung: 22.03.2016
Darmstadt 2016 — D 17
1. Gutachten: Professor Alejandro Buchmann, Ph.D.
2. Gutachten: Professor Dr. Marc Fischlin
Bitte zitieren Sie dieses Dokument als:
URN: urn:nbn:de:tuda-tuprints-52497
URL: http://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/5249/
Dieses Dokument wird bereitgestellt von tuprints,
E-Publishing-Service der TU Darmstadt
http://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de
tuprints@ulb.tu-darmstadt.de
Die Veröffentlichung steht unter folgender Creative Commons Lizenz:
Namensnennung – Keine kommerzielle Nutzung – Keine Bearbeitung 3.0 Deutschland
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/de/
Für
Adrian, Maja & Sonja

Abstract
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) were made possible around the late 1990s by indus-
try scale availability of small and energy efficient microcontrollers and radio interfaces.
Application areas for WSNs range from agriculture to health care and emergency re-
sponse scenarios. Depending on the scenario a sensor network can span from some
rooms to an area of several square miles in size and so the number of sensor nodes can
vary from a fistful of nodes to hundreds or thousands. Sensor nodes are composed from
a set of building blocks: processing, communication, sensing/actuating and a power
supply. The power supply is usually a battery pack. Especially these limited energy
resources make it tremendously important to save resources to achieve a long lifetime.
Most WSNs are planned and developed to satisfy only one application, and they are
controlled by a single user. But, with the Internet of Things approaching, more and
more sensor networks will be used for multiple tasks simultaneously and are reaching
larger sizes. As sensor networks grow it becomes mandatory to localize traffic, both
for energy conservation as well as security. Additionally, the broadcast medium of the
wireless channel of WSNs allows an adversary all sorts of attacks, like eavesdropping,
replaying messages, and denial of service attacks. In large or unattended networks it
is even possible to physically attack the hardware of a sensor node to gain access to its
firmware and possibly cryptographic keys.
In this work we propose the Scopes Framework and the security enhancement Sec-
Scopes. The Scopes Framework introduces dynamic partitioning of a WSN with support
for multiple in-network tasks. SecScopes enables secure access control, key exchange
and communication.
The partitioning is done by a scoping mechanism which allows the dynamic defini-
tion of subsets of sensor nodes. The Scopes Framework supports in-network tasks by
managing network connections for each task, and allowing the selection of efficient
routing algorithms. To allow access control on a partition of the network we introduce
attribute-based encryption in sensor networks. Secure key exchange is also based on this
encryption scheme. To secure communication more efficient symmetric cryptography is
employed.
With the Scopes Framework we provide a modular and flexible architecture that can
be adjusted to the needs of different scenarios. We present a detailed evaluation of the
performance of the framework and compare and discuss the results for the different
stages of the framework. The results of the evaluation show the general feasibility of the
approach, in spite of the adverse resource constraints.

Zusammenfassung
Drahtlose Sensornetzwerke (WSNs) sind Ende der 1990er Jahre durch die industrielle
Verfügbarkeit von kleinen, energie-effizienten Mikrocontrollern und Funkschnittstellen
möglich geworden. Einsatzgebiete für WSNs reichen von der Landwirtschaft bis in den
medizinischen oder Notfall-Bereich. Abhängig vom Einsatzgebiet kann ein Sensornetz-
werk über wenige Räume bis hin zu Gebieten von mehreren Quadratkilometern reichen
und so kann auch die Anzahl von Sensorknoten von einer Handvoll bis zu mehreren
hundert oder sogar tausend reichen. Sensorknoten setzen sich aus folgenden Blöcken
zusammen: Ablaufsteuerung, Kommunikation, Sensorik/Aktorik und Stromversorgung.
Die Stromversorgung ist in der Regel Batterie-basiert. Diese geringen und limitierten
Energiereserven machen es sehr wichtig Ressourcen zu sparen, um eine lange Laufzeit
zu erreichen.
Meistens werden WSNs für eine spezielle Anwendung entwickelt und sie werden von
nur einem Benutzer kontrolliert. Aber, durch das Internet der Dinge, werden immer
mehr Sensornetzwerke für mehrere, gleichzeitige Aufgaben genutzt werden und sie
werden größer. Mit dem Wachsen von Sensornetzwerken wird es unumgänglich Netz-
werkpakete möglichs lokal zu halten, sowohl um Ressourcen zu schonen, als auch zur
Erhöhung der Sicherheit im Netzwerk. Zusätzlich erlaubt das Broadcast-Medium der
Funkschnittstelle eines WSNs einem Angreifer viele Angriffsmöglichkeiten, z.B. Mithö-
ren von Verbindungen, Nachrichten wiedereinspielen oder Denial of Service-Attacken. In
großen oder abgelegenen Sensornetzwerken kann es zudem zu physischen Attacken auf
die Sensorknoten kommen, um Zugriff auf die Firmware oder sogar kryptographische
Schlüssel zu bekommen.
In dieser Arbeit stellen wir das Scopes Framework und die Sicherheitserweiterung
SecScopes vor. Das Scopes Framework erlaubt die dynamische Partitionierung eines
WSNs mit Unterstützung für mehrere Tasks im Netzwerk. SecScopes erlaubt Zugriffs-
kontrolle auf die einzelnen Partitionen des Netzwerks, sicheren Schlüsselaustausch und
sichere Kommunikation.
Die Partitionierung des Netzwerks wird durch einen Scoping-Mechanismus erreicht,
der eine dynamische Definition von Subsets von Sensorknoten erlaubt. Das Scopes Fra-
mework unterstützt Tasks innerhalb des Sensornetzwerks durch die Bereitstellung von
Netzwerkverbindungen pro Task und der Möglichkeit ein effizientes Routing auszuwäh-
len. Die Zugriffskontrolle auf eine Partition des Netzwerks wird durch attribut-basierte
Verschlüsselung erreicht. Der sichere Schlüsselaustausch basiert ebenfalls darauf. Zur
sicheren Kommunikation wird effizientere symmetrische Verschlüsselung eingesetzt.
Mit dem Scopes Framework stellen wir ein modulares und flexibles System zur Verfü-
gung, das an verschiedenen Einsatzszenarien angepasst werden kann. Wir zeigen eben-
v
falls eine detaillierte Evaluation der Leistungsfähigkeit des Frameworks und vergleichen
und diskutieren die Ergebnisse der verschiedenen Ausbaustufen. Das Ergebnis der Eva-
luation zeigt die Machbarkeit des Ansatzes, trotz der stark eingeschränkten Ressourcen.
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The Internet has changed the way of life for most people in the last decade. Informa-
tion is exchanged via email or instant messaging and it evolved from a tool for experts to
a connector of people all over the world. And it is still evolving. One of these evolutions
is the integration of more and more devices into the Internet. Today most of the new TV-
sets are Internet capable and the Internet of Things tries to incorporate most electronic
devices in the near future. One of the enabling technologies to access and use even the
smallest device are Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs).
With advances in miniaturization of electronic components and enhanced perfor-
mance over the last decade, smart electronic devices are penetrating more and more
areas of daily life. Application areas for WSNs range from agriculture or logistics to
health care and emergency response scenarios. These applications can be split into sev-
eral (sub-)tasks. Depending on the scenario a sensor network can span from some rooms
to an area of several square miles in size and so the number of sensor nodes can vary
from a fistful of nodes to hundreds or thousands. Sensor nodes are composed from a
set of building blocks: processing, communication capabilities, sensing/actuating and
power supply. The large quantities of nodes participating in sensor networks has pushed
prices down. These nodes consist of a slow CPU combined with a limited amount of
memory. This allows pre-processing or decision taking on the local node before report-
ing data via a communication link or triggering some kind of actuation. The transceiver
is most of the time a low-bandwidth radio link, but also other techniques like infrared
are possible. Sensing/actuation depends on the actual application, many sensors or ac-
tuators are possible here. The power supply is usually a battery pack. The low cost
requirements result in highly constrained resources on a sensor node. This requires
suitable and efficient algorithms, optimized for the limited CPU and memory space. Es-
pecially the limited energy resources make it tremendously important to save resources
to achieve a long lifetime. Transmitting messages requires a significant amount of en-
ergy and, therefore, as few messages as possible are sent. Messages should be kept as
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short as possible. The range of the transceivers used is typically limited and messages
are sent in a multi-hop fashion, i.e. a message is received by a node and then forwarded
to its destination, hop by hop.
1.1 Motivation
Today’s WSNs are planned and developed to satisfy only one application, and they
are usually controlled by a single user. In the future more and more sensor networks
will be used for multiple tasks simultaneously and are reaching sizes where structuring
is necessary for efficient use. This also leads to more heterogeneous networks, where
several users have to cooperate in a large network. Even smaller networks benefit from
structuring, as just parts of the network can be included in an application and the rest
can stay in a power saving mode. With the broad deployment of sensor networks in
industry, the need for security has increased and became an important issue. While
approaches have been proposed to both problems in isolation, an integrated mechanism
for secure structured sensor networks is still missing.
Having multiple users cooperating in a WSN introduces the need for frameworks that
support multiple networking trees, meshes or just end-to-end connections. This is only
marginally available in current approaches. Also many developments in the area of
WSNs are focused on a specific scenario. This makes sense to achieve high efficiency
during operation but makes deployment and reuse for other purposes more difficult.
Looking back on hardware and performance advances over the last decade of WSNs,
it is definitely feasible to push for a more generic design, introducing a higher level of
reusability, and sacrificing some resources.
Securing a WSN is a tough challenge. On the one hand the limited resources of the
sensor nodes require very efficient security algorithms. On the other hand sensor nodes
are mostly deployed in insecure or hostile environments. Additionally the multi-hop
communication allows an adversary all sorts of attacks, like eavesdropping, replay-
ing messages, different man-in-the-middle attacks, like injecting, dropping or altering
messages, and denial of service attacks by blocking radio channels in specific areas or
the whole network. In large or unattended networks it is even possible to physically at-
tack the hardware of a sensor node to gain access to its firmware and cryptographic keys.
The following two examples emphasize the need for structuring a WSN and introduc-
ing security in a corresponding framework. The first is an emergency response scenario
where reusability and partitioning is a major demand. The second scenario is from the
domain of logistics. Here support for multiple users and security are the major issues.
1.1.1 Scenario: Emergency Response
After an incident at a chemical plant the equipment is partly destroyed, other parts
of the plant are still functional. The statically deployed infrastructure to monitor safety
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and control the different systems is also damaged. This infrastructure was deployed as
a WSN, so that after a potential incident it can stay functional in areas that were not
affected. At the incident site single sensors can still work and monitor potential threats.
Getting the remaining infrastructure back in a working state is a high priority task, so it
can be used by emergency response teams, such as, firefighters, robots or quadrocopters,
to handle the incident. To acquire an overview of the situation in a short time, and
identify areas with, e.g. leaked chemicals that are unsafe for human personnel, the
remaining sensors have to be reconnected to the WSN. For this purpose the robots and
quadrocopters are able to deploy additional sensor nodes to enhance the radio coverage
of the WSN, or allow additional monitoring of critical areas through sensors at specific
locations.
With the network reconnected, structuring helps to keep the unaffected areas of the
plant in a normal state, and the damaged part is not affected by data exchanged there.
Also the network at the incident site can get divided into high and low priority areas
where different emergency response teams can work independently from each other. In
that situation, new sensing or control tasks are only deployed in areas where they are
needed.
1.1.2 Scenario: Container Harbor
Back in 2004 Culler et al. described a container harbor scenario [24] that still is
challenging today. In a large international container harbor, like Hamburg or Rotterdam,
you have different areas where containers can be loaded or unloaded, on ships or trucks.
There are storage areas and an office complex, where companies, customs, etc. are
located. All these parties want to know where their containers are, what the status of
their containers is or what is exactly inside a specific container. In this scenario a sensor
node is attached to every container. The nodes can identify whom they belong to, the
content of the container and monitor and control its state, e.g. temperature in a cooling
container.
To query a set of containers, a company can create a partition based on conditions that
the containers must fulfill. Conditions could be defined on type of container (e.g. all
cooling containers), owner or other grouping criteria. Later on the company can maintain
the firmware for monitoring the container, query the logged entries or configure the
cooling management.
Using a partition has the advantage of limiting the network traffic only to the areas of
the network where the members are located, which favors network security. Data secu-
rity is an important issue in this scenario. Unauthorized access to a competitor’s sensor
nodes should be prevented and only properly authorized and authenticated containers
should join a partition.
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1.2 Shortcomings of Wireless Sensor Networks
Starting with a one task network is just natural, but with further progress more tasks
will be transferred to commonly used networks. At this point today’s networks will fail
because they were developed with a single application in mind and lack the ability to
service multiple applications and are not reusable for emerging developments. Current
operating systems for WSNs support parallel execution of different tasks, but support
from the overlaying frameworks is very limited or non-existent.
As sensor networks grow it becomes more important to localize traffic, both for energy
conservation as well as security. The lack of structure in today’s networks makes it
difficult to accommodate multiple users in a sensor network. In a structured WSN each
application can get its own overlay network.
The different overlays in a structured WSN introduce a first level of security, as shown
for publish / subscribe systems in [33]. They limit the visibility of a task and its data to
a subset of the WSN. Only sensor nodes participating in the same overlay or are used to
route messages for it can be aware of the overlay’s presence. This drastically reduces the
number of potential adversary nodes in a large WSN. However, malicious sensor nodes
can pretend to be part of the group. To prevent this, access control mechanisms should
be introduced to the group creation process. This feature is not available in current WSN
frameworks.
1.3 Secure Multi-Purpose Wireless Sensor Networks
Statically structuring a sensor network is not enough. It is important to be able to
define groups in a way that suits the needs of an application without excessive resource
consumption. In the Scopes Framework this is achieved by a binary representation of a
boolean expression to declaratively define a scope to structure the network and refresh
messages for a scope with configurable refresh intervals.
Besides structuring of the WSN, the support for different scenarios and multiple con-
current tasks is a highly desirable property. Supporting the basic functionality of execut-
ing multiple concurrent applications is handled by the operating system. The Framework
extends this support to manage network connections for each application or task, and
allows the selection of different routing algorithms. Being able to choose the optimal
routing for a scenario is important for efficiency. Therefore, the Scopes Framework is
modular. Routing algorithms, the language or functions to determine scope member-
ships, and of course the tasks are adjustable to the specific needs of a scenario.
Security is one of the top priorities in commercial deployments of WSNs. Therefore,
the Scopes Framework introduces secure group joining and communication procedures.
This ensures the confidentiality of exchanged data and prevents malicious nodes from
unauthorized joining an arbitrary group.
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This thesis presents the Scopes Framework and the extensions that enable Secure
Multi-Purpose Wireless Sensor Networks. The framework presented in this thesis makes
the following contributions:
Scoping. This is the major building block of the framework and enables the dynamic
definition of subsets of sensor nodes in the network. Therefore, a declarative lan-
guage was defined to easily create and delete groups. Scoping also provides the
ability to hierarchically structure groups and subgroups, so called scopes and sub-
scopes, of nodes. It also enables further security measures, as messages are kept in
the specific area of a scope and the creation mechanism offers a proper place for
an access control mechanism.
Multitasking and Reusability. Multitasking is a major aspects for a multi purpose WSN
and it is also an integral part of the Scopes Framework. It allows the management
of tasks on a sensor node and enables also multiple users in one WSN. To use the
Scopes Framework in many different scenarios and to be able to introduce new
applications in an existing WSN, design modularity and reusability received high
priority.
Access Control. To control who can access a scope is a basic security requirement. Using
an Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) scheme, access control can be integrated in
the framework in a transparent way, restricting the access to a scope only to autho-
rized devices. This is provided by our proposed security architecture that provides
security in the process of creating, maintaining and deleting scopes.
Secure Key Exchange and Communication. Secure communication is, besides access
control, the second basic security requirement. To be able to deploy a WSN in
a business environment, as discussed in the scenario in section 1.1.2, confidential-
ity of the transmitted data is vital. In our proposed architecture we use efficient
symmetric cryptography to secure the communication inside a scope. Therefore, a
secure way to exchange symmetric keys is mandatory. This is an integral part of
the ABE scheme also used for access control.
Implementation. The reference implementation of the Scopes Framework has undergone
extensive development and testing and is a robust system that can be reused in
future projects.
1.4 Organization of this Thesis
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 2. In the Scopes Framework chapter we elaborate on the details of our frame-
work design and explain the different modules and phases of the architecture and
its runtime behavior.
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Chapter 3. The Securing the Scopes Framework chapter deals with security problems in
WSNs and solutions introduced in Scopes. It also discusses the influence of security
on the architecture of the Scopes Framework introduced in chapter 2.
Chapter 4. After completing the architectural description, we will evaluate the Scopes
Framework. This includes the different versions of the Scopes Framework, the
security algorithms and libraries used.
Chapter 5. In this chapter we examine the work related to this thesis from different
areas. This section is divided in two major parts. The first reviews the work related
to scoping while the second part covers related work in the security domain.
Chapter 6. Last we present conclusions and point out further developments.
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The basic concepts of scopes was originally conceived to provide structure in loosely
coupled publish/subscribe broker networks [32, 33] in the Rebeca Publish/Subscribe
system, see also section 5.1.2. These were later proposed for sensor networks by J.
Steffan in [123, 124] and the first implementation was done in [53] for a simulator to
prove feasibility.
Before we start with details of the Scopes Framework we will take a short step back
and show some background on wireless sensor networks and define our understanding
of common terms.
2.1 Prerequisites
Wireless sensor networks were created around the late 1990s. They were made possi-
ble by industry scale availability of small and energy efficient microcontrollers (MCUs)
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and especially radio interfaces, the two most important building blocks of sensor net-
works. Over the last decade several hardware platforms were built. The early sensor
nodes showed the feasibility around the year 2000. The first widely used platform that
also was commercially available was the Mica2 [23], from 2002 and after that around
2004 Telos, TelosB/Tmote and micaZ [85] were developed. Developments from the
last years went in different directions, like the Imote2, the SunSPOTS [94] or Econo-
tags [107]. They are not built around the paradigm of energy efficiency like previous
sensor nodes, but with much more performance, e.g. the microcontrollers used here
have common XScale or ARM cores. Some sensor network platforms went back to the
roots and tried to extend the still very popular Tmote platform with more powerful mi-
crocontrollers from the same MCU families as before, like the Zolteria Z1 [154]. The
current versions of microcontrollers have more than doubled the RAM and flash mem-
ory, and added new hardware building blocks like AES encryption support with roughly
the same power consumption. Other Platforms try to find an equilibrium between the
powerful Imote2 class and the energy efficient Tmote class of sensor nodes; examples
are the WASPmotes [120]. Besides those, many custom built sensor network platforms
were used in different scenarios.
Wireless Sensor Networks were at first deployed in situations where they have to
monitor data over a large area, e.g. environmental. There are numerous examples for
this type of usage, like the Great Duck Island experiment [77], in California’s coastal
Redwood forests [127] or Glascweb to monitor glaciers in Norway [81].
The scenarios evolved and the next generation of sensor networks was able to not just
sense, but also to actuate based on the sensed data. Sometimes with a human-in-the-
loop, sometimes autonomously. Application areas are, for example, building automation
or inventory control, like the chemical drum storage management [63].
The radio interface is quite stable since the introduction of the IEEE 802.15.4 [84]
compliant radio, working on the same frequencies as wireless LAN or Bluetooth. But
there are also versions for different frequencies. More powerful nodes may use Bluetooth
or even wireless LAN as connection to the outside world, but for the majority of power
efficient platforms the IEEE 802.15.4 interface is standard.
To ease the development for the different hardware platforms, small operating systems
with basic functionality were created. One of the first and still popular ones is TinyOS
[50]. It uses its own C dialect called nesC which had some reliability issues as we
started with this work. Therefore, we used the SOS operating system [44] that was also
popular at that time and was one of the first operating systems that supported over-the-
air deployment. We moved the Scopes Framework to Contiki [27] after having stability
issues with SOS. Contiki started as research project, and has a similar large and active
community as TinyOS.
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2.1.1 Sensors, Nodes, Platforms
This section summarizes common terms in wireless sensor networks and presents a
consistent definition of them.
Definition 2.1. A Sensor Node (short node) is a small independent piece of hardware.
In its simplest form it has an MCU, a radio device and some kind of sensor system.
Additionally, sensor nodes can be equipped with flash storage or actuation devices, a
simple example is a LED. They are mostly battery powered, but can also be attached to
energy harvesting equipment [116] or a constant power supply. Sensor nodes can carry
multiple sensors and can also use different wireless connections. Sensor nodes can be
mobile or stationary.
Definition 2.2. A Base Station can be compared to a gateway in a common computer
network, as it is used to communicate with the outside world of the sensor network,
like the Internet or another network. Mostly there is only one base station in a sensor
network, but it is also possible to use multiple stations. A base station can be a common
wireless sensor node, but most of the time it is a more powerful node, or even a PC with
constant power supply.
Definition 2.3. A Wireless Sensor Network (sensor network, WSN) is a wirelessly con-
nected network of sensor nodes. If the sensor network is only built out of one hardware
platform (maybe except the network’s base station) it is called a homogeneous Wireless
Sensor Network, if different platforms are used it is called a heterogeneous Wireless Sen-
sor Network. A sensor network can contain static and mobile nodes and it is assumed
that new nodes join or existing nodes leave the network at all times.
A Wireless Sensor Actor Network (WSAN) is a wireless sensor network, where sensor
nodes not only can sense, but also actuate. The terms wireless sensor network and
wireless sensor actor network, are sometimes used as synonyms, sometimes not. Here
they are used as synonyms, as the Scopes Framework is explicitly designed to support
not only sensing nodes, but also nodes are capable of actuatuion.
Definition 2.4. A Wireless Sensor Network Application (WSN Application) describes the
overall scenario and specific goals that the application is meant to achieve. To reach
the goals an application may be divided into smaller, separate Tasks, with each task
providing a specific functionality to the overall application.
Definition 2.5. Resources in wireless sensor networks are limited goods, that may or
may not be replenished and most of the time are meant to be scarce. The most promi-
nent resources are energy, computation capacity and (wireless) network bandwidth.
Energy, most of the time supplied by batteries, is the best example for a resource that is
constantly drained and will not be replenished by itself. Network bandwidth and compu-
tational capacity, are goods that can run dry, during heavy duty periods, but are available
again afterwards. Other resources are, e.g. storage space, RAM and code memory.
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2.2 Architecture
The Scopes Framework is a modular framework that enables multitasking by bring-
ing a logical structure to the network. With the Framework, nodes are organized into
groups, which we call a scope. It is the central abstraction provided by the framework
to applications. A scope can be defined by means of a logical expression, which must be
satisfied by a node to become its member. Once a scope is created, it continues to exist
until it is explicitly removed, even as nodes fail or if they temporarily leave and rejoin.
The framework takes care of reliably maintaining the scope membership.
Scopes provide a bidirectional communication channel between the member nodes
and their sink node. The framework can operate with multiple routing algorithms. Any
routing algorithm allowing bidirectional traffic and multiple concurrent routes can be
used. Each top-level scope can be dynamically configured to use any routing algorithm;
subscopes – scopes that are embedded in another scope – inherit it implicitly. Separat-
ing the definition of a scope from the underlying routing algorithm potentially enables
scopes to span across different node platforms, and allows other optimizations through
the choice of diverse routing algorithms.
Figure 2.1: A Wireless Sensor Network with active Scopes.
2.2.1 Terms and Definitions
Next we will define some often used terms to ensure the proper definition and under-
standing of them.
2.2.1.1 Scopes
Definition 2.6. A Scope Definition is a set of properties that a sensor node has to match
to be a member of a scope. This definition is mostly a boolean expression built from
key-value pairs and a set of operators. But the definition is not limited to boolean
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expressions. By replacing the standard scope membership module by a custom one,
other kinds of definitions are possible, as long as they are representable by a byte-string.
A scope definition is transformed into a transport representation, a byte-string, to be
distributed in a WSN.
Definition 2.7. A Scope is a subset of nodes of a wireless sensor network and is defined
via the scope definition. A node can participate in a scope, iff it matches the scope’s
definition. These nodes are called scope members and can be potentially spread around
the network. Scopes can be nested, this means that scopes can be created on top of
existing scopes, these are called nested scope.
Definition 2.8. As scopes can build hierarchies, a scope’s parent scope is called its Super
Scope and there can only be one of it. Child scopes are called Subscopes and can be more
than one.
Definition 2.9. The World Scope is an implicitly defined scope. Every node in the sensor
network is member of the World Scope and does not have to evaluate a scope definition.
The World Scope is only used to create other scopes inside. Scopes on top of the World
Scope have a special meaning. They are called top-level scopes and they are the first
scopes in the hierarchy that are used by applications.
2.2.1.2 Node Roles
Definition 2.10. The scope’s Root Node is the sink of a scope. This sink receives all
messages from member nodes and sends messages to the members of a scope. It is
responsible of managing the scope. This means that it is responsible to keep the scope
alive and delete it, if requested.
Definition 2.11. A scope Member Node is a node that matches the definition of a scope
and so participates in the scope and can send/receive messages. It is also used for
routing purposes, as stated in the next definition. There can be several of them.
Definition 2.12. A scope Intermediate Node is a node that is on the routing path between
a member node and the root node, but not a member of the scope. It is used to forward
messages from the root node to member nodes or vice versa for the multi-hop commu-
nication of a WSN. This requires that all information needed for routing decisions have
to be available in the header of the routing algorithm, as the intermediate node may not
know how to parse to data area of the message.
2.2.2 Scoping
A scope is a group of sensor nodes, selected by specified properties. A Scope can be
used several times for different queries and tasks. It is created by the so called Scope
Root Node (see definition 2.10). The Scope Root Node is responsible for distributing
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the Scope Definition (see definition 2.6) to all potential members of the Scope and it
has to take care of the maintenance. The lifetime of a scope is limited by two factors.
On the one hand it is the lifetime of the root node itself, when the root node leaves
the sensor network for any reason, the node who manages the scope is removed and in
consequence the scope is removed after a period of time. On the other hand the root
node can send a message that deletes the Scope. This operation is only allowed to the
root node.
Creating hierarchies is one of the major benefits of the scoping concept and an inte-
gral part of the Scopes Framework presented here. Two notions of scopes exist in the
Framework: top-level scopes and nested scopes (see definitions 2.9 and 2.7). Top-level
scopes are created inside (or on top) of the so called World Scope (see definition 2.9),
which includes all sensor nodes in the wireless sensor network. All other scopes created
inside a top-level or nested scope are nested scopes. Scopes that are created inside the
same Super Scope (see definition 2.8) can overlap each other, depending on their Scope
Definition. This means nodes can be member of multiple of these scopes at the same
time, iff they are member of the common super scope. A new nested scope can only be
created over nodes that are member of the same super scope, so a scope cannot overlap
the boundaries of its super scope. Scopes with different super scopes are independent
of each other and rely on the limits of their super scopes, as just mentioned.
In the Scopes Framework the visibility of messages sent through a scope is limited to
the nodes participating in the scope. These are all Member Nodes (see definition 2.11)
and all Intermediate Nodes (see definition 2.12). The visibility of a scope itself, which
means knowledge about its existence, is limited to the nodes of its super scope. The
benefit of these restrictions is that messages are kept in areas where they are needed
and other areas of the network are unaffected by the traffic. This restriction is also the
first step towards security, as it avoids spreading data of a scope all over the network,
but keeping it in the regions the scope is created and used.
2.2.3 Multi-Tasking
The Scopes Framework allows the execution of multiple tasks at the same time. To
allow different tasks the Scopes Framework manages the registration of a task and the
scopes it has created. Only registered tasks are able to use the framework and can
receive messages. And only the registered task that created a scope is able to delete it.
In a sense this is a notion of ownership of a scope by its creating task. The multi-tasking
itself is provided by the underlying operating system.
2.2.4 Reusability and Reconfigurability
One major aspect in creating the Scopes Framework was to be able to reuse it in
as many scenarios as possible. We reviewed several scenarios and deployments where
WSNs are used, like the container harbor scenario or others like habitat monitoring and
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environment monitoring [77, 82, 126, 127, 140]. This led to the understanding, that
scenarios are different in the way of their specific tasks, their demand on properties
to create scopes and the use of different messaging patterns. To cope with all these
demands the Scopes Framework was created in a highly modular way, so it is easy to
replace or add modules for routing, property definition or tasks. Especially to support
different messaging patterns efficiently it was mandatory to enable support for differ-
ent routing algorithms, so that the appropriate one can be chosen for a task. Another
important objective was that after some time a WSN may be reconfigured to support
new tasks that will be added. So a possible over-the-air (OTA) exchange of modules is
important and is supported by our design. The transfer itself is handled by the life-cycle
management task (LCM task) that can be used by the root node of a scope to distribute
new modules and trigger their registration. The LCM task can also be used to delete
or update existing tasks. An efficient mechanism to distribute modules was proposed
in [39].
2.3 Layers of the Scopes Framework
The architecture of Scopes is divided into four layers, where three are shown in fig-
ure 2.2. The uppermost layer is responsible for providing a multitasking environment
and management of the task lifecycle, e.g. the memory management to provide the abil-
ity to instantiate and run multiple tasks on a sensor node. These layers are the Scope
layer and the Routing layer. The Scope layer is responsible for managing the scope
membership status and additional information of the current node. The Routing layer
manages network connections and message transfers. The lowest layer is the hardware
abstraction layer provided by the wireless sensor network operating system not shown
in figure 2.2. The operating system allows access to sensors, the network interface and
other hardware via a defined API.
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2.3.1 Application Layer
The tasks of a WSN application that have to be executed by the local node are located
on the application layer. These tasks can be preinstalled or deployed at runtime. Tasks
have three interfaces available to interact with the Scopes Framework: task, notification
and property repository API.
The task API provides the ability to register the task with Scopes, manage and use a
scope. The registration is mandatory to make the task known to the Scopes Framework.
After that it can be used to interact with a scope and may create new scopes.
The notification API notifies the task regarding changes in the node’s state of the scope.
This means the Scope Framework signals the task if it joins or leaves a scope, or if it
receives new scopes. With this information a task can decide which scope to use for
communication or it can trigger other operations.
The property repository API enables a task to provide properties to the Scopes Frame-
work via the property repository. Providing new properties to the framework has the
advantage, that the task can influence scope joins or leaves. It is also possible to read
properties, for example, latest sensor data from the framework’s repository, and retrieve
data for the tasks own usage. The naming of the properties provided here is used to cre-
ate scope definitions, referring to data of the repository. This can be important in some
scenarios, for example, if a node in the harbor scenario detected a very high tempera-
ture, it may create a scope over its neighboring nodes to detect if this data was caused
by, e.g., a fire.
2.3.2 Scope Layer
This layer hosts the scope manager module and the scope membership module. These
two maintain all information regarding scopes and decide what operations are to be
executed. The scope manager module is the center of all Scope Framework activities.
It stores all information needed for managing the scope’s life-cycle and usage. It also
tracks the state of the local node in specific scopes. These scopes may be, for example,
the scopes a node is member of, scopes that it is only a potential member of 1, and scopes
it is aware of and may act as an intermediate node.
The scope manager module has no knowledge about the content of a scope definition.
For the scope manager module to be able to decide to join a scope or not, the definition
is passed on to the scope membership module. This module can be the standard one
provided with the framework, or it can be a custom one. To easily exchange this module
there is an API, that can be implemented. Now, to get the definition for the scope, the
specification array is parsed and evaluated by the scope membership module and after
processing of the data a true or false is sent back, depending on whether the properties
could be satisfied or not.
1 The state depends on the nodes dynamic properties, for details see section 2.3.2.1
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Besides the above mentioned interface to the scope membership module, the scope
manager module provides APIs to the upper and lower layers. The APIs to the applica-
tion layer are the task API and the notification API. With the task API tasks can register
themselves with the scopes module, so they can interact with it, create or delete scopes,
and send and receive data via a scope. The notification API is used to signal changes in
known scopes or the status of scopes.
To the routing layer the scopes module also provides the notification API. It signals
the same change and status information as to the task modules. Additionally, there
are message exchange functions, so the scopes module can send and receive messages
to and from other nodes in the network. This API still uses the notion of scope id’s
to identify the target of a message. This represents some additional effort to adapt a
routing algorithm to the Scopes Framework, but it enables Scopes to have exchangeable
routing modules.
2.3.2.1 Scope-Membership
A scope is a group of sensor nodes complying with a specified scope definition. The
most important part of a specification language for the Scopes Framework is the ability
to sufficiently describe these definitions, which mostly rely on node-local properties.
The properties used in scope definitions are highly scenario dependent; that is why the
scope membership functions are separated from the rest of the scope management. This
way the scope membership functions can be easily replaced or extended, depending
on the needs of the scenario. For common operations the Scopes Framework provides a
default membership module. For more scenario specific operations it may be extended or
replaced. The standard operations provided only use node-local information for the sake
of efficiency. In a custom module information from the network or combined properties
can be used additionally for membership evaluation.
Properties can have different characteristics, static or dynamic. Dynamic properties
are very interesting, as the change of the property may lead to a reevaluation of a scope
definition. For example, it is possible that the change of the property ”Temperature”
causes the definition for a scope to be no longer fulfilled. In this case the sensor node
drops its membership. Dynamic properties are implemented to trigger a reevaluation if a
change occurs. This also means that dynamic properties are much more expensive than
static ones, as they impose much more computation overhead. Additionally, a node can
be in a third state evaluating a scope with dynamic properties in its definition. Besides
member and not member it may be a potential member of this scope. This is the case
when the static properties of the scope definition match the node’s properties and the
dynamic properties are currently not met. In contrast to the dynamic properties static
properties, such as node id or owner, are simple. These properties are set at one point
in time, e.g. before the deployment or before a new scenario is enabled in the network.
They are assumed to be stable and no reevaluation is needed.
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2.3.3 Routing Layer
On the routing layer messages are exchanged between different nodes in the network
on one side and between the network and the local scope and task modules on the
other side. Not all messages received by a node have to be forwarded to the other
layers. For example, if a node is not a member of a scope and the scope has no dynamic
properties this scope is not relevant for the local scope manager module.However, as the
node can be on the path between two members of the scope, it is important that the
routing forwards the messages. To decide how to handle an incoming message and if
the message has to be delivered locally, routing algorithms use their routing information.
Thid depends on the specific algorithm, and the information about memberships of the
local node from the notification API.
The Scopes Framework enables the use of many different routing algorithms and can
adapt to different traffic patterns with different routing modules used. The decision
which routing module to use is taken by the task that generates the traffic, this is not
done automatically. In this sense the developer of a task with special needs for its data
traffic, has to select or provide a matching routing algorithm.
As mentioned in the scopes layer section, the routing layer has two interfaces avail-
able. The notification API can be used in routing modules to link routing information to
a specific scope id, so that messages to or from a scope can be forwarded or delivered
locally. Also the notifications make it possible to clean up memory. For example, after
leaving or deleting a scope the corresponding routing information may be obsolete and
memory can be freed. The message exchange API is used to deliver messages from the
outside to the local scope manager module and for sending messages to the network.
2.4 Scope Specification
Specifying a scope definition is highly dependent on the scenario. Properties used in
the two scenarios proposed in the introduction are also quite different. While in the
container harbor scenario properties are related to content or owner; in the emergency
response scenario it is more about locations and endangerments. But there are also
other properties possible, like restricted areas where it is allowed to enter or not. Most
of these properties are representable by a key-value pair and can be combined to a
boolean expression to define a scope.
To be able to also support definitions that use more complex expressions or scenario
specific operations, we leave the decision about the scope definition to the scope mem-
bership module shown above. External applications can resort to the default language
described below to create scopes or to scenario specific extensions. Such expressions are
parsed and flattened into a pre-order network format specifically designed for sensor
networks. This format is descriptive enough to accommodate the necessary expressions,
yet compact enough to typically fit in one network message. In-network applications can
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also construct scopes by resorting to this predefined byte-string format. Any arbitrary
node can be used to create a scope, however in practice we observe mostly two cases for
scope creation. Scopes created from gateway nodes have global and permanent charac-
ter. Regular nodes in most cases create localized neighborhood scopes for tasks such as
event detection.
2.4.1 Scope Definition Language
The declarative language shown in figure 2.3 defines the available range of scope def-
initions and includes expressions to create and delete scopes. The basic constructs are
shown here, for the version with extended operations see [41]. Scopes can be defined
based on static properties, e.g. the owner of a container, or on dynamic properties,
e.g. the content of a container. We exemplify the most important constructs within the
container harbor scenario, the used scope definitions are shown in figure 2.4. Imagine
we want to define a scope ferdexMotion over containers from company Ferdex that
have been dropped or otherwise shaken above a defined threshold, here 3g. An appli-
cation running on this scope can, for instance, report the id and position of the member
nodes. ferdexMotion is satisfiable by nodes with a 3D-acceleration sensor, whose val-
ues are greater than the given threshold, and the user-defined variable company equals
ferdex. Properties included in an expression may have a more static (e.g., company) or
dynamic (e.g., accel_{x,y,z}) nature. Dynamic properties are very powerful, but their
use is expensive since every change results in a re-evaluation of the scope membership
expression.
Finally, scopes can be nested and therefore form a hierarchy. Nested scopes specialize a
scope definition by implicitly restricting the membership condition of their parent-scope.
For example, if a scope dhll is defined over all nodes belonging to company DHLL, the
scope dhllCooling could specialize it by selecting those nodes attached to a cooling
container. The latter can then be used to monitor the temperatures and regulate them
correspondingly. Conceptually speaking, nesting scopes contributes clearer definitions
and a better organization. Technically, they reduce the communication overhead thus
improving the performance and the energy efficiency.
2.5 Scopes Network Behavior
Now that we know the details of the Scopes Framework’s layers and how to specify
a scope definition, we will have a closer look at the network-wide behavior of a scope.
This behavior is the same for all scopes and independent of each other.
The lifecycle of a scope has three different phases. First, the creation phase, where
the scope is established by distributing its definition and the joining of nodes to it. The
second phase is the maintenance phase or usage phase. Here tasks can use the scope to
send messages to member nodes or member nodes back to the root node. In this phase
the framework maintains a scope, so that it is kept alive and joining or leaving nodes are
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CREATE SCOPE ferdexMotion AS (
company = ‘Ferdex’ AND
EXISTS SENSOR Acceleration3D AND
(accel_x > 3.0 OR
accel_y > 3.0 OR
accel_z > 3.0) );
CREATE SCOPE dhll (
company = ’DHLL’ ) ;
CREATE SCOPE dhllCooling (
EXISTS SENSOR Temperature AND
containerType = cooling
) AS SUBSCOPE OF dhll;
Figure 2.4: Scope declarative definitions
handled properly. At the end is the deletion phase. This phase can be triggered in two
ways: the command to delete a scope is explicitly called from a task, or if the periodic
keep-alive refresh is stopped, it is triggered after a timeout. In this phase the scope is
deleted and all resources that were kept for management are freed.
2.5.1 Creation Phase
The scope creation phase starts with sending the first scope creation request and ends
with all nodes in the network that match the scope definition becomming members of
the scope.
When a scope is created from a task, figure 2.5, first a scope creation request (SCR) is
sent to all possible members. Which nodes are possible members depends on the parent
scope of the new scope. Is it created on top of the World Scope the SCR is delivered
to all nodes in the sensor network, as it can not be known in advance which nodes will
participate in the scope. Is the new scope created as part of another scope the SCR is
disseminated through the super scope to all members of this scope.
If an SCR is received by a node the scope of the SCR is added to the scope table of that
node, if the scope definition contains dynamic properties that have to be monitored,
or if the node becomes member of the scope by fulfilling the static properties. Is the
node becoming a member it will join the scope. Also if a scope definition with dynamic
properties is fulfilled the node joins the scope. Does the evaluation of the dynamic
properties, now or later, not match the definition it will leave the scope. The scope will
still be added to the routing table as it may later match the dynamic properties.
The routing algorithm is notified about state changes of a scope. The states are added,
a scope is just added to the scopes table, or joined, the node is member of a scope.
The added state is used by the routing modules to do all necessary steps to establish a
connection with the root node of the scope, so messages can be exchanged. Messages
in a scope are not yet delivered to the local tasks unless the node joins the scope. In the
added state the node can evaluate dynamic properties and act as intermediate node. If
the stat is joined, messages can be delivered locally.
When the scope management module receives an SCR some checks are done to decide
if the node is member of this scope. You can see this in figure 2.6. The first checks make
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Figure 2.5: Scope Creation Message Sequence
sure that the message was received the proper way. It is checked if the specified super
scope is known and if the node is member of it. The next step checks if the module
handles an SCR or a scope refresh (see next section, 2.5.2), here we will go on with the
SCR tree. For an SCR it is then checked if the target task is registered and available. If
these steps are all answered positive the scope definition is evaluated. Does the node
match the definition it adds the scope to the scope table and joins it. Does it not match
the criteria, but the scope definition contains dynamic properties, the scope is just added
to the internal scope table. If neither is the case the node ends the processing of the SCR.
2.5.2 Maintenance Phase
The maintenance phase starts after the initial creation of the scope and ends either
when the scope is deleted from the root node, or no refreshes are sent to the scope and
so the time-to-live for the scope ends.
After the establishment of a scope it can be used to exchange data. Data can be sent
from the root node of the scope to the member nodes or from the members to the root
node. To maintain the scope in a working state in regular intervals Scope Refresh (SR)
messages are sent by the scope’s root node. These intervals can be configured and are
one of the design parameters of a sensor network that uses the Scopes Framework.
The cause for regularly sending SRs is to handle nodes joining or leaving the WSN,
where a node can leave a scope intentionally or as result of a failure. Handling new
nodes in the network with SRs is similar to the SCR, therefore the SR is also sent via
the super scope. If a SR is received the scope definition is evaluated and the node
20 2 The Scopes Framework
 act Scope Creation
Scope 
creation 
request
Drop message
Add and join new 
scope
Add new scope Reset scope timer Delete scope
«datastore»
ScopesTable
(from Scopes Manager Module)
«datastore»
SubscriberTable
(from Scopes Manager Module)
For the checks data from 
these tables is used.
[else]
[Superscope known]
[Member of superscope]
[New scope: creation]
[Target task registered]
[Membership check passed] [Scope has dynamic properties]
[else]
[else]
[Scope nested in superscope]
[Scope known: refresh]
[else]
[else]
[else]
[else]
[Membership check passed]
Figure 2.6: Scope Creation Workflow
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may join the scope or not. Handling leaving or failing nodes results in reevaluating the
routing path to possibly reconnect interrupted paths. How to do that depends on the
used routing algorithm. But the SR can be used as trigger for this reevaluation.
Basically SRs are SCRs, but for SRs two different kinds of messages are possible. A full
SR includes the same data as an SCR and is the standard case. It combines all the header
data plus the scope definition. A simple SR only consists of the header information.
Of course there is a difference in functionality of the two refresh messages. The full
SR can be used to help with new nodes in the network and also with leaving or failing
nodes. The simple refresh cannot integrate new nodes into the network, this is obvious
as the scope definition is missing in this message. But still it can keep the network alive
and can trigger the renewal of the routing path as nodes that already know the scope
have stored the scope definition and so can use the simple refresh message like a full
SR. We introduced this mechanism to reduce the load that a full SR may introduce to
an intensively used network or if a large scope definition is used. For a large scope
definition the difference between a full and a simple SR can be like a few bytes vs. some
100 bytes, as we will see after introducing our security measures.
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Figure 2.7: Scope Maintenance Workflow – detail
The detail shown in figure 2.7 is known from the SCR processing in figure 2.6. So we
concentrate on the new sub tree. After taking the decision that the received message is
a SR, it is checked if the parent scope of the scope to be refreshed is the same, so we can
be sure that we update the correct scope. For a full SR the scope definition is evaluated
and if necessary the scope status changed. If the status changed the routing, tasks are
notified about this change. If the node is a member of the scope its time-to-live counter
is reset. This counter is further explained in the next section, 2.5.3.
Besides the maintenance part, in this phase the scope is operational for its actual
job: the message exchange. Since the actual exchange highly depends on the algorithm
used, be it a gossiping-, tree- or mesh-approach, the mechanisms how tasks get to send
messages and how they receive them are defined in the Scopes Framework.
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Before a message is handed over to the routing module it is checked if it is valid
and can be transmitted, see figure 2.8(a). Therefore, the task that tries to send the
message has to be registered and the scope the message is sent to has to be known to
the framework and the node has to be a member. Is one of the previous checks negative,
the message is not handed to the routing module and dropped. To receive a message,
it is handed from the routing module to the scope manager module and here we also
apply the previously mentioned checks, but with the difference that we have to filter
the intended target of the message first, member node or root node, see figure 2.8(b).
After the look-up of the scope and if the node is member in this scope, it depends on
the intended target of the message how it is further processed. If it is for all member
nodes of the scope, it is only checked that the receiving task is properly registered and
then the message is delivered. Is the message targeted at the scope’s root node, first it
is checked that the local node is the creator of the scope and then after the registration
of the receiving task is assured it is delivered. As seen before with sending a message, if
any of the above checks is negative the message is dropped and not delivered to a task.
2.5.3 Deletion Phase
The deletion phase starts with the task that created the scope on the root node issuing
the deletion command, or if the time-to-live counter of a scope runs out because of not
receiving any SRs. The expiration of the counter can occur because of, e.g., physical
problems with the wireless network, or the loss of the deletion message in the network
after a regular deletion and no SRs being sent anymore by the former root node.
As just mentioned, a scope can be deleted in two different ways. First, the root node
of a scope sends a deletion message to all members of the scope. In this case the scope
is deleted instantly and the used resources are freed. To reach also nodes that are just
potential members because they do not meet dynamic properties, the deletion message
is sent like a data message through the super scope. With the deletion of a scope also all
its subscopes are recursively deleted.
The second way is, that for some reason no SRs are received by a node for a con-
figurable time. This scope time-to-live (TTL) is also one of the Framework’s design
parameters. If no SR is received before the TTL expires, the scope is assumed to be
dead. This means that there is no route to the scope root node or the root node itself has
left the scope. In principle this means that no one is interested in the data transmitted
via the scope and so it can be deleted safely to save resources. When the TTL runs out
it is deleted as if a deletion message was received and resources are freed without any
further notice to other nodes in the network.
If a deletion message is received by a node, it is checked by the scope manager to
determine if it is a valid deletion message. If it is valid the scope is deleted. This check
is depicted in figure 2.9 and does some sanity checks if the scope to be deleted is valid
by checking scope and super scope, and if the message was sent from the root node of
the scope.
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Figure 2.8: Scope Data Exchange Workflow
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Security is an important concern for WSNs.
For the Scopes Framework we identified two major security issues. First, access control
based on the properties of the scope’s definition is a mandatory step to ensure only
authorized nodes join a scope. Second, a secure group communication is needed to
allow confidentiality and integrity in data exchange. Therefore, the secure distribution
of a group key has to be supported. All this has to be integrated in a way that takes the
distributed nature of the Scopes Framework into account.
In the following the security assumptions and models used are defined and after that
the security architecture introduced into the Scopes Framework is described. In the end
the security integration points within the framework are explained and shown in detail.
But first, we will show a short introduction to security, the algorithms used and the
theory behind it.
3.1 Prerequisites
3.1.1 Security Algorithms
Today security is an important issue and it gets increasing attention. But security is
also a question of trust. The user has to trust the manufacturer of, for example, an
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embedded device that secure algorithms are used and implemented correctly. Often se-
curity is achieved by using proprietary solutions or just as ’security by obscurity’. Proven
secure (open source) solutions are available. This does not mean that open source is
always better than closed source, but it opens the security design for review by everyone
who is interested, which can lead to a more robust security and increased trust.
Today more and more flaws in security designs and algorithms are discovered and
embedded systems are becoming targets for industrial espionage. With this in mind,
security patterns in embedded systems that are based on hiding system details and not
really implementing security are obsolete, as more and more often embedded systems
are deployed unattended. This thread is getting even worse for WSNs as they are meant
to work in distant areas or depending on the scenario may be just dropped at a remote
location [67].
Security goals that have to be achieved by a system are quite different as they often
depend on the usage scenario. But the possible goals are common over all computing
systems. Still, they may have different characteristics on different computing systems,
for example, data secrecy on a wired network may be achieved by restricting physical
access to the infrastructure, where data secrecy in a wireless network cannot be achieved
by these measures. In [19,135] a set of security goals related to WSNs are presented. Se-
curity goals are not only relevant for a whole security design, but also for the algorithms
used by it. Therefore, we will take a closer look at possible security goals.
Authentication ensures that when a node communicates with one of its peer nodes, this
peer node is the one it pretends to be.
Authorization enables only authorized nodes to access other network nodes or re-
sources.
Availability ensures that network services are at the disposal of authorized parties, even
though denial-of-service attacks are carried out.
Freshness describes how current a message or key is. A system that ensures this security
goal has to make sure that a node always gets the most recent message or key. Also
replaying of messages has to be prevented.
Integrity ensures that data is not altered while transported from sender to receiver. This
includes accidental and intended alteration.
Non-repudiation prevents a node from denying to have sent a message.
Secrecy or Confidentiality ensures that the content of a message is kept secret. This
means that only authorized nodes can access the data and an eavesdropper is pre-
vented from reading the message. For WSNs with high churn rates also forward
and backward secrecy are important security goals. Forward secrecy ensures that a
leaving node cannot access any future messages and backward secrecy that a new
joining node cannot access content of messages before joining.
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A common approach to secure a data connection between two parties is to use cryptog-
raphy. There are two types of basic cryptographic protocols, symmetric and asymmetric
cryptography.
Symmetric algorithms use the same key on both ends of the communication channel
to encrypt and decrypt a message. The advantage of symmetric algorithms is that you
need quite small key-sizes to get good cryptographic strength. But as on both sides the
same key is used, there has to be a second secure channel to transmit the key from one
end to the other. For WSNs symmetric cryptography is a good choice, as most of the
sensor node platforms already have hardware blocks for symmetric cryptography. To
get the symmetric key to the decrypting entity is a hard problem, as the key has to be
transmitted via the unsecured wireless connection as a second channel. To secure the
symmetric key in transit, asymmetric approaches are used.
Asymmetric algorithms do not need a second secure channel to transmit their keys, as
in this scheme a public/private key-pair is used. The private part stays at the receiver
of a message and the public part can be made available to everyone who is interested
to send a message to the receiver. The message can then be encrypted with the public
key and only the holder of the private key can decrypt the message. For sensor networks
there are two problems using asymmetric cryptography. On the one hand there may be
not enough space to store all public keys for all other nodes in a larger network. With
nodes leaving and joining the network updating this database on every node would not
be feasible. On the other hand there could be a public key infrastructure (PKI) to manage
and make keys available on demand, but this introduces more traffic inside the sensor
network and it removes the strength of an ad-hoc network to just deploy new nodes and
self-configuring the network.
It seems natural for WSNs to use symmetric cryptography for message encryption. In
our approach we introduce dynamic groups based on properties to have a secure way
to distribute the encryption key. We use attribute-based encryption (ABE) schemes, that
were previously only used on systems larger than WSN nodes. ABE is based on elliptic
curve cryptography (ECC) and pairing in elliptic curves. Therefore, we will explain the
basics of ABE and the used ABE scheme in the next chapters.
3.1.1.1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography
This subsection is taken from [45] and will briefly introduce elliptic curve cryptogra-
phy (ECC).
ECC is an asymmetric cryptographic scheme and is based on the elliptic curve discrete
logarithm problem (ECDLP) in a finite cyclic group.
First we clarify what a group is: An abelian group (G,∗) consists of a set G and a binary
operation ∗ : G× G→ G satisfying these properties:
1. (Associativity) a ∗ (b ∗ c) = (a ∗ b) ∗ c for all a, b, c ∈ G.
2. (Commutativity) a ∗ b = b ∗ a for all a, b ∈ G.
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3. (Existence of identity) There exists an element e ∈ G such that a ∗ e = e ∗ a = a for
all a ∈ G.
4. (Existence of inverse) For each a ∈ G, there exists an element b ∈ G, called the
inverse of a, such that a ∗ b = b ∗ a = e.
The group operation is typically called addition (+) or multiplication (·). For the
addition as operation, the group is called additive group, with identity element denoted
by 0, and inverse element of a denoted by −a. In case of multiplication as operation the
group is called multiplicative group, with identity element denoted by 1, and the inverse
element of a denoted by a−1. The group is finite if G is a finite set, in which case the
number of elements in G is called the order of G. The tripple (Fp,+, ·) is a finite field
denoted further Fp.
If you have a finite additive group G of order n and g ∈ G, the smallest positive integer
t with t · g = 1 is called the order of g, where t · g denotes t times adding g. t always
exists and is a divisor of n. The set 〈g〉= {t · g|0≤ i ≤ t−1} of all powers of g is itself a
group under the same operation as G. This is called a cyclic subgroup of G generated by
g. The same is true for multiplicative groups. Has G an element g of order n, then G is
a cyclic group and g is called a generator of G.
With the group definition as basis we define an elliptic curve E over Fp as
y2 = x3+ ax + b
where a, b ∈ Fp satisfy 4a3+ 27b2 6≡ 0 (mod p), p is a prime number and Fp is the field
of integers modulo p. A pair (x , y) with x , y ∈ Fp is a point on the curve if it satisfies
the given equation. The set of all points on E is denoted by E(Fp). The point at infinity
∞ is also said to be on the curve E. The set of (p, E, P,n), with E being an elliptic curve
over Fp, P being a point on the curve and n the prime order of P, are called the domain
parameters of an elliptic curve.
There are well known methods to add two points on an elliptic curve (x1, y1) and
(x2, y2) to get a third one. The set of points E(Fp) forms with this addition method an
additive abelian group with the infinity element ∞ as identity. A cyclic sub group of
these elliptic curve groups can be used to define a discrete logarithm system.
Given the public domain parameters (p, E, P,n) of an elliptic curve, an integer d se-
lected at random from the interval [1,n−1] is denoted the private key of a public/private
key-pair. The corresponding public key is Q = dP. The problem of determining d from
the given domain parameters and Q is the ECDLP. The hardness of this problem ensures
security of elliptic curve cryptography. To solve this problem algorithms like number
field sieve (NFS) [37, 104] or Pollards rho algorithm [103] are used. To ensure secu-
rity choosing good domain parameters is vital. Therefore, a set of curve parameters
expected to be secure are published by the industry consortium SECG [121] and recom-
mendations regarding key sizes to be used can be found on the following Website [9],
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where a set of recommendation papers from different organizations are compared. The
largest ECDLP instance solved as of today is from 2015 and it was solved over a 113bit
binary field [139].
Compared to other public key crypto systems like RSA, ECC has the advantage to
reach a high security level with rather small key sizes. A key of 160bit ECC correlates
to a 1024bit RSA key, or 512bit ECC correlate to 15,360bit RSA. Besides the key size
itself the reduction of computation is the actual win. Computing 160bit mathematical
operations save a lot compared to 1024bit operations [43]. As the reachable security
levels and performance is as requested, the question for functionality remains. The typ-
ical operations for a public key system are key exchange, signage and encryption, and
for all these ECC has a counterpart, e.g. elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), ellip-
tic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) and elliptic curve integrated encryption
scheme (ECIES).
The public key approach aims at one-to-one communication. A sender encrypts a
message for a specific receiver. There are approaches to let a message have multiple
recipients, but they are not what we are looking for in WSNs. We want to use an
encrypted group establishment where an unknown number of nodes can decrypt the
group creation to possibly join the group. This is not feasible with classic public/private
key approaches, but there are new approaches like Attribute-based Encryption (ABE)
that allow this pattern. It is based on pairings in elliptic curves, so we will have a look
at them in the next chapter.
3.1.1.2 Pairing on Elliptic Curves
A good introduction to pairings (and bilinear maps) is [7] from Bethencourt, which
we will summarize.
In 1993 pairings were first used in cryptography, but at that time they were used to
break ECC crypto by reducing the ECDLP to the DLP in finite fields. The first use in a
cryptographic protocol was in 2000 for a 3-party Diffie-Hellman by Joux [59], followed
by the first practical identity-based encryption scheme by Boneh and Welsh [10] in 2001.
This is the predecessor of attribute-based encryption, that we will discuss in the next
section.
Bilinear maps are also called pairings because they associate elements from one cyclic
group G to elements of another such group Gt . Bilinear maps are defined over two input
groups G1,G2, but most of the time these groups are the same.
1 This group G is also
mostly an elliptic curve or a sub group of it. Gt is a finite field. Now, a bilinear map from
G× G to Gt is a function e : G× G→ Gt such that for all u,v ∈ G; a, b,∈ Z,
e(ua,v b) = e(u,v )ab.
1 This is the way it is also used in the algorithm in this work.
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One additional condition that we assume is that being g a generator of G the map e(g, g)
generates Gt .
Bilinear maps can be computed with the Tate or Weil pairing, while the Tate pairing
is normally faster. These algorithms are computationally expensive and very complex.
This is why we skip details about them at this point. For our system we used the Tate
pairing for performance reasons.
Concerning security: using these algorithms makes it mandatory to ensure that the
elliptic curve, or its mapped finite field, has a bit-size that is assumed secure. On the
previously mentioned website [9] are also recommendations for the finite field size.
In the following we will show encryption algorithms that are based on pairings in
elliptic curves.
3.1.1.3 Attribute Based Encryption
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) evolved from identity-based encryption (IBE) which
was first mentioned by Shamir [117]. The IBE crypto system uses a public/private key
approach, where the public key is the user’s identity. Here almost everything that
uniquely identifies the user can be chosen as public key, e.g. email address, name
and postal address or a phone number. A key generation center then generates from
the identity and a secret seed the private key that the user can use to decrypt messages
or sign emails, like a regular public key crypto system. But there is no Infrastructure
needed to distribute the public keys as they are implicitly given by the identity of the
receiver. Sahai et.al. introduced fuzzy IBE [113], an IBE system that can cope with
small deviations of an identity, like they are common in reading biometric attributes.
Additionally, they propose a second use case for fuzzy IBE as so called attribute-based
encryption. Here not the identity is used, but a set of attributes that have to match with
the private key to be able to decrypt a message.
There are two well known ABE schemes, ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption
(CP-ABE) [8] from Bethencourt et. al. and key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-
ABE) [38] from Goyal et. al. . CP-ABE uses the same approach proposed for fuzzy IBE.
By encrypting a message under an access structure that tells which attributes are needed
to be able to decrypt the message and having private keys with a set of attributes that
have to match the access structure used for encryption to decrypt a message. KP-ABE in
contrast uses a reverse approach. Here the message has a set of attributes and the private
key contains an access structure where is stated which attributes can be decrypted. For
our approach we chose the scheme of Bethencourt et. al., which is explained in detail in
the next section.
Ciphertext Policy – Attribute Based Encryption
As mentioned above we were looking for a security algorithm that works well in a
distributed environment and nicely integrates with our scopes property structure. With
the elliptic curve based ciphertext policy – attribute based encryption (CP-ABE) proposed
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by Bethencourt et al. in [8] we are able to provide secret keys associated with a set of
attributes. These are used on the sensor nodes to decrypt matching ciphertexts. And we
gain ciphertexts associated with a policy which is used to specify an access structure that
needs to be fulfilled by a node to decrypt the message.
In [150] another ABE scheme is proposed for the use in wireless sensor networks, key
policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE). In KP-ABE the secret keys have an access
policy and the ciphertext includes properties. This is used for fine grained access control
to sensor data. For our framework this is not suitable, as we need the access structure
with the ciphertext and properties on the keys. In this sense KP-ABE works the wrong
direction as we need it, in contrast CP-ABE works the way we need it. How this is applied
to the Scopes Framework will be shown later in this chapter.
Bethencourt et al. defined five basic operations in CP-ABE of which we implemented
four: setup, key generation, encryption and decryption. The fifth operation is used to gen-
erate a sub key of a given secret key with a restricted set of attributes, which is not used
in our Framework. In the following we describe the four implemented operations and
show the parameters of the different keys and the ciphertext. For an in-deep explanation
of the parameters, refer to [8].
Setup. The setup does not take any input. It does select a bilinear group G0 with prime
order p with generator g and two random exponents α,β . With the given elliptic
curve parameter list it generates the public parameters PK and a master key MK.
e(...) is the pairing operation.
PK = 〈G0, g,h= gβ , e(g, g)α〉
MK = 〈β , gα〉
Key Generation. The key generation takes the master key MK and a set of attributes S
with a chosen random r and r j for each attribute, and computes a matching secret
key SK. The secret key SK includes each attribute from S with a corresponding
component needed for the decryption process.
SK = 〈D = g(α+r)/β ,∀ j ∈ S : D j = g r ·H( j)r j ,D′j = g r j〉
Encryption. The encryption takes as parameters the public parameters PK, a message
M and an access policy A with a set of attributes and Y as set of leaf nodes of A.
The message M will be encrypted to the ciphertext CT in a way that only with a
matching secret key SR which satisfies the policy A it can be decrypted. The cipher
text CT contains implicitly the specified access policy.
CT = 〈A, C˜ = Me(g, g)αs,C = hs,∀y ∈ Y : Cy = gqy (0),C ′y = H(att(y))qy (0)〉
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Figure 3.1: CP-ABE Access Policy: Threshold Gates with three elements
Decryption. The decryption takes the public parameters PK, a ciphertext CT including
an access policy A and a secret key SK which represents a set S of attributes. If
the attributes of secret key SR satisfy the access policy A, the ciphertext CT will be
decrypted and the message M will be returned.
The above mentioned access policy in the CT is created using a tree structure that an
SK with the associated attributes has to satisfy to be able to decrypt. The tree is built by
so called threshold gates, for an example see figure 3.1, where each interior node is a
threshold gate and each leaf in the tree is associated to an attribute of the policy. With
threshold gates it is quite easy to model ’AND’ or ’OR’, e.g. 2of2 or 1of2. Numerical
attributes can be achieved by exploding the numerical value to its bit representation
and have one attribute representing one bit. Together with the threshold gate approach,
comparisons like <,>,=,≤ and ≥ can be modeled. Now, to be able to decrypt a cipher-
text there has to be an assignment of attributes from the SK to nodes of the tree such
that the threshold gates are satisfied. This can be efficiently evaluated and if the tree is
satisfied, the computation to retrieve the message M is executed.
CP-ABE is collusion resistant; this is typical in attribute based encryption [38, 113].
It means that an adversary can obtain as many SKs as he wants, as long as he does
not obtain a key that decrypts the message by itself. With the obtained keys he is not
able to successfully decrypt the CT. A general problem that comes with attribute based
encryption is key revocation [10,117], since the encrypting sender cannot verify that an
encrypted message can only be decrypted by a non-revoked receiver and with CP-ABE
there may be many secret keys that match a given policy. Bethencourt et al. refers here
to a possible solution to include expiring attributes in the secure key attributes. In [150]
a key update mechanism is proposed for a different ABE system. As we were able to
introduce the idea in CP-ABE, see section 3.3, the mechanism will now be described in
more detail.
Revocation via key update
The key update mechanism was proposed for key policy attribute-based encryption
(KP-ABE) [38], which is related to CP-ABE. In the KP-ABE extended by the revocation
algorithm from [150] the basic idea is to exchange the parameter y in the MK, PK and
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SK with a new value. As the parameter is also used in the ciphertext it can only be
decrypted with a matching access policy and the respective y . The keys in KP-ABE are
defined like2
MK = 〈y, t1, · · · , t|N |,β〉,
PK = 〈G1, g, e(g, g)y , {Ti = g ti}i∈N , gβ〉,
SK = 〈g y−θβ , {Di = g
qi(0)
ti }i∈L〉.
Most of the parameters look familiar compared to CP-ABE. The important entries for
key update are y from MK, e(g, g)y from PK and g
y−θ
β from SK.
Now, to update the keys a new y ′ is chosen, which replaces the value of y in MK. In
PK e(g, g)y , y is also directly replaced by e(g, g)y
′
. The SKs are a bit different, as the
y in g
y−θ
β has to be replaced. To do this first the term g
y′−y
β is computed and after a
multiplication with the old term the result is g
y′−θ
β . This last step has to be done at all
SK holders that are not to be revoked. This also means that only authorized holders
of secret keys have to get the g
y′−y
β and SK holders that have to be revoked should be
excluded in the distribution of the update term.
◊
In general, memory is a rare resource on sensor nodes regardless of flash or RAM
space. To reduce the code needed on an individual node, we can limit the functionality
depending on the use case of a node. A sensor node in the WSN has always to be
able to decrypt messages. So, decryption has to be available on all sensor nodes in the
network. Encryption has to be available on all nodes that may create a new scope to be
able to encrypt a new scope creation request. Setup and key generation of the CP-ABE
algorithm should take place outside the sensor network. This way the master key can
be kept outside the network, which is important to security, as no one can retrieve the
master key to generate arbitrary keys.
3.1.2 Security in Wireless Sensor Networks
Security in WSNs is an important issue, as all data is transmitted through the wire-
less broadcast medium and messages can be received over a wide area. This scenario
includes a wide variety of potential thread areas, like key management, cryptography,
secure routing, secure data fusion and other issues [19]. Compared to computer net-
works there are many common concerns, but with a different view on the topics. This is
due to the differences of the environment in WSNs and common networks. Besides the
medium, cable vs. wireless, the resources are very different. From power from a wall
2 The equations of KP-ABE keys and the revocation algorithm were taken from [150].
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socket vs. battery power to server-size computers vs. embedded hardware with some
MHz computing power.
One of the basic concerns about security is to encrypt data to store or transmit it in
a secure way. For a personal computer this is in principle a solved case. There are
plenty of algorithms that may get insecure over time, be it because of design flaws
or because of raw computing power that reduce the effectiveness of the algorithms’
basic mathematical problem. Even special hardware add-ons for computers are available
for commonly used cryptographic algorithms to unload the cpu from computation. Of
course, there are replacement algorithms that are better suited to the new advances in
their surrounding, but they have to be implemented and deployed on systems in the
field before they can enhance security.
On a sensor node (and for embedded systems) there are different ways to get algo-
rithms included. First, adding a custom chip or FPGA to the sensor node to do the
computations, like in PC systems add-on cards are used, but on a much more integrated
level. Second, a cryptographic function block inside a microcontroller, that enables a
specific algorithm. Or, third, a software implementation that is running on the mi-
crocontroller. On a sensor node mostly one of the last two options are found, or a
combination of both, as the function blocks available on microcontrollers are most of
the time symmetric algorithms with basic functionality. To prevent problems with key
exchange of the symmetric key, asymmetric algorithms may be used to share the key
for the function blocks. The type of algorithm is very important for feasibility in WSNs.
Generally speaking the use of symmetric cryptographic algorithms, this means the same
key is used on both sides, puts less load on a microcontroller than an asymmetric al-
gorithm, e.g. using a public/private key pair, given the same cryptographic strength.
Asymmetric algorithms are normally executed by the cpu, so the small symmetric key
is transferred using the asymmetric cryptography and the symmetric algorithm is then
used for the larger data to be exchanged.
Besides using asymmetric cryptography, there are also specific key management pro-
tocols in WSNs that reduce the computational load for the sensor node and ensure the
secure key distribution in the network. A common approach is to deploy different kinds
of keys on sensor nodes to establish different kinds of security domains. So, a rout-
ing algorithm may establish pair-wise keys to secure the data transmission between
neighboring nodes. Alternatively it can establish group keys, e.g. for local clusters, a
neighborhood or for all backbone nodes. This has the advantage that less storage is
consumed for storing keys and sensor nodes can communicate with a larger number of
nodes. But as a drawback, if one of the keys is compromised the communication of a
larger group of nodes is accessible to the adversary. The larger the group a key is dis-
tributed to, the larger is the risk that a key gets compromised. As the key is stored in
more sensor nodes it has a larger possibility to be retrieved by an adversary that compro-
mised a node in the field. Key management protocols can use quite different approaches
with probabilistic or deterministic characteristics. A probabilistic approach preloads a
different set of keys to every node in the sensor network from a global set of keys. The
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distribution and the number of keys are chosen based on the probability to enable com-
munication between two neighboring nodes, as the two nodes must have the same key.
In contrast, a deterministic approach ensures that two nodes have corresponding keys.
E.g., LEAP [153], Localized Encryption and Authentication Protocol, provides four dif-
ferent keys, each one for a different kind of communication pattern found in WSNs. The
keys are a group key that is shared with all other nodes in the network to send broadcast
messages, a cluster key shared with neighboring nodes grouping to a cluster, a pairwise
key shared with another node for one-to-one communication and a key shared with the
base station.
Secure routing algorithms use a wide variety of well known cryptographic methods
to achieve different security goals. Besides encryption of plain texts and decryption of
cipher texts, the computation of hash functions or message authentication codes (MAC)
are common building blocks of these algorithms. Also the different modes of operation of
cryptographic algorithms, like cipher block chaining (CBC) or counter mode (CTR), are
commonly used. [62] One of the first secure routing algorithms in WSNs is SPINS [98].
It consists of two components that provide authentication (µTESLA) and data confi-
dentiality and data freshness (SNEP). With these it provides an authenticated routing
protocol. It employs a symmetric block cypher to retrieve stream encryption/decryption
and a MAC to achieve its security goals.
A problem for secure routing is the operation of aggregation. It is very popular in
WSNs, as it enables saving of communication bandwidth and energy by reducing the
amount of data to be transferred. If data is requested, e.g. by the base station, data
aggregation takes the data from a node’s neighbors and combines it with its own data
to a new value. This combination can be done by mathematical or statistical functions,
like simple adding or computing an average. In general there are two choices in a WSN
where a secure routing scheme is deployed for applying aggregation. The encrypted
data can be decrypted, then the aggregation function can be applied to the plain text
of the data values and afterwards the data gets encrypted again. This is a very simple
approach that can be used in almost every encryption scheme. This approach makes
it mandatory to have every decryption key available on a node that may be used by
encrypted data passing this node. Otherwise it may not be possible to compute an
aggregation value. Deploying many keys on a single node increases the risk of physical
attacks on a sensor node. A more advanced way to apply aggregation functions is to
apply it on the ciphertext of the data [36]. This uses properties of special encryption
algorithms that match transformations on a ciphertext to the encrypted plain text data.
This means the same transformations that were applied to the ciphertext are applied
to the encrypted plaintext value, so after decryption the transformed value is obtained.
This provides the advantage that no decryption key has to be distributed in the WSN
to allow aggregation. This saves transmission bandwidth and keeps the number of keys
distributed in a WSN at a low number.
In WSNs a broad range of attacks can be encountered. Besides brute force attacks like
Denial of Service (DoS), where a network is flooded with artificial data and legitimate
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requests get dropped because of the mass of other data, or jamming of the wireless
medium also more specific attacks can be observed. We will discuss a selected set of
attacks occurring in WSNs.
A Sybil attack is carried out by a node claiming multiple identities to the rest of the
network [90]. This may be used in geographic routing where a node claims to be located
in several locations and attract more traffic to himself thus enabling the node to monitor
traffic traveling in different areas.
To execute a wormhole attack usually two colluding nodes in different areas of the
WSN are needed. Then messages from one side of the network are forwarded via a
low-latency link to the colluding node, where the messages are replayed. This attack is
used to fake that these two areas are close to each other.
A node compromise is the basis of many other attacks. With a node compromise an
adversary gains low level access to a sensor node. This may be done via physical access
and a programming tool or via the network and the ability to inject code to take over the
node. Compromising a node can have the goal to retrieve data stored on a node like a
cryptographic key or to reuse the node’s hardware and to reprogram the node with code
from the adversary.
A node replication attack has the goal to clone an existing sensor node in the network.
The cloned node is placed in a way that it can react faster than the original node to net-
work requests. Then the new node can take over all the communication of the original
one. The cloned node may damage the WSN by misbehavior or by retrieving confidential
data addressed to the original node.
Therefore, we discuss common security problems and challenges in the next sec-
tion and related cryptographic libraries and security frameworks are shown later in
section 5.5.
3.1.2.1 Problems and Challenges
There are several articles regarding problems and challenges in WSNs [96, 97, 135].
They all refer to the same basic problem classes.
First, the scarce resources. The limitations in computing power, storage and memory
not only force the application code of a WSN to be small, it also mandates limitations to
security algorithms, as there have to be enough resources left to operate the nodes’ orig-
inal tasks. Another important limiting factor is power consumption. Transmitting data
or doing heavy computations pushes the energy consumption to levels where a battery
may be drained after some hours, which demands light weight security algorithms.
The next class is unreliable communication. Unreliable transfer of data makes it
mandatory to carefully include error handling to security protocols. As such proto-
cols are well defined they have to cope with lost or crippled messages. Especially
crippling of messages that overlapped while sent leaves protocol data easily with val-
ues that are out of scope of combinations that are possible by design. This problem may
render a whole transfer as a fail if just one packet in between got changed, as it may
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not be decrypted anymore. The denser the WSN the more vulnerable it is to this kind
of problem. Also synchronization between nodes in a WSN is important when secure
key distribution is used. If not all nodes in a WSN use the same keys, nodes with dif-
ferent keys may not be able to communicate with each other, as they are not able to
decrypt messages of each other. In this case the network gets fragmented, even though
the physical network is still connected.
The last one is unattended operation. Obviously unattended nodes are very vulnerable
to physical attacks as an adversary can try to compromise a node with low risk of disclo-
sure. Even remote management of nodes may not detect compromises, as modifications
of sensors or similar cannot be detected but may influence the security of the network.
A big challenge is to find the right security algorithms for WSNs in general and to
select a matching one for a given set of requirements. Most of the time it is all about
trade-offs. Secure algorithms are either computationally intensive or introduce another
security problem, e.g. ABE algorithms vs. symmetric encryption. Especially if there are
specific functional requirements, like in our Scopes Framework, computational efficiency
is not always possible and it has to be evaluated in which environment the combined
system is feasible. Another challenge is to secure a WSN in a way that it still can carry
out its original tasks on one side and on the other the multitude of possible attacks
sketched above have been taken into account at design time. Also countermeasures for
the strongest threats have to be included into the small program space of a microcon-
troller. Last and most important challenge for real-world deployments is the question
of lifetime of the network. Most of the time this question cannot be answered reliably
beforehand. In spite of this fact the WSN application has to be designed in a way that it
can be tuned to comply with functionality and also expected life-time.
3.2 Models and Assumptions
3.2.1 Network and Trust Model
A WSN is considered that executes the Scopes Framework with the proposed security
enhancements. It is composed of scope root nodes for accessing the network and many
sensor nodes. Additionally at least one trusted authority must be part of the network on
special actions, like in the event of a revocation of a sensor node, or in the bootstrapping
phase to issue secret keys for the sensor nodes. As this trusted authority is holder of the
network’s master key it is offline if the WSN is in normal operation to keep this key out
of reach of an adversary.
To ensure security of cryptographic keys on sensor nodes it is essential to take mea-
sures to prevent physical compromise of sensor nodes. If tamper resistant hardware is
too expensive for the planned scenario, alternatives like tamper resistant packaging or
similar may be possible. The measures to be taken also depend on the expected threat
level.
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3.2.2 Adversary Model
The adversaries are considered to attempt accessing a scope they are not authorized
to access. The attackers may be external intruders or users of the network that are
not authorized to access the target scope. The internal users have access to their root
nodes, but none of them has an encryption key that complies with the target scope. The
adversaries are assumed to have active and passive capabilities. In particular they can
eavesdrop on all message traffic in the wireless sensor network. Attackers can collude
with each other and, for example, exchange keys of their sensor nodes. In general it is
assumed that attackers have an interest in keeping the network up and running.
3.2.3 Security Requirements
To secure a distributed scope, some common security aspects like data confidentiality
and integrity, that are also desirable in other sensor network security schemes, should
be provided. The following requirements were recognized in conjunction with access
control in the Scopes Framework.
SR1: Secure group key exchange – The basis for group- or scope-level access control is
to be able to securely exchange scope keys to establish a trusted group communi-
cation. This scheme should provide a secure exchange of a symmetric scope key to
enable efficient cryptography between scope members.
SR2: Group-level access control – The scope-level access control extends the secure key
exchange and adds access control. This ensures that only authorized sensor nodes
can join a scope and exchange data. This supposes that the access control scheme
provides a system to precisely describe the properties of potential scope members
and define expressive attributes and special security levels for the sensor nodes.
SR3: Collusion resilience – As described in the adversary model, users of the sensor net-
work may cooperate to access a scope without being authorized . Therefore, it
is vital to include in the access control scheme mechanisms that prevent collud-
ing unauthorized users from gaining an advantage over what they can get from
individual attacks.
SR4: Forward secrecy – Managing the sensor nodes and to be able to exclude malicious
or malfunctioning nodes is an important functionality in most scenarios. To support
such a functionality the access control scheme should ensure that after revoking a
malicious or leaving node it should not be able to join a secured scope afterwards,
even though the access structure might be satisfied. Also the access to scopes it is
currently a member of should not be possible anymore.
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3.3 Secure Scopes Architecture
To secure computer systems there is the choice between two cryptographic methods:
symmetric and asymmetric. Symmetric cryptography is efficient, but it is not secure
to transmit the common keys via a wireless channel. Asymmetric cryptography on the
other side is computationally more demanding, but is better suited for a distributed
system with its public/private key-pair. Unfortunately in wireless sensor networks with
radio communication as one of the largest consumers of energy a public key infrastruc-
ture (PKI) with all the exchanges of public keys imposes a huge burden on the sensor
network. To achieve access control in the Scopes Framework we use the existing scope
properties as criteria. Properties in combination with a public key system that may not
need a PKI in its background led us to the attribute-based encryption (ABE) systems.
They provide many features that we need, but for the cost of heavy computation. To
reduce the computation effort we combine the security features of ABE systems with the
light-weight symmetric cryptography. This is what we are looking for.
The CP-ABE algorithm [8] is based on elliptic-curve cryptography. Although elliptic
curves were shown to be feasible in sensor networks [72], its application here results
more expensive because CP-ABE also uses pairings on elliptic curves (an evaluation is
shown in section 4.3.1.3). Pairings are computationally expensive. This means, it is too
costly to encrypt data traffic directly with it. For this purpose, symmetric algorithms are
better suited. Additionally, the AES algorithm is available as hardware module on nearly
all sensor nodes that use wireless radio communication, e.g., [85, 154]. Therefore, we
use CP-ABE for secure key exchange and access control to scopes, and the exchanged
key is used for AES encryption to enable secure data communication between the scope
members.
Having CP-ABE and AES as cryptographic primitives, leaves us with at least three
keys. These are the public and secure key (PK/SK) of CP-ABE and the AES key. To
differentiate them we call the AES key the scope key as this key is distributed among
the members of a scope and secures the communication between them. This key is
generated automatically and will not leave a sensor node in plain text. The other two
keys are supplied by a task running on the sensor network. They are used to establish an
access policy for a new scope (PK) and to be able to evaluate this policy on other nodes
(SK), we still refer to them as public and secret keys. If there are multiple applications
in the network there may be also multiple sets of PK/SK pairs.
The integration of CP-ABE and the Scopes Framework introduces changes in all three
phases of the original framework and adds a new phase before WSN deployment. To
differentiate between the original Scopes Framework and the security enhanced one, we
refer to the latter as SecScopes. First, in the new bootstrapping phase all the necessary
keys are generated and distributed to all the nodes before they are deployed. The second
phase is the scope creation, where the scope definition is divided in static and dynamic
properties. The static attributes are used to encrypt the scope key with CP-ABE. The
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dynamic properties are encrypted using the scope key. The next phase is maintenance
phase, where the scope is still maintained, but the scope keys are distributed and may be
automatically refreshed with the regular scope refresh mechanism. Last, in the deletion
phase it is ensured that the deletion is only triggered from an authorized node, while
the timeout mechanism is still in place to help saving resources.
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Figure 3.2: Layered Architecture of SecScopes
Now, for example, the scope definition for scope ferdexMotion from figure 2.4 on
page 19 is separated into a dynamic and a static part. This means the terms of the ac-
celeration sensor are included in the dynamic part and the other terms are in the static
part. The conditions of the static part are then used to encrypt the scope key, where the
dynamic part is encrypted using this key. Besides simple boolean terms the Scope Frame-
work allows also the definition of mathematical functions or scenario specific functions
to be used in the scope definition. To do so threshold gates are used, see section 3.1.1.3.
These gates have a number of child gates and a threshold, e.g. 2of5. Are more child
gates satisfied than the threshold, the gate is satisfied. As long as the mathematical func-
tion , e.g. < or >, can be expressed with a tree of threshold gates and they use static
properties, they are included in the static part of the scope definition. If they cannot
be represented as threshold gates they are included into the dynamic part. To ensure
that the dynamic properties cannot just be ignored so called placeholder properties are
introduced for each dynamic term in the static properties part. E.g. for scenario specific
functions a term HAS_FUNC_SCENARIO1 can be used or for sensors a HAS_SENSOR_xyz
can be introduced. This way we make sure that only nodes that are able to evaluate the
dynamic property part are able to decrypt and maybe join the scope.
An important feature for lasting security is the ability to renew the used scope keys.
Every message encrypted using the scope key has an id attached that identifies the used
scope key. With the scope refresh mechanism we can distribute a new scope key just
by replacing the current key with a new one. For each scope two keys are stored, this
enables a slow roll out of a new key and after some time switching the used key. This
mechanism can be done automatically in predefined intervals. The interval length is a
design parameter of the SecScopes Framework.
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If a scope key is compromised by an attacker, rekeying in this way is still a secure way
to exclude unauthorized nodes, as the new key is distributed encrypted by CP-ABE. It
can only be extracted from authorized nodes. In the worst case scenario, where CP-ABEs
master key is compromised, the only way to regain security is to generate a new master
key and replace all public and secret keys on all nodes of the sensor network. This can
be done in one-to-one connections, e.g., using ECDH which is part of TinyECC3 [72]
to establish a secure connection with a single node and exchange the secret key. This
assumes an additional, temporary ECC key pair that has to be generated on all nodes in
the network. But as the master key is kept outside the WSN at the trusted authority this
scenario is assumed unlikely.
Another possible security breach is the compromise of a node’s secure key. This allows
the attacker to act as if he were the compromised node and may also join the same
scopes. If such a compromise is detected it is important to revoke this specific secure
key. To enable revocation in CP-ABE we adapted a mechanism proposed in [150] for
a key policy attribute-based encryption scheme (KP-ABE), see section 3.1.1.3 for the
original scheme. The principal idea is to update a parameter in all keys (including the
MK) except the ones to be revoked. With this mechanism it is possible to revoke as many
keys as needed in one step.
Revocation Algorithm
We have the given master key MK , public key PK and the set of secret keys SKi,
as previously discussed in section 3.1.1.3, where i ∈ N with N the set of nodes in the
network. To update the keys the trusted authority updates the gα in MK with a random
α′ ∈ Zp to gα′. For the PK e(g, g)α is replaced by e(g, g)α′ and
∆=

gα
′ · (gα)−1
 1
β = g
α′−α
β
is calculated. To update all PK and SK the new e(g, g)α
′
and ∆ parameters are dis-
tributed among the group of nodes that should be authorized even after the key update.
With the Scopes Framework this may be achieved by a scope excluding all nodes that
are to be revoked. The nodes to be revoked can be excluded from the update scope
because of a not matching access structure A, e.g. over the set of valid node ids. Even a
compromised node is not able to join this scope. To update an SKi its parameter D has
to be updated with the distributed ∆ value the following way:
D′ = D ·∆= g α+rβ · g α
′−α
β = g
α′+r
β .
◊
After a node is revoked it is not able to join any scope anymore, as its old secure key
cannot decrypt any new SCR. Also if other nodes get revoked and the node receives the
3 TinyECC was ported to Contiki as part of this work.
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∆ from the new revocation it is not possible to regain a working secure key, as the new
∆ depends on the previous α value. But for the scope it is currently member of it can
still en-/decrypt messages, as it owns the current scope key. To ensure forward secrecy
the revocation mechanism is used in conjunction with the scope key refresh mechanism.
As the node is not able to decrypt SCR and SR messages it is unable to obtain a renewed
scope key and is not able to communicate anymore with scopes he was member before.
As the node is now excluded from the network and the scopes it was member of, it can
still act as a regular intermediate node.
Talking about intermediate nodes. Besides the already mentioned root node of a scope
and its members there are two other kinds of nodes. The intermediate nodes, that are
not members of a scope, but are used to route messages; and nodes that do not partici-
pate in a scope at all. The nodes that do not participate will not route any messages and
so are passive. Intermediate nodes are used for routing and get to see many messages
of scopes. But as they are not members they are not able to decrypt messages as they
do not own the valid scope key. This also excludes the possibility for these nodes to
aggregate values on the way through the network.4
Colluding users are in general a threat to crypto systems, but as the security archi-
tecture here is built on top of the CP-ABE algorithm, SecScopes are not susceptible to
collusion attacks as CP-ABE is not [8].
Considering our container harbor scenario from section 1.1.2 the question arises, who
will be the trusted authority? As SecScopes supports per task public and secret keys each
company using the WSN could be its own trusted authority, issue keys and define the
possible properties. As the keys need some storage space it would make sense to have
only one key per sensor node and the different companies just issue new properties to
be used on a node, which they can then use with their scopes and tasks. There are
publications in this direction, like [88], but they impose much more computational load
than the architecture described here and therefore are currently not feasible. Therefore,
here a single trusted authority is assumed with a common set of properties that can be
issued to the sensor nodes.
A single trusted authority helps deploying new tasks, as it can make sure that only
tasks from authorized parties, e.g. logistics companies, are allowed and installed on the
nodes. For this purpose a module to manage the life-cycle of installed tasks is available
on all sensor nodes. To deploy tasks to a subset of nodes a scope with the Life-Cycle
Manager task (LCM) is created and the task then distributed. This ensures that the task
is securely transmitted and a cryptographic hash value ensures that the task was not
altered or no transmission errors occurred. With the LCM, tasks can also be deleted or
updated.
4 The Scopes Framework is currently not supporting aggregation, but we have shown in [57] that it is
possible to extend scopes to do so.
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3.4 Integration in Scopes
With the integration of security into the Scopes Framework, the major concern was
to preserve the distributed and modular capabilities of the framework. Therefore the
integration focused on the scopes manager module and the application interface. This
way it is possible to use all provided security measures independently from scenario
specific modules like membership conditions or the routing. Keeping the interface to the
routing modules eases the integration and supports the usability of scopes, as existing
routing algorithms don’t have to be adapted and new algorithms just have to include the
existing interface.
The changes to the task interface are also limited. The task registration was extended
to supply the needed cryptographic keys for CP-ABE. An additional parameter was added
to the scope creation to supply the access policy for the newly created scope. With these
minor changes a task can utilize the full security functionalities of scopes.
The scopes manager module was subject to extensive changes. Besides the straightfor-
ward interface changes described above, the management structures were extended to
include management data for the encryption, namely CP-ABE keys, scope keys and sta-
tus information. The data transmission was enhanced by an encryption and decryption
mechanism. It ensures that, if a valid scope key is present, the sent data is encrypted
using the available AES encryption in counter mode (AES-CTR) [30], which is obviously
also used for decryption. Most changes were done in the scope creation and refresh
mechanisms, as here the access control to a scope, scope key exchange and key re-
fresh system are integrated. More details on the implementation are provided in section
4.3.2.1.
Performance is discussed in section 4.3, but some precautions for good performance
can be taken in advance by introducing the following design decisions, especially as the
computation of CP-ABE encryption and decryption is a major issue. To keep the compu-
tational overhead to a minimum we trade it off for storage space. Since for each scope
refresh the same encrypted scope key is disseminated (unless the key is refreshed) we
store the decrypted scope keys in memory to save further computation costs. Addition-
ally, the dynamic scope definition part is saved in plain text to simplify the repeated
evaluation of the dynamic properties.
The following subsections will detail the newly added bootstrapping phase and the
extended creation, maintenance and deletion phases.
3.4.1 Bootstrapping Phase
Bootstrapping is performed before the sensor node is deployed. In our scenario this
would be before the container is shipped, e.g., while it is loaded with goods, informa-
tion is updated on the node. First, the master key MK and the public parameters PK are
generated at the trusted authority, if not already present. Then, a secret key SK is gen-
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Figure 3.3: Scope Creation Workflow – Security Enhancements
erated for the container node with suitable properties. Here we would have properties
like company or containerType or types of sensors that are available. The SK and PK
are then stored on the node, ready for deployment. If the SK has to be installed on a
node in an untrusted environment this may be achieved using ECDH [8] to establish a
common key to encrypt the transmission.
This phase enables the establishment of a secure system in a trusted environment be-
fore the network is deployed. After initializing security it is now possible to establish
secure connections and apply the access-control mechanisms. As multiple tasks with
different sets of properties are possible in a WSN, each task may get its own secure/pub-
lic key pair. This is also important to support multiple trusted authorities, but occupies
more resources. Through the task registration at the Scopes Framework the SK and PK
are made available.
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3.4.2 Creation Phase
The scope creation procedure remains mostly unchanged, see figure 3.3, but the SCR
message is altered. Before, it was mainly the binary representation of the scope defini-
tion, with some additional fields. Now there are two parts. First there is the encrypted
scope key (encrypted with the specified access policy) for the symmetric encryption. And
second, the dynamic portion of the scope definition and the additional fields encrypted
with the scope key. The access policy reflects the static properties specified in the scope
definition extended by static placeholders for the dynamic properties. This ensures that
only nodes that can extract the scope key can access the full scope definition and so join
the scope.
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Figure 3.4: Security Processing Workflow
3.4.3 Maintenance Phase
The scope refresh messages that are used to keep a scope alive are similarly struc-
tured as the SCR, so they undergo the same changes. The simple scope refreshes that
don’t contain any payload and just serve the purpose of keeping the scope alive are not
changed. Additionally, the processing of an SR is extended by the scope key refresh
mechanism. Here the IDs of the scope keys are added with the ciphertexts. This way
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Figure 3.5: Scope Maintenance Workflow – Security Enhancements
it can be decided in advance if new scope keys are distributed and it is necessary to
decrypt them. This is shown in detail in section 4.3.2.1.
3.4.4 Deletion Phase
The deletion of a scope is not allowed to be triggered from outside the scope. There-
fore, the root node of the scope to be deleted encrypts the scope id with the scope key.
This way all members of the scope can ensure that the deletion was triggered from an
authorized node by evaluating the ciphertext. Deleting a scope from a scope member
other than the root node is possible, but it does not allow a proper deletion of the scope,
as only member nodes are reached that are children of the deleting node. The root node
will refresh the scope that was deleted in the next cycle and reestablishes the scope.
With the current architecture this cannot be efficiently prevented as every secret that
the scope root may send to the scope members has to be known by the member.
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For the evaluation of the Scopes Framework and SecScopes two prototype implemen-
tations were used. The first one was the result of a diploma thesis [53] and was imple-
mented for a simulator. It was optimized and extended to be the first incarnation of the
Scopes Framework to be run in a real WSN. Utilizing the lessons learned from the first
prototype that relied on the SOS operating system, we built a new version from scratch
for the Contiki operating system as we reached the limits of SOS with the first implemen-
tation. The Contiki based implementation was extended to the SecScopes Framework.
Working with these different implementations made it reasonable to have a separate
implementation sections for each of them. They are located in the different evaluation
sections. The results of all systems are gathered in a real life testbed.
4.1 Testbed
The testbed used in this work is deployed at the Piloty building, Technische Universität
Darmstadt. The TUDµNet-testbed [42] is built with 32 TelosB sensor nodes on floor 1
and was extended to a second floor and an additional area at the TIZ building lab of
GKmM1. All sensor nodes are connected to a router backbone network. We used only
floor 1 of the testbed, as it is the largest connected area, see figure 4.1. During the time
we used the testbed it was constantly upgraded.
While doing the evaluation of the SOS implementation, the testbed in its first deploy-
ment had 30 TelosB nodes that were only connected to an active USB-hub to power
the nodes and to be able to program them on a per room basis. The logging was
1 DFG Research Training Group 1362: Cooperative, Adaptive and Responsive Monitoring in Mixed
Mode Environments (GKmM); http://www.gkmm.de
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Figure 4.1: Piloty building testbed
implemented on the nodes and the log files were retrieved after a test run by down-
loading them over the 802.15.4 wireless connection. To be able to compare the logs
from different nodes we implemented a simple time synchronization.
Taking a timestamp network wide of each nodes’ local time before and after a test
run, the different node local times can be translated to a test run time. This copes with
the different node local times and removes problems with small deviations in the nodes’
timer accuracy. The nodes were deployed in the same places as shown in figure 4.1,
here the full testbed is shown. The Testbed used for the first evaluation can be seen in
figure 4.2, nodes 1 and 2 were not used here and the corresponding room is omitted.
All other tests with Contiki were run on the full testbed deployment using not only
32 nodes, but also a router back-bone network with a modified version of the MoteLab
[141] software. This version supports our specific network infrastructure and is able
to deploy Contiki code to the nodes in the network. The rest of the functionality, like
logging of output on the serial port and test scheduling is the same as the original.
This means the serial log data of a node is output via USB to the connected router.
From there the data is forwarded to a central DB server that stores the log entry and
assigns a timestamp. To transfer the data a separate network segment is used to avoid
influences in log data transmission. Besides that we have not experienced any difficulties
regarding the log functionality. And as we just need correct relative timestamps, this is
a feasible solution.
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4.2 Scopes Framework
In this section we will compare the SOS and Contiki versions of the Scopes Framework.
We use abbreviations for the different routing algorithms used in the evaluation. The
common flood routing is referred to as FLD. Gradient-based routing which is used in the
SOS implementation is referred to as GBR. And Selective flooding, unicast return (SelfUR)
used in the Contiki build is referred to as SEL. Details of the routing algorithms will be
shown in the different implementation sections.
4.2.1 SOS Operating System
We built the first proof-of-concept of the Scopes Framework using the SOS Operating
System [44]. This was the first operating system to enable runtime code distribution
and loading, a feature other operating systems did not support at the time. This enables
distributing and loading of modules over the air once the sensor network is rolled out.
Additionally, SOS provides the abstraction of modules and allows modules to register
functions. So, every module can provide methods to other modules and ease the imple-
mentation of APIs between conceptual layers. SOS offers two inter-module communi-
cation mechanisms: message passing and registered methods. Where message passing
is arbitrated by the OS scheduler (asynchronous processing) and registered methods,
like callback functions, are directly called and blocking the further processing until the
sub-routine is finished (synchronous processing).
4.2.1.1 Implementation details
The SOS version of the Scopes Framework evolved from the proof-of-concept version
developed in [53]. This version was written only for simulators and was not functional
on a real sensor network. Also, it was missing some integral parts of Scopes, like dy-
namic scopes, scope hierarchies or a scope definition language. To get the code working
in a real environment a big part of the code had to be reviewed and partly rewritten.
The problems solved range from alignment issues of memory structures on the 16bit mi-
crocontroller to problems with the timing of sending/receiving messages in the routing
modules.
The SOS version of the Scopes Framework already includes the most important fea-
tures related to scopes that are found in the current Contiki version. First, this is the
layered and modular architecture that makes it easy to adjust modules to the given en-
vironment using defined interfaces between the modules. The scopes could also form
hierarchies to structure the network by using only static properties. Using sensor data
as a property is possible, but it is not evaluated further if the values change, which
gives it a static character. The properties can be expressed using a declarative language
that is defined in section 2.4.1. The definition of a scope is then parsed to a pre-order
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byte representation that is compact and can be easily exchanged between sensor nodes.
This version also includes the small and full refresh mechanism explained earlier to save
some bandwidth. For a regular scope refresh message this saves only some bytes of
the scope definition, but for a scope with the security enhancement, this can save some
hundred bytes per refresh cycle. As routing algorithms we have implemented a simple
flooding algorithm as a baseline for our tests and a more sophisticated multi-hop routing
that uses a tree structure. The tree routing is an extended gradient-based routing [114]
which is based on directed diffusion [51].
The general approach of the extended gradient-based routing is the same as directed
diffusion. There are request, data, acknowledge and reject messages. A request is sent
during the first phase of the algorithm to announce the scope in the network. Therefore,
the refresh is flooded through the sensor network or the super scope of the new scope.
The transmission of the request messages is also used to build the routing tree for the
direction from the member nodes of a scope to its root nodes by storing the node ids
of where another node got the request message from. Up to 10 parent node ids can be
stored. If a node matches the scope property it replies with an acknowledge message.
So the parent scope knows which nodes are its children nodes. Each node can also have
up to 10 child nodes. This and the former limit are parameters that can be changed
at compile time. Is a child node sending an acknowledge to a parent that already has
completed its limit of child nodes, the parent node answers to the acknowledge with
a reject. In this case the child node tries to send an acknowledge message to the next
entry in its parent node list and removes the node that rejected it. With the limits of
the child and parent lists we restrict the maximum memory size used, which is very
important on the constrained sensor nodes, and allows some kind of load balancing.
After this mechanism completes, data can be exchanged via the scope. To manage the
scope memberships over time the refresh mechanism was also used here.
Available framework APIs.
APIs were defined to be able to interact with the Scopes Framework. Besides the most
important one, the application API, there are also APIs for routing algorithms and for
the scope membership evaluation. First we show the application API:
1 void send_scope_create ( parentScope_id , scope_id , propLen , p r o p e r t i e s ) ;
2
3 void send_scope_data ( scope_id , sendDirect ion , srcApp_id , destApp_id ,
4 msgType , payloadLen , payload ) ;
5
6 void send_scope_remove ( parentScope_id , scope_id ) ;
Listing 4.1: Scopes Framework application API (SOS version).
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To create a scope, applications call the send_scope_create(...) method. The
ScopeMgr module sends a scope creation message to all potential scope members: if
it’s a new top-level scope, it is sent to all nodes; otherwise it is only sent to members
of the parent scope. Whenever a node becomes a member of a scope, this is signaled
to applications that have registered to receive this information. Once a scope has been
created, a bidirectional data channel between the scope root and its members was es-
tablished, which can be used by invoking send_scope_data(...). During the lifetime
of a scope, refresh messages are sent in regular and configurable intervals to allow au-
tomatic maintenance and to keep the scope alive (this mechanism is explained in detail
in section 2.5.2). After finishing its task, an application can delete its scope by calling
send_scope_remove(...). A removal message is then sent to the member nodes. In ad-
dition, applications can register for notifications about the scope membership changes.
These are asynchronously delivered to them, to avoid polling.
A received membership definition is forwarded by the scopes manager to the member-
ship module. The membership module can be replaced by custom ones as mentioned
earlier. The API used to communicate with the module is shown below.
1 bool check_scope_membership ( scopeDe f in i t i on , length ) ;
Listing 4.2: Scopes Framework membership evaluation API (SOS version).
The definition in binary form is handed over to the membership module by calling its
check_scope_membership(...) method, including the definition’s length. The mem-
bership module then parses the data and decides if the node fulfills the definition or not.
Depending on the result a boolean is returned to the scope manager module.
The routing API, listing 4.3, is composed of two parts, the communication part and
the scope status signaling.
1 void scope_send ( scope_id , parentScope_id , sendDirect ion , destApp_id ,
2 destMsgType , payloadLen , payload ) ;
3
4 void s cope_ inse r t ed ( scope_id ) ;
5
6 void scope_removed ( scope_id ) ;
Listing 4.3: Scopes Framework routing API (SOS version).
In the process of scope creation, management and deletion the membership state of
a node can change. A node may join or leave a scope or the scope itself is deleted.
To be able to save resources and tell the routing mechanism if it has to maintain a
route or not, two methods were introduced in the routing API: scope_inserted(...)
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is called if a node joins a scope; if the node leaves a scope or the scope is deleted
scope_removed(...) is invoked by the scope manager module.
The third method of the API is scope_send(...). This one is called for every message
to be sent to a scope. It makes no difference what kind of message it is, SCR, SR, data
or a deletion message.
4.2.1.2 Methodology and Setup
To evaluate the Scopes Framework we have conducted numerous experiments on our
live testbed. The Piloty-building testbed comprises 30 TelosB nodes, powered through
USB hubs (see Figure 4.2), distributed over 9 offices and spanning 544m2. In each
room, nodes are located either next to the windows or above fluorescent lamps. The
building’s thick walls greatly reduce radio ranges, forcing a multi-hop behavior even at
the maximum transmission power level.
Figure 4.2: Piloty building testbed and scopes used for evaluation on SOS
Scopes.
In our tests we used the scopes depicted in figure 4.2. These represent reasonable,
real-life scopes. The scope S1 covers all nodes. Such scopes are necessary, e.g., for mas-
sive software updates. Scope S2 emphasizes that membership is not necessarily given
by physical proximity, instead scopes build overlays. Finally, S3 and S31 illustrate nested
scopes. These occur in any hierarchical relation, for instance, in domain organization.
The scope definitions were based on operations on node IDs, although as explained
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before, other relations over node properties such as location could have been used. Ta-
ble 4.1 summarizes the scopes that were used. The last column presents the size of scope
definitions and the entire creation message. These highlight the compactness of the rep-
resentation. Lastly, all scopes were created at the network boundary, namely node 43
(top left). This forced a minimum of 2 hops and an average of over 3.
Scope Description Parent Size
Scope Scope Def. OS Message
S1 All nodes world 4 bytes 18 bytes
S2 Nodes with even id world 74 bytes 88 bytes
S3 Nodes whose id < 24 || id > 33 world 9 bytes 24 bytes
S31 Node id ∈ {21,43,45,47,48} S3 24 bytes 38 bytes
Table 4.1: Summary of employed scopes
Distributed Logging.
In order to track node activity in each experiment, we have extended the framework
with a logging module. Its main task is to log events as requested by other modules. It
registers a function at the OS’s kernel:
1 void log ( u int16_t scope_id , u in t8_ t event , u in t8_ t s i ze , u in t8_ t data * ) ;
Listing 4.4: Scopes Framework log API (SOS version).
The parameter scope_id indicates the scope to which the log entry will be associated,
whereas event is the concrete event to be logged. A set of events was defined which
includes SCOPE_CREATED, SCOPE_DELETED, and SCOPE_DATA_RECEIVED. If additional in-
formation needs to be logged, the parameters’ size and data can be used. Modules that
need to log events register to the function to invoke it.
Once invoked, the function obtains a timestamp from the OS and buffers a new log
entry before storing it in the data flash. There are two reasons for storing log entries in
the flash. First, in many cases, due to the length of our experiments, log data didn’t fit
in RAM. Each TelosB has only 10KB of RAM, but 1MB of data flash. Second, making log
data persistent greatly helped debugging our code when nodes crashed while debugging.
Since SOS didn’t provide a driver to access the data flash, we had to implement one.
The module can be queried wirelessly for the logged entries. Queries can require actual
entries or a full dump. This might trigger the transmission of hundreds or thousands of
messages, thus retries were implemented to better tolerate message failure.
To make sense out of each node’s logged data, log entries must be time synchronized
with each other. Instead of adjusting all clocks to a common time base, we let clocks run
unsynchronized. At the beginning and at the end of each experiment, we apply unidirec-
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tional synchronization [109] from a mobile base station acting as reference clock. This
station sends its local time, which gets logged at each node. Once data is collected after
an experiment, these two reference timestamps are used to shift and scale all logged
entries accordingly, indeed transforming all of them offline to a common scale.
There are two important aspects to the framework, namely reliability and efficiency. In
the next subsection we discuss how reliable the scope mechanism is and its relation to
the underlying routing protocol.
4.2.1.3 Performance Evaluation
Scope Creation, Removal and Maintenance
We first investigate the two main scope operations, creation and removal, together with
the scope maintenance. Consider the scope membership described by a function, φ(t),
that outputs the percentage of nodes which belong to a scope out of an expected set at
a given time t; φ: Z→ [0,1]. The ideal membership φI(t) is a function of time which
equals 100% when the scope is alive and 0% otherwise, this resembles an instantaneous
scope creation and removal. The values observed in practice, φR(t), lag behind the ideal
values, i.e., once a scope is created it takes time for nodes to reach a high membership
percentage, and later when a scope is removed it takes time to drop down back to 0%.
This is natural and due, for example, to message propagation delays and medium loss.
Definition 4.1. When multiple test repetitions are considered, we refer to φRmax , φRav g
and φRmin as the maximum, average and minimum membership values, respectively.
Scope reliability is described by the following parameters:
Definition 4.2. The reliability value stands for the deviation of the average measured
membership values from the ideal ones. To quantify the reliability value, the area of the
curve φRav g is calculated and compared to the area of φI . The closer the value to 1 is,
the closer φRav g is to φI , thus the higher the reliability value, with 1 reflecting the ideal
curve.
Definition 4.3. The stability of the scope mechanism indicates its tolerance to network
dynamics. This is quantified by calculating the area between the curves φRmax and φRmin.
The closer the value is to 0, the more stable the memberships are.
Definition 4.4. The quickness in achieving an expected membership percentage is im-
portant. We quantify the creation and removal delay by measuring the time it takes for
φRav g to reach >98% after a scope creation, and to 0% after a scope removal, respec-
tively. Clearly, the lower these values, the better.
In Figure 4.3 we characterize the reliability of the framework for S1 and S2 (the be-
havior of nested scopes is evaluated in detail later). The figures present φRmax , φRav g
and φRmin as defined above. A scope is always created at t=0:05 and remains alive for
63 seconds, thus, φI(t) is 100% between t=0:05 and t=1:08, and 0% elsewhere. This
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Figure 4.3: Scope creation, removal and maintenance for FLD and GBR
scope lifetime allows for 10 refreshes at a period of 6 seconds (indicated with vertical
dashed lines drawn at regular intervals). The rightmost dashed vertical line indicates
the last point at which all nodes should automatically remove themselves from the scope
in case the explicit scope removal message wasn’t heard. This occurs 20 seconds after
the last refresh (t=1:25).
The plots for S1, 4.3(a) and 4.3(b) show that the creation delay was quite low: it
occurred immediately with Flooding, further called FLD, while it took 3 refresh periods
with gradient based routing, further called GBR. For both algorithms, the scope mem-
bership was kept up at around 100% until the explicit removal was requested. Later,
once a scope was removed, almost all nodes heard the explicit removal message. Virtu-
ally no nodes resorted to the lease expiration timer with FLD (0.26%), while for GBR it
was below 5% – an acceptable value. The removal delay of GBR was thus higher than
FLD’s (only after the lease expires did nodes automatically release resources). While the
reliability values were almost the same with 0.9938 for FLD and 0.9937 for GBR, FLD’s
stability (0.0209) was better than GBR’s (0.0632). As mentioned before the values for
reliability and stability are the deviation to the ideal or min/max curves. The plots for
S2 exhibit a slightly lower reliability value. The scope creation delay worsens for FLD,
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requiring 1 refresh period, and GBR showed an unstable scope membership percentage.
The results show that both approaches are viable in practice.
Nested Scopes.
We now evaluate the behavior of hierarchical relations among scopes. In these tests,
we created scope S3 at t1, and one second later created subscope S31. While S3 remained
alive (as before) during 63 seconds, S31 remained alive for 33 seconds, which allowed
for 5 refreshes to be issued.
Figure 4.4 presents the respective reliability results for FLD and GBR. Again, while
both protocols reached high scope membership percentages, GBR (99%) was slightly
lower than FLD (100%). The reliability values were high in both cases: FLD achieved
0.9949, while GBR got 0.9705. Also, FLD was more stable than GBR (0.0178 vs.
0.0889). The scope creation delay was 1 refresh period for FLD and 3 for GBR, whereas
the removal delay was 20 seconds for FLD and 0 seconds for GBR. These results point
out that nested scopes exhibit similar reliability properties to those of top-level scopes.
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Figure 4.4: Scope creation, removal and maintenance for nested scopes S3 and S31
Network Density.
We now discuss the effects of network areal density ρA
2 on scope operations and main-
tenance. Particularly, we consider the effects of density with respect to the reliability of
the scope operations. This is of importance because not all setups will have the same
density as ours, or even a constant one.
There are two main effects that influence the reliability. On one side, the more nodes
there are, the higher the redundancy available to build the underlying scope overlays,
thus the reliability increases. On the other side, the more nodes there are, the more
collisions can occur, which decreases the reliability and stability.
2 When we refer to density the areal destiny is meant.
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ρA #Nodes Nodes per area
4 30 1/18.1m2
2 18 1/30.2m2
1 10 1/54.4m2
Table 4.2: Node densities
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Figure 4.5: Scope operation costs
We inspected this issue by repeating all of our tests with three node density values.
These configurations are presented in Table 4.2, with the resulting density in nodes per
m2. The amount of nodes per room is indicated with ρA.
In general terms, we can say that the denser the network, the higher the reliability
values. Also, it can be observed from the previous figures 4.3 that S1 is more reliable
than S2.
Scope Operation Costs.
The energy costs of the scope operations are largely due to messages sent and received.
Evidently, energy efficiency depends on the routing mechanism chosen. We studied
the operation cost in isolation; in a typical use these become marginal compared to
data exchange. Figure 4.5 plots link-level traffic for S1 and S2. Each measurement
point represents one test run (2 minutes), there were 25 runs. The curves confirm the
expected routing algorithm behavior. The behavior exhibited by FLD is deterministic,
since the decision whether a node is member of a scope or not is totally local: a test run
requires around 340 scope management messages regardless of the scope definition. In
turn, GBR pays the price of the increased reliability of the acknowledged reverse paths.
This overhead, in contrast to flooding, does depend on the number of member nodes.
Therefore, the GBR traffic for S1 exhibits a constant factor of times 2, while for S2 the
factor is times 1.5, compared to the FLD traffic.
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tt0 t1 t2 t3 t4
a delay scope alive
no scope
25 sec. auto-scope removal
M x
root-to-members or members-to-rootscoped data traffic
POST timer, [2 s]SEND timer [0.25s + e],
  0s< e <1.5s
b wait
t5
tt0 t1 t2 t3 t4
a delay scope alive
no scope
25 sec. auto-scope removal
root-to-members or members-to-rootscoped data traffic b wait
t5
Figure 4.6: Test sequence for scope data traffic
Scope Traffic
We proceed by evaluating the bidirectional data channel described in section 4.2.1.1.
As important metrics, we consider goodput and link level message exchange. While the
former refers to the end-to-end application layer traffic, the latter indicates the in-
network traffic needed to obtain that goodput. We have designed our traffic tests as
illustrated in Figure 4.6. During the first [t0, t1) and last (t4, t5] stages, there is no ac-
tivity. A scope is created at t1, and remains alive until it is removed at t4. In order to
allow the scope to stabilize after its creation and removal, we introduce an initial delay
of α and a wait of β seconds (respectively). Traffic itself occurs during (t2, t3).
The two traffic directions, root-to-members (RtM) and members-to-root (MtR), were
tested separately. For the RtM tests we chose α=15s and β=3s. This large α value
allows the scope to stabilize through two refreshes before data transmission starts. For
the MtR tests we chose α=3s and β=20s. Here, a short α was sufficient, but a larger β
was needed to account for removed (i.e., unstable) nodes. More importantly, since sen-
sor network applications are diverse, we concentrate on two communication patterns:
periodic and bursty traffic.
Periodic Traffic.
These tests encompass, e.g., monitoring applications. Here, in RtM tests, the scope
root sends M = 30 messages to the members, whereas in MtR tests each scope member
sends M messages to the root. Each sending node posts a timer that is triggered with a
frequency λ = t3−t2
M
= 2 seconds. To reduce network collisions, message transmission is
delayed randomly by " (with λ
8
≤ " ≤ 7λ
8
) by the sending application. To further stress
the routing protocols, we used scope S1, which includes all 30 network nodes.
Especially the RtM plots have a high fluctuation in the measurements. This is the result
of the predefined intervals in the test execution as explained above and the different
clock drifts in the sensor nodes that lead to differently shifted intervals throughout the
network. The result is a high peak in one interval and a deep valley in the following
interval. These artifacts can be observed in all the experiments, more or less distinct.
The top two plots of Figure 4.7 present goodput results both for RtM and MtR. (Note
that RtM was sampled every 2 seconds, thus the theoretical goodput is 30 [messages/2
seconds], while MtR was sampled every second, thus the theoretical goodput is 15
[m/s].) The RtM goodput plot, 4.7(a), shows that both protocols have similar good-
put. FLD showed an average goodput of 96.44%, slightly above GBR’s 91%. The MtR
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goodput plot, 4.7(b), does however show a clear advantage for GBR (95.44%) over FLD
(74.44%). This was to be expected since flooding causes too many collisions, while GBR
restricts the data flow to those links whose gradient values are high. The tail exhibited
by FLD was due to a node that got automatically removed from the scope at the middle
of the test and then heard a refresh, hence re-started sending messages.
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Figure 4.7: Goodput and link-level periodic traffic
In the bottom plots of figure 4.7, the link-level traffic is shown. These curves include
both data and scope management traffic. The MtR plot, figure 4.7(c), exemplifies that
the typical usage yields marginal management overhead. GBR transmits 15% more
messages than FLD due to the acknowledgment and reject messages. This increase in
link-level traffic constitutes an upper bound for GBR’s overhead compared to FLD. The
biggest difference between the routing protocols becomes evident in figure 4.7(d). GBR
is one order of magnitude better than FLD: it induces less than 9% the messages required
by FLD. This constitutes GBR’s main strength and outbalances any scope maintenance
overhead, even under the chosen adverse test conditions.
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Bursty Traffic.
The following tests encompass event-based applications such as object-tracking, where
bursty traffic is the predominant pattern. A message burst is produced in two cases:
when an event-subscription is to be disseminated rapidly from the subscribers to the
publishers (RtM traffic), and whenever a set of nodes detect an event and need to notify
the subscriber (MtR traffic). To support bursts, however, several mechanisms such as
route lookups and concurrent medium access via the MAC protocol must tolerate stress.
For the bursty tests, sending nodes produced a message burst which can be approxi-
mated by a gaussian function with center=5, standard deviation=2.3 and a peak value
of 7. This amounted to a total of M=15 messages. As with the periodic traffic, the burst
is ideally sent in intervals of λ=2 seconds, and scope S1 was used for the experiments.
In the RtM tests, it is only the scope root node who sends the burst, while in MtR tests,
all 30 (member) nodes sent the burst back to the root.
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Figure 4.8: Goodput and link-level bursty traffic
The results presented in figure 4.8 include both data and scope management traf-
fic. The theoretical values are represented by the Gaussian curve. Figures4.8(a) and
4.8(b) display the goodput for RtM and MtR traffic, respectively. In the RtM tests, GBR
produced a goodput of 78.62%, while with FLD 99.77% of expected messages were re-
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ceived. In the MtR tests, FLD got 44.54% and GBR got 69.19%. Further, the graphs
show that in terms of burstiness, FLD was superior to GBR. While FLD exhibited the ex-
pected behavior, GBR showed a high latency. This was due to GBR reaching a maximum
bandwidth. While FLD uses the capacity of all communication links to send messages,
GBR restricts the nodes’ out-degree. This sets a capacity along the established routes.
Hence, under the same load, GBR needs more time to transport the message burst.
Figures 4.8(c) and 4.8(d) show the total RtM and MtR traffic, respectively. All of
the qualitative statements regarding the burstiness and latency made above hold here
as well. As for throughput, we can claim that both FLD and GBR reach the maximum.
While FLD utilizes the complete network capacity, GBR’s traffic is lower. The significantly
better GBR efficiency over FLD for MtR – an order of magnitude – is clearly visible in
4.8(d).
4.2.2 Contiki
With the previous implementation we reached the limits of SOS and had to cope with
several stability issues. Therefore, we had to look for a new system to build further
enhanced versions of the Scope Framework on.
The second part of our Scopes Framework evaluation will show the second, extended
implementation of scopes built on top of the well known Contiki operating system. We
evaluate the Scopes Framework on Contiki and relate the results to the former SOS
version. We use the SOS version as a baseline for the performance evaluation of our
new implementation.
4.2.2.1 Implementation details
The extended reimplementation of the Scopes Framework had the goal to be based on
a stable and widespread operating system and had to clean up problems encountered
in the previous version. It provides the same functionality as its predecessor and got
extended with additional features, where the security extensions are the most important
improvements.
Our choice of the Contiki operating system is based on its broad and active commu-
nity. It has support from industry and academia, even though it started as an academic
project. From the implementation point of view, Contiki is implemented using C, as our
previous version of Scopes was, and it supports concurrent tasks and over-the-air (OTA)
task updates. With this background Contiki proved to be much more stable than SOS
and supported all the features we need for the Framework.
The design for the new Scopes Framework was kept closely to the original, as the
layered and modular architecture has proven to be a good choice for extendability and
adaptability to different scenarios in our tests. The basic functionality of scope creation,
maintenance and deletion was also transferred and basic membership functions were
added. Developing on Contiki also introduced a different style of coding. The SOS
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operating system wrapped everything in an event. This means a module had, beside
some management methods a central event handler that managed the behavior of the
module. In Contiki so called protothreads [29] and callback functions are heavily used
to structure tasks. Also the separation of different tasks is not as sharp as the modules
on SOS, so deploying a task OTA is more difficult on Contiki as references to external
functions have to be managed.
One major issue to be solved in the new version was to reduce the complexity of
code. Especially the GBR routing is very complex and memory intensive, as two routing
trees have to be managed. Our solution is SelfUR (selective flooding, unicast return; we
use SEL in the following). It is specified at length in [64], we will show here a short
summary.
We identified two major issues with the former GBR algorithm. It is complex in man-
aging the routing trees and it uses a large amount of memory for their management,
where most of the memory is dynamically allocated. So, first, all the memory used for
SEL is now allocated statically, this prevents resource problems at runtime. The basic
idea of GBR is kept for the implementation of SEL, but we incorporated some obser-
vations: One of our observations was, that when creating a top-level scope the whole
network has to get the SCRs and this is the same for all scopes of this kind. Second,
creating multiple scopes resulted in multiple routing trees, two per scope. We changed
this behavior to a single routing tree created for a specific root node. This ensures a low
memory footprint and much less tree management messages in the sensor network. The
routing tree is used for the member nodes to send data back to the root node. Sending
data to the member nodes is done trough selective flooding, as in this direction all nodes
are addressed. For the selective flooding not to send all data to the whole network each
time, the nodes store their roles for the different scope routings. This means besides
the root and member nodes there are so called forwarder nodes. These are in charge to
connect the different member nodes and the root node to be able to communicate with
each other. But the forwarder nodes do not participate in the scope itself. This means
that they do not send messages to or receive messages from participants of the scope
directly, they just forward. This way only member, root and forwarder nodes broadcast
messages to the member nodes and it is ensured that these messages are kept in the
vicinity of the scopes spacial distribution.
The APIs of the new Scopes Framework have been changed slightly from the previ-
ous version. The task API, listing 4.5, has been adjusted to the new task registration
mechanism and some functionality was moved into the interface.
To receive data from a scope in the SOS version it was possible to address a task by
its module id. Contiki does not know this kind of id. So, we introduced a registration
mechanism where a task registers itself with the Scope Framework and a self-assigned
id. This way the id is known and a task can be addressed. Additionally the Scopes Frame-
work now has a scopes_init(...) method where the used routing and membership
functions can be configured. This way it is possible to configure different routing algo-
rithms for different scenarios. Nested scopes inherit the routing of their parent scope.
66 4 Evaluation
1 /* c a l l b a c k s */
2 s t ruc t s cope s_app l i c a t i on {
3 void (* add )( scope_id ) ;
4 void (* remove )( scope_id ) ;
5 void (* j o i n )( scope_id ) ;
6 void (* leave )( scope_id ) ;
7 void (* recv )( scope_id , void *data , data_ len ) ;
8 } ;
9
10 /* i n t e r f a c e f u n c t i o n d e c l a r a t i o n s */
11 void s c o p e s _ i n i t ( s t ruc t scopes_rout ing * rout ing ,
12 s t ruc t scopes_membership *membership ) ;
13 in t s c o p e s _ r e g i s t e r ( subsc r i be r_ id , s t ruc t s cope s_app l i c a t i on * task ) ;
14 void s cope s_unreg i s t e r ( s u b s c r i b e r _ i d ) ;
15 bool scopes_open ( subsc r i be r_ id , superScope_id , scope_id ,
16 void * specs , spec_len , f l ag s , t t l ) ;
17 void s copes_c lo se ( subsc r i be r_ id , scope_id ) ;
18 void scopes_send ( subsc r i be r_ id , scope_id , d i r e c t i on , void *data , data_ len ) ;
Listing 4.5: Scopes Framework task API (Contiki version).
With scopes_open(...), scopes_close(...) and scopes_send(...) there are the
methods as in the previous versions API. What was added are the scope status callbacks
add(...), remove(...), join(...) and leave(...) that are called if a scope is added
or removed from the ScopeManagers internal scope table, or if the node joins or leaves
a scope. This way a task knows what scopes are available and in which state they are.
This is important if the task is also executed when the scope is not alive and it has to
wait until the node joins the scope again to exchange its data.
1 /* c a l l b a c k s */
2 s t ruc t scopes_membership {
3 in t (* check )( void * specs , spec_ len ) ;
4 } ;
Listing 4.6: Scopes Framework membership API (Contiki version).
The APIs for the membership function and routing (listings 4.6 and 4.7) are not
changed. The notification interface of the routing API got enhanced to match the one
from the task interface. This also allows a more fine grained resource management in
the routing algorithms.
The property repository API, listing 4.8, allows access to the repository that is used for
membership evaluation. It provides the ability to read and write values to the repository.
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1 /* c a l l b a c k s */
2 s t ruc t scopes_rout ing {
3 void (* send )( scope_id , d i r e c t i o n ) ;
4 void (* add )( scope_id , d i r e c t i o n ) ;
5 void (* remove )( scope_id ) ;
6 void (* j o i n )( scope_id ) ;
7 void (* leave )( scope_id ) ;
8 } ;
9
10 /* i n t e r f a c e f u n c t i o n d e c l a r a t i o n s */
11 void s copes_ rece i ve ( void* data ) ;
Listing 4.7: Scopes Framework routing API (Contiki version).
1 /* i n t e r f a c e f u n c t i o n d e c l a r a t i o n s */
2 in t s copes_ repos i t o ry_va lue ( index ) ;
3 in t s co p e s_ r e po s i t o r y_ v a l u e _ s e t ( index , value ) ;
Listing 4.8: Scopes Framework property repository API (Contiki version).
4.2.2.2 Methodology and Setup
The evaluation of the Contiki version of the Scopes Framework was also conducted
in our live testbed at the Piloty building. But it was enhanced with an additional room,
compared to the previous SOS evaluation, as explained in section 4.1. Which leaves it
with 32 TelosB sensor nodes in 10 rooms and a coverage of a bit less than 600 m2. The
testbed was also extended by a router per room that is able to deploy new node images
in the network and provides a convenient logging mechanism. In the extended sensor
network the node ids were reassigned, but this has no influence on our experiments,
besides the renaming.
Scopes.
In our evaluation we have used the scopes depicted in figure 4.9. These represent the
same scope definitions as in the SOS version for comparison reasons, listed in table 4.3.
The scope S1 covers all nodes. Scope S2 focuses on the distributed properties of a scope.
Finally, S3 and S31 illustrate nested scopes. The last column of table 4.3 presents the size
of scope definitions in Contiki and the entire creation message. These show the same
compactness of the representation as the SOS version of the framework. All scopes were
created at the network boundary, the top left node 1, this forces a hop count between 2
and 3.
Data logging.
The distributed data logging is in the enhanced testbed far more advanced than our
old approach. With the new Motelab backbone described in section 4.1 we are able
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Figure 4.9: Enhanced Piloty building testbed and scopes used for evaluation on Contiki
Scope Description Parent Size
Scope Scope Def. OS Message
S1 All nodes world 5 bytes 19 bytes
S2 Nodes with even id world 5 bytes 19 bytes
S3 Nodes whose id ≤ 8 || id ≥ 19 world 11 bytes 25 bytes
S31 Node id ∈ {1,4,27,29,32} S3 29 bytes 43 bytes
Table 4.3: Summary of employed scopes
to log all serial output of all nodes in the network. Therefore, the sensor nodes are
connected to the Motelab routers. These connect to the serial console of each node and
send every output line to a database server, where the entry is stored with a timestamp
in a database table. This introduces a small delay between issuing of a log entry on a
sensor node and the storage and time-stamping at the database, but as all routers are
connected to the same network and the data is transmitted via Ethernet the delay can
be assumed constant over all entries.
With this approach our logging is independent from node failures or network issues,
which we encountered with the wireless approach we used with SOS. Additionally, the
complicated and error-prone computation to synchronize timestamps of log entries over
all nodes in the network is obsolete, as we now have a central instance that assigns
timestamps. With the logging function on the node we also were dependent on the
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resources of the sensor node, not just memory space, but also computation time. With
the logging on the sensor nodes influences on the system behavior cannot be ruled out.
The external logging also removes these influences.
4.2.2.3 Performance Evaluation
In conformance with the evaluation of the SOS version of the Scopes Framework we
will look at the framework’s reliability and efficiency, see section 4.2.1.3 for the defini-
tions.
Scope Creation, Removal and Maintenance.
First, the reliability of managing a scope is investigated. We look at the operations
of scope creation, maintenance and deletion. To evaluate the reliability we employ the
same measurements as with the SOS results. We assume an ideal curve φI(t), where the
percentage of member nodes is 0% if the scope is not created or is deleted and from time
t on, where the scope is created and managed, the number of member nodes is 100%.
This leads to the function φ: Z→ [0,1], that we have seen before in section 4.2.1.3. It
describes the sequence of measured membership events and shows how many percent
of the nodes in the network are members of a scope at a given time t of the experiment.
To gain a better understanding of our results we show besides the average of 5 test runs
φav g also the minimum φmin and maximum φmax percentage of memberships achieved
over all test runs. Of course this does not reflect the single experiment run, but gives an
impression of worst and best case. The average can give additional guidance on how to
interpret these two curves, as the distance of the average curve from the min and max
curves relates to the probability of these two extremes. The shorter the distance, the
higher the probability. In the optimal case all three curves match the ideal φI .
In our experiments with the Contiki based framework we send the scope creation at
t = 30 seconds. The scope is then kept alive for 68 seconds and is then deleted by a
deletion message at t = 98 seconds. The scope refresh interval is set to 6 seconds like
in the SOS experiments and reflected in the graphs by light grey vertical lines. The time
span the scope is alive allows for 11 scope refresh cycles. If a node misses the scope
deletion message the scope times out 20 seconds after the last refresh message and is
then deleted at t = 116 seconds. This is also shown in the graph by the last vertical line
on the right.
In figure 4.10 we show the results for the reliability tests for the scopes S1 and S2. First
thing to mention here is that we achieve almost perfect results in these tests with our
new SEL routing algorithm. For scope creation we measured an average of 3 seconds
from sending the first SCR to achieving 100% membership. Deleting a scope was even
faster with an average of 2-3 seconds form sending the removal message to all members
leaving the scope. As can be seen in 4.10(c) sometimes nodes miss the deletion event,
but then get cleaned by the scope time-out.
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Figure 4.10: Scope creation, removal and maintenance on Contiki
Compared to the SOS version Contiki enables a much better stability, as for the flood
routing no random scope leaves and re-joins of nodes can be seen in figure 4.10(a).
The use of selective flooding in SEL for the root node to member node communication
drastically improves the reliability of the scopes’ memberships. For the scope S1 selec-
tive flooding (fig. 4.10(b)) and flooding (fig. 4.10(a)) are the same, as here the whole
network is included in the scope. But already scope S2 profits from selective flooding’s
reduction of SCR resending and achieves the same reliability of the flooding algorithm
with fewer messages sent. This can be seen by figures 4.10(c) and 4.10(d).
Nested scopes.
Now we show the evaluation of the reliability of FLD and SEL regarding nesting a
scope in figure 4.11. Therefore, we create S3 in the same way as for the experiments
above, but we additionally create scope S31 15 seconds after S3. It remains for 48 sec-
onds and is then deleted, 5 seconds before S3 is also deleted.
In figure 4.11(a) we can confirm the observation from above, that our Contiki imple-
mentation of the Scopes Framework enables us to get results matching the ideal case.
Both scopes, S3 and S31, are alive with all member nodes from creation to deletion of
4.2 Scopes Framework 71
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
 90
 100
00:20 00:30 00:40 00:50 01:00 01:10 01:20 01:30 01:40 01:50 02:00 02:10
sc
o
p
e 
m
em
b
er
sh
ip
 [
%
]
elapsed time [mm:ss]
S3 avg
S31 max
S31 avg
S31 min
(a) FLD, S3
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
 90
 100
00:20 00:30 00:40 00:50 01:00 01:10 01:20 01:30 01:40 01:50 02:00 02:10
sc
o
p
e 
m
em
b
er
sh
ip
 [
%
]
elapsed time [mm:ss]
S3 avg
S31 max
S31 avg
S31 min
(b) SEL, S3
Figure 4.11: Scope creation, removal and maintenance for nested scopes on Contiki
the scopes. We also observe a slight increase in time to create the subscope, here we get
an average of 3.6 seconds. Still this shows that the first SCR is received and processed
by all nodes. With the SEL routing, figure 4.11(b), the connection to the two nodes far
from the root node got lost in some experiments and is reflected in the lesser reliability
before deleting the scope. The average value imposes that this problem only occurred in
a small number of runs.
Network density.
The areal densities ρA changed slightly compared to the SOS evaluation. In table 4.4
the densities for our experiments are shown. ρA = 4 and ρA = 2 increased by two nodes
and the area covered also changed slightly.
ρA #Nodes Nodes per area
4 32 1/17.3m2
2 20 1/27.5m2
1 10 1/54.9m2
Table 4.4: Node densities for Contiki
The stability for density ρA = 2 for the scopes S1 and S2 show the same almost ideal
behavior as we have seen for the ρA = 4 density seen in figure 4.10. Therefore, we omit
these figures. Only for the ρA = 1 we recognize a slightly lower stability at the beginning
of the scope creation. The fewer messages exchanged by SEL and the relatively sparse
network resulted in some nodes joining with a later SCR then the first one. This implies
that for the optimal performance of the Scopes Framework a higher density has to be
chosen.
The figure 4.12 supports the conclusion that density ρA = 1 is not favorable for the
Scopes Framework. In 4.12(a) and especially 4.12(b) it can be seen that this density
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Figure 4.12: Scope density for S3 and S31 on Contiki
results in more unstable scope memberships, but still an average membership rate of
nearly 80% is achieved. From the definition of scope S31 can be seen, that these 20%
missing relate to one node missing in the scope. Besides that the two other figures show
the same results for the base scope as we have seen in the single scope experiments. Just
the scope creation in figure 4.12(d) of the sub scope took some additional refresh cycles
until the scope reached a stable state. From there on it is stable and the scope deletion
is handled as expected and the scope is deleted after receiving the deletion message.
Resource Costs.
The efficiency metric for the scopes operation costs also used in the SOS evaluation
is shown in figure 4.13(a) for the Contiki version of the Scopes Framework. The figure
shows the link-level traffic for S1 and S2 over the scopes life-cycle. Again, each mea-
surement took 2 minutes and represents all the messages exchanged in the tests run,
there were 25 test runs. As the network is 2 nodes larger FLD uses around 370 scopes
management messages. SEL used the same number of messages. This is to be expected,
as SEL uses a flooding algorithm for the RtM communication direction and the scope
management messages are only issued from the root node. Compared to GBR the man-
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agement costs are reduced and are deterministic as they only depend on the number of
nodes and not additionally if a node joins the scope, as this was the case for GBR.
To estimate the resource costs we sum up the ROM and static RAM usage of all mod-
ules implemented in this work. Dynamic RAM allocation is not used. Other modules
provided by the Contiki OS are not listed here as these are resources that Contiki
uses independently of the Scopes Framework. Especially the routing algorithms re-
use modules provided by Contiki for basic communication patterns. This implies that
the overall firmware size is the size of the Scopes Framework RAM and ROM, listed in
figure 4.13(b), plus the size of the Contiki OS RAM and ROM usage.
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Figure 4.13: Resource costs
Figure 4.13(b) shows the amount of RAM and ROM used by the Scopes Framework.
The size is independent of the routing algorithm being used and uses roughly 8kB ROM
and 1kB RAM. It includes all the Scopes functionality, like handling of scopes, member-
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ship checking, data store for membership properties and logging. The scopes modules
plus the routing algorithms have a total size of 8.5kB ROM for FLD and 12kB for SEL.
The RAM usage is roughly 1kB for FLD and 1.5kB when using SEL. These numbers leave
enough room for additional code for Scope tasks.
Scope traffic.
For the Scope traffic tests on Contiki we employed the same mechanisms that were
used for the SOS evaluation. We have a setup and tear down phase at the beginning and
end of every run to let the scope stabilize or be removed. In between our traffic tests
take place. The detailed description given in the corresponding section of chapter 4.2.1.3
remains valid for the current evaluation.
We also evaluated the two traffic directions root-to-member (RtM) and member-to-
root (MtR) separately with two communication patterns: burst and periodic, as these
are very commonly used patterns in sensor networks. For all these tests the same delays
are used for stabilization and teardown phase. These are α=5s after creation of the
scope to let it stabilize and β=23s for the tear down phase to let all the remaining
messages be delivered before the scope is closed.
Periodic traffic.
In the RtM tests, the scope root sends M = 31 messages to the members, whereas
in MtR tests each scope member sends M = 31 messages to the root. Each sending
node posts a timer that is triggered with a frequency λ = t3−t2
M
= 2 seconds. To reduce
network collisions, message transmission is delayed randomly by " (with λ
8
≤ " ≤ 7λ
8
)
by the sending application if sending direction is MtR. To further stress the routing
protocols, we used scope S1, which includes all 31 network nodes.
The first two figures in 4.14 show the results of the goodput experiments. The data
is shown in messages per two seconds, as the send interval is two seconds. Both fig-
ures show a similar behavior we observed in the previous experiments with the SOS
version. Figure 4.14(a) shows the RtM direction and a slightly better performance of
the FLD routing (98.70%) compared to the SEL routing (87.50%). These results are
better than the results under SOS: +3.5% for the FLD routing and +13% for the new
SEL routing. Figure 4.14(b) shows the MtR results and also shows results comparable
to the SOS experiments. It shows for FLD routing 14.98% and for SEL routing 78.07%
of the theoretical goodput. This result reveals a higher sensitivity of the system to high
network traffic. Compared to the former SOS results the relations between the routing
algorithms are still valid, but the absolute numbers are worse: for FLD a loss of 59.46%
and for SEL routing a loss of 17.37%. The next two figures 4.14(c) and 4.14(d) depict
the link-level traffic and reflect the results of the previous two figures and their results.
The SOS results show the same behavior, but with an even worse result for FLD perfor-
mance. The figures show all link-level traffic, this means data and management traffic
of the Scopes Framework. In figure 4.14(c) we can see quite similar traffic for both
routing algorithms. This is as expected, as in the RtM direction SEL also uses a flooding
4.2 Scopes Framework 75
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
 35
 40
 0  20  40  60  80  100
g
o
o
d
p
u
t 
[m
/s
ec
]
elapsed time [sec]
theoretical goodput
SEL
FLD
(a) root-to-members goodput
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
 35
 40
 0  20  40  60  80  100
g
o
o
d
p
u
t 
[m
/s
ec
]
elapsed time [sec]
theoretical goodput
SEL
FLD
(b) members-to-root goodput
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
 35
 40
 45
 50
 55
 60
 65
 0  20  40  60  80  100
tr
an
sm
is
si
o
n
s 
[m
/s
ec
]
elapsed time [sec]
SEL
FLD
(c) root-to-members link-level traffic
 0
 50
 100
 150
 200
 250
 300
 350
 400
 450
 500
 550
 600
 650
 0  20  40  60  80  100
tr
an
sm
is
si
o
n
s 
[m
/s
ec
]
elapsed time [sec]
SEL
FLD
(d) members-to-root link-level traffic
Figure 4.14: Goodput and link-level periodic traffic on Contiki
technique for routing. Still SEL uses 20.86% less messages than FLD. In figure 4.14(d)
The traffic of FLD is up to a magnitude larger than the SEL traffic. Over the total time of
the experiment FLD uses 562,68% of messages compared to the total SEL traffic.
Bursty traffic.
For these bursty tests, sending nodes produce also a message burst which can be ap-
proximated by a gaussian function, as with the SOS tests before. A gaussian function
with center=5, standard deviation=3.2 and a peak value of 7 is used. This amounted
to a total of M=15 messages. As with the periodic traffic, the burst is ideally sent in
intervals of λ=2 seconds, and scope S1 was used for the experiments. In the RtM tests,
it is only the scope root node who sends the burst, while in MtR tests, all 31 (member)
nodes sent the burst back to the root. For the figures the number of messages in each 2
second slot is evaluated. This reduces the resolution of the results, but better reflects the
message count per slot. This is also the cause that the scope refreshes are only reflected
when they generate a high load, which is only significant in figure 4.15(d).
The results presented in figure 4.15 include both data and scope management traffic
for the link-layer. The theoretical values are represented by the gaussian curve and are
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Figure 4.15: Goodput and link-level bursty traffic on Contiki
data traffic only. Figures 4.15(a) and 4.15(b) display the goodput for RtM and MtR
traffic, respectively. In the RtM tests, FLD is slightly superior to SEL with 82.23% com-
pared to 75.44% goodput. This is the result of redundancy of flooding combined with a
small amount of traffic, which can clearly be seen in the link-level traffic figure 4.15(c).
Here, in the RtM direction only the root node sends and the number of messages in
the network is fair and introduces only some more management and routing overhead
than SEL, 119.35% against 63.77% for SEL, compared to the MtR scenario. In the MtR
tests, figure 4.15(b), FLD had a goodput of 27.52% and SEL reached 76.43%. Further,
the graphs show that FLD had a similar behavior as the tests executed on the SOS plat-
form, the SEL routing performs better than the old GBR. In total FLD lost some goodput
compared to the previous tests, due to the same causes as before. The link-level traffic
for FLD leads to congestion and message loss due to collisions or dropping of messages,
compare figure 4.15(d). The significantly better SEL efficiency over FLD for MtR – an
order of magnitude – is clearly visible in 4.15(d) and could be preserved from the former
SOS implementation.
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4.3 SecScopes Framework
The SecScopes Framework is the combination of the Scopes Framework for Contiki
with the security measures proposed in chapter 3. First, we will evaluate the perfor-
mance of the chosen security algorithms on common sensor network platforms, used by
the newly introduced security measures in the Scopes Framework. Then we will have a
look at the combined Framework with the security measures.
4.3.1 Security Algorithms
We have three sets of security algorithms available to our implementation. First, the
AES Algorithm implemented in the hardware of the IEEE 802.15.4 radio chip. Second
the TinyECC library that supports elliptic curve cryptography and provides algorithms,
e.g. for encryption/decryption or sign/verify data. TinyECC includes a math library for
calculations on elliptic curves. These math functions were enhanced by us to support
our implementation of the CP-ABE algorithm that was implemented from scratch for this
work. CP-ABE is the third.
In figure 4.16 the dependencies between the Scopes Framework and the security algo-
rithms are shown. The dashed blocks were newly implemented for this work, the dotted
blocks were enhanced to meet our needs.
Contiki OS
TinyECC
CP-ABE
ScopeManager
EC-Math.-
Functions
AES
AES-CTRTate-Pairing
Figure 4.16: Relationships between Scopes and security algorithms
As the AES front-end is just an interface to the hardware algorithm we do not expect
any performance issues in this direction. Therefore, we will show some implementation
details for AES, but focus for our performance considerations on the tandem of TinyECC
and CP-ABE.
4.3.1.1 Implementation details
Symmetric Cryptography (AES)
The hardware AES blocks on Econotag and Tmote Sky only support encryption of data.
Using AES in counter mode (AES-CTR, [71]) allows to use AES as block cipher and only
AES encryption is needed to encrypt and decrypt data. As both hardware blocks have
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different interfaces we defined a unified interface that implemented the AES-CTR mode
with the specific hardware block, see listing 4.9.
1 /* t y p e d e f s */
2 typedef s t ruc t aes_key_s {
3 uint32_t va l [4 ] ;
4 } aes_key_t ;
5
6 /* Func t ion p r o t o t y p e s */
7 u in t8_ t a e s _ i n i t ( ) ;
8 void a e s _ c t r _ c i p h e r ( u in t8_ t *data , u in t16_t len , aes_key_t *key ) ;
Listing 4.9: AES Counter Mode API.
The aes_init function is only needed for the initialization of the advanced security
module (ASM) of the ARM7 of the Econotags, for the Tmotes this function just returns.
The logic of the AES counter mode is implemented in the aes_ctr_cipher function. The
Tmote implementation is straight forward, as this hardware block just waits for a key
and data to encrypt it. The ASM implementation needed quite more effort, as the ARM
module needs to run a selftest before it can be used and it offers some configuration
options that have to be set correctly, before the module can be used.
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
The mathematical operations on elliptic curves are provided by the TinyECC library.
It provides an extensive API but not all functions are used. Therefore, we will shortly
summarize the APIs provided, and show in listing 4.10 a selected set of functions that
are used in CP-ABE. Additionally, simple assignment functions are omitted.
The standard TinyECC distribution was enhanced to additionally provide a full Tate
pairing and to compute random points on the elliptic curve, besides some basic opera-
tions.
TinyECC provides APIs for operations on big natural numbers (NN) and big natural
complex numbers (NN2). These define arithmetic operations, data assignments and
number theoretic operations modulo a number. They are used by the following APIs.
ECC API (ECC) provides operations on the elliptic curve and the Tate pairing API (TP),
which is used to provide the computation of a bilinear pairing on the elliptic curve. The
SHA1 API (SHA1) that also comes with TinyECC, provides the calculation of the SHA1
digest. All these APIs are used for our CP-ABE implementation.
Attribute-based Encryption (CP-ABE)
The CP-ABE implementation for the sensor nodes was done from ground up. To ensure
proper implementation and calculation we used the implementation of CP-ABE from the
PBC library [75] as guidance and reference implementation for debugging. This way we
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1 /* SHA1 */
2 void SHA1_Reset ( SHA1Context * contex t ) ;
3 void SHA1_Update( SHA1Context * context , const u in t8_ t *message , u in t32_t len ) ;
4 void SHA1_Digest ( SHA1Context * context , u in t8_ t d i g e s t [ SHA1HashSize ] ) ;
5
6 /* Func t i on s on e l l i p t i c c u r v e s */
7 void ECC_ini t ( void ) ;
8 Params* ECC_get_param ( void ) ;
9 void ECC_Random_PointMul ( Po int *P ) ;
10 void ECC_Random_Hash( Point *P , NN_DIGIT *h ) ;
11 void ECC_mul( Po int *P0 , Po int *P1 , NN_DIGIT *n ) ;
12 void ECC_add( Point *P0 , Po int *P1 , Po int *P2 ) ;
13
14 /* Func t i on s on b ig na tura l numbers */
15 void NNModRandom(NN_DIGIT *b , NN_DIGIT *c , NN_UINT d i g i t s ) ;
16 void NNModAdd(NN_DIGIT *a , NN_DIGIT *b , NN_DIGIT *c , NN_DIGIT *d ,
17 NN_UINT d i g i t s ) ;
18 void NNModSub(NN_DIGIT *a , NN_DIGIT *b , NN_DIGIT *c , NN_DIGIT *d ,
19 NN_UINT d i g i t s ) ;
20 void NNModMult(NN_DIGIT *a , NN_DIGIT *b , NN_DIGIT *c , NN_DIGIT *d ,
21 NN_UINT d i g i t s ) ;
22 void NNModNeg(NN_DIGIT *a , NN_DIGIT *b , NN_DIGIT *c , NN_UINT d i g i t s ) ;
23 void NNModInv(NN_DIGIT *a , NN_DIGIT *b , NN_DIGIT *c , NN_UINT d i g i t s ) ;
24 void NNMult(NN_DIGIT *a , NN_DIGIT *b , NN_DIGIT *c , NN_UINT d i g i t s ) ;
25 void NNDiv(NN_DIGIT *a , NN_DIGIT *b , NN_DIGIT *c , NN_UINT cD ig i t s ,
26 NN_DIGIT * d , NN_UINT d D i g i t s ) ;
27
28 /* Func t i on s on b ig na tura l complex numbers */
29 void NN2ModRandom(NN2_NUMBER *a , NN_DIGIT *b , NN_UINT d i g i t s ) ;
30 void NN2ModMult(NN2_NUMBER *a , NN2_NUMBER *b , NN2_NUMBER *c , NN_DIGIT *d ,
31 NN_UINT d i g i t s ) ;
32 void NN2ModExp(NN2_NUMBER *a , NN2_NUMBER *b , NN_DIGIT *c , NN_DIGIT *d ,
33 NN_UINT d i g i t s ) ;
34 void NN2ModInv(NN2_NUMBER *a , NN2_NUMBER *b , NN_DIGIT *c , NN_UINT d i g i t s ) ;
35
36 /* Tate p a i r i n g */
37 TPParams* TP_getTPparams ( void ) ;
38 void TP_TatePair ing (NN2_NUMBER * res , Po int *P , Po int *Q) ;
Listing 4.10: TinyECC math library API.
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could compare our algorithm’s results with the intermediate and end results of the PBC
library implementation and ensure proper functionality.
For the attribute-based encryption there are two APIs available. The algorithm API
that supports the core algorithm functions and the serialization API that allows the seri-
alization and deserialization of memory structures that have to be transmitted with the
cypher text to allow proper functionality. Here we will focus on the algorithm API, see
listing 4.11. The corresponding memory structures are omitted because of their textual
size and number of attributes.
1 /* Func t ion p r o t o t y p e s */
2 void cpabe_ in i t ( void ) ;
3
4 void cpabe_setup ( cpabe_pub_t *pub , cpabe_msk_t *msk ) ;
5 void cpabe_keygen ( cpabe_prv_t *prv , cpabe_pub_t *pub , cpabe_msk_t *msk ,
6 char** a t t r i b u t e s ) ;
7 void cpabe_enc ( cpabe_cph_t *cph , cpabe_pub_t *pub , NN2_NUMBER * m,
8 char * p o l i c y ) ;
9 in t cpabe_dec ( cpabe_prv_t *prv , cpabe_cph_t *cph , NN2_NUMBER * m) ;
10
11 void cpabe_revocat ion_update (NN2_NUMBER * g_hat_alpha_prime , Po int * de l ta ,
12 cpabe_pub_t *pub , cpabe_msk_t *msk ) ;
13 void cpabe_pub_update (NN2_NUMBER * g_hat_alpha_prime , cpabe_prv_t *pub ) ;
14 void cpabe_prv_update ( Po int * de l ta , cpabe_prv_t * prv ) ;
Listing 4.11: CP-ABE Algorithm API.
As described in chapter 3.1.1.3 the first set of methods is closely related to the func-
tions provided by the CP-ABE algorithm, where the cpabe_init prepares the memory
structures of the algorithm. The cpabe_setup generates a public and a master key.
cpabe_keygen generates a private key out of the public key and a set of attributes.
Functions cpabe_enc and cpabe_dec allow the encryption and decryption of a message.
In the Scopes Framework this message is the symmetric key for the AES encryption.
The second block of methods relates to the revocation of keys as described in sec-
tion 3.3. cpabe_revocation_update updates the master key and returns the parameter
to update all private and public keys. This is split, so that the parameter can be dis-
tributed to the nodes that will stay in the network and a coordinated update can be
executed. To update the public and private keys the functions cpabe_pub_update and
cpabe_prv_update are used. After the update, nodes with the old key cannot com-
municate with the rest of the network or new nodes, as all use the new parameter
keys.
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4.3.1.2 Methodology and Setup
For the evaluation of TinyECC on Contiki we reconstructed most of the parameters of
the original tests to only have changed the underlying operating system and program-
ming language. Therefore, we used the Tmote Sky as test platform and ran the test
cases that came with the TinyECC distribution with the same elliptic curve. We selected
the best and the worst case in the sense of runtime. So all optimizations of TinyECC are
enabled or all optimizations are disabled. This will give us an overview of the perfor-
mance we then compare to the results of the original TinyECC implementation reported
in [72].
The original results [61] for the Tate pairing algorithm are only given for Imote2 and
MicaZ nodes, so we cannot directly compare these. We decided to use the Tmote Sky
as our smallest platform as a reference to estimate the performance. We again used the
test case and elliptic curves that came with TinyECC to evaluate the performance. This
time with all optimizations enabled.
For the results of CP-ABE we evaluated it on four platforms, namely Tmote Sky, Z1,
Stargate and a PC. On the Tmote Sky we ran the stable version 2.4 of Contiki. The
Tmotes are similar to the well known TelosB nodes, the only difference is that TelosB
have a maximum frequency of 4MHz. We used the Tmotes at 4MHz to get results that
are equivalent to the TelosB platform and did additional tests at the Tmotes’ maximum
frequency of 8MHz. Similarly to the Tmote Sky nodes, the Z1 nodes use an MSP430
microcontroller, but a more recent, faster version. It’s maximum frequency is 16MHz
and we did tests here at 8 and 16MHz to compare the results to the Tmotes. On the
Z1 we used Contiki 2.5, as the Z1s are supported by Contiki starting with this version.
Additionally, to support the new MSP430 a recent C compiler is necessary. The Stargate
was chosen, due to its similarity with the Gumstix Connex and Imote2 sensor nodes. The
experiments were executed on an embedded Linux at 200 and 400MHz, were 400MHz is
the maximum for the Stargate. As a desktop PC sized device we did tests on a 2,200MHz
Core2Duo, where only one core was used for our experiments.
Because of the diversity of platforms, operating systems and build environments, not
all experiments and analyses could be performed on all platforms.
Sizes Small Medium Large
Properties 1 5 7
Policy 2 5 8
Table 4.5: Definition of property and policy set sizes
The most important part of our results is the runtime evaluation. It was done on all
platforms and with three different sets of properties shown in table 4.5. One set rep-
resents an CP-ABE access policy used to restrict access to a ciphertext. If a node wants
to decrypt the ciphertext it has to have a key with properties matching the access struc-
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ture. These access structures are represented as threshold gate, see section 3.1.1.3. The
small set has a property attrib1 and the policy used is attrib1 1of1. The medium
set has five properties and its policy is attr1 attr3 attr9 attr4 2of4. The large set
has seven properties and its policy is the exploded version of attrib4 > 6, see sec-
tion 3.1.1.3. This settles in eight terms for an 8bit unsigned integer. We did also
experiments on ROM size and static and dynamic RAM usage and used a script from
TinyOS to retrieve this data. This was done on all platforms except the PC. To estimate
energy consumption on the Z1 and Stargate platforms, we calculated U × I × t or P × t
for the Stargate platform. Both equations return milli-joules and are based on voltage
(U), current (I) and execution time (t). The power (P) equals P = U × I .
The Tmotes are the only platform available in this evaluation where TinyECC provides
assembler code to speed up computation, so we show a performance comparison for this
platform. The Z1s MSP430 uses an advanced assembler instruction set that seems to be
incompatible, as we could not get the assembler code to run on them. Also the X-Scale
processor on the Stargate seems to have little differences from the Imote2 one.
For our experiments we obtained a 192bit and a 512bit curve that are both suitable for
pairing operations on elliptic curves, one from the reference implementation of CP-ABE,
the other from the TinyECC distribution. The 512bit curve is rated secure for pairings,
but puts too much load on low power sensor nodes, so that we also did the experiments
with the 192bit curve.
All our experiments were repeated 10 times and the results were averaged. The code
used was the same for all platforms, except for methods provided by the operating
systems and in the case of Tmote Sky the assembler optimization.
4.3.1.3 Performance Evaluation
First, we show the performance evaluation for the TinyECC distribution and after-
wards for the CP-ABE implementation.
TinyECC on Contiki
The evaluation of TinyECC on Contiki was done on a Tmote Sky with 160bit elliptic
curve parameters. We will first show our results in figures 4.17(a) and 4.17(b), and then
compare them to the reported values in [72] in figures 4.17(c) and 4.17(d).
Figures 4.17(a) and 4.17(b) show the timing results of all three Tiny ECC algorithms.
These are ECDSA, a signature scheme, ECIES, an encryption / decryption algorithm,
and ECDH for key agreement using elliptic curves. In figure 4.17(a) all optimization
switches of TinyECC were turned off. This results in zero runtime for the init functions,
as no pre-computations are required. In this experiment encryption / verification, and
signing / decryption take almost the same amount of time. Comparing this to figure
4.17(b) where all the optimizations are enabled, revealed that the encryption is here the
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Figure 4.17: Results of TinyECC on Contiki.
most expensive operation. Also the performance increased for all operations more than
ten times, note the different scales in the two figures. But with all optimizations the
initializations also need a considerable amount of time. E.g. the initialization of ECDSA
is the operation with the second highest costs overall. The advantage here is, that the
initialization operation only has to be performed once. Having a look at all values the
times at 8 MHz are consistently less then 50% of the times at 4 MHz.
Comparing the results with the originally reported ones can be seen in figures 4.17(c)
and 4.17(d). First, we note that in all cases and operations we have at least a slight gain
in performance. For the 4 MHz results the gain varies between 0.64% and 2.94%, which
is not very significant and at least confirmed the results from the original paper. However
the 8MHz results show a gain of 5.41% to 7.55%. This in contrast is a significant gain
achieved by porting the code to C and Contiki.
Here we were able to show that TinyECC is performing slightly better on Contiki than
on TinyOS and we made sure that our base library is fully functional.
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Figure 4.18: Timing of Tate Pairing with all optimizations.
Tate Pairings in TinyECC.
For our next evaluation we had no numbers to directly relate to. But still the results in
figure 4.18 showed for a 192bit Tate pairing computation that it is roughly as expensive
as the encryption operation from basic TinyECC. The time needed for the computation
of a pairing in a 512bit curve took with 92.7s and 44.2s more than 13 times longer
than for the small curve. Depending on the application, even these large values can be
accepted in a WSN. E.g., for a monitoring application that runs for a long time it may
not matter if from time to time such a long operation takes place.
CP-ABE on Contiki
We started our evaluation of the CP-ABE algorithm with an estimate of the theoret-
ical computation costs. Next we show detailed measurements of execution time on
all platforms and, as far as possible, with all property sets and curves we presented
earlier. After that we give numbers for the energy consumption on the Z1 and Star-
gate platforms. Last, we show ROM sizes for all platforms (except the PC), and RAM
requirements for Tmotes and Z1s.
Theoretical Operation Costs.
Table 4.6 shows the used computations over all CP-ABE operations. We defined three
classes of operations: multiplication, additions and pairings. As we have seen in the
last section, pairings are very expensive, and so they are in a separate class. The setup
operation is the only constant one. It uses 1 pairing and 4 multiplications. Key genera-
tion depends on the number of properties to be included in the secret key and it uses 2
multiplications and 1 addition, plus 3 multiplications and 1 addition per property. En-
cryption and decryption highly depend on trees, the policy tree for encryption and the
minimal satisfied policy tree for decryption. The tree used for decryption is smaller or
has the same size, this depends on the actual policy and property set used to satisfy the
policy. The base costs for encryption are 2 multiplications and 1 addition. For each node
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except the tree root we add 3 multiplications and 1 addition, plus 2 multiplications and
1 addition for every leaf node. Leaf nodes represent properties and inner nodes thresh-
old gates. For decryption the costs are a bit higher, but in general this tree is smaller
than for encryption. The base cost is 1 pairing and 2 additions, plus 6 multiplications
and 2 additions for all nodes except the tree root, and 2 pairings, 1 multiplication and 1
addition for all leaf nodes.
Operations setup keygen enc dec
Pairings 1 0 0 1
leaf: 2
Mult 4 2 2 0
prop: 3 (n-1): 3 (n-1): 6
leaf: 2 leaf: 1
Add 0 1 1 2
prop: 1 (n-1): 1 (n-1): 2
leaf: 1 leaf: 1
Table 4.6: CP-ABE theoretic cost estimation.
Measured Operation Costs.
Next we will look at figure 4.19 which shows the execution times on all platforms with
a 192bit elliptic curve. In our experiments we used all optimizations of TinyECC, except
the assembler optimization, as this is only available on Tmotes and except the curve
optimizations, as these are not available for the curves we use for pairing computations.
Figures 4.19(a), 4.19(b) and 4.19(c) show results of the small, medium and large prop-
erty sets, where for the large set Tmotes and Z1s had not enough RAM available, so they
are missing in this figure.
The execution time of setup was constant over all three sets. This was to be expected,
as the same keys with the same sizes had to be generated. Looking at the key generation
we can see, that this was by far the most expensive operation in our setup, even though
it was not using pairing. For a Tmote with 4MHz and the medium set it took more
than 2.5 seconds to compute the secret key. Comparing the three sets for key generation
and encryption we see a steady increase of execution time, as these two functions com-
pute values on properties and the complete policy tree. At decryption execution time
increased from small to medium, but for the large set it took the same time as for the
medium. This was because for decryption only properties that were needed to satisfy the
policy are included in computation. These trees were of the same size for the medium
and large sets.
Comparing the different platforms, we recognized the different execution times. Of
course for a desktop PC this computation is no big deal, so we got 21ms, 47ms and 64ms
for the key generation, as the slowest, and 15ms for setup, as the fastest operation. The
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(b) Medium set.
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Figure 4.19: CP-ABE execution time for 192bit curves.
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Stargate achieved also very good performance values with times between 0.5 and 1.5
seconds. For Tmotes and Z1s we see a constant improvement, doubling the frequency
halves the execution time. At 8MHz, where we had data for both platforms, timings
were almost equal. The small difference arises from the different compilers used, as the
compiler for the Z1s produced smaller code than the one of the Tmotes.
Besides this the execution times for these small nodes were very high. But keeping
in mind, that we only have to decrypt a new scope key once in a while for re-keying
or when a new scope is created these may still be acceptable values. Of course nodes
should run at full power for this kind of operation.
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Figure 4.20: Influence of assembler optimization on execution time.
After obtaining these numbers we wanted to check if the provided assembler code for
several methods inside the TinyECC library can speed up execution times. As we only
had working assembler code for the Tmotes, we compared execution times with and
without assembler code for the small property set, see figure 4.20 . In general using the
assembler optimization speeds up the execution, but the gain we achieve is small. On
average we gain 1 second. With execution times between 40 and 150 seconds this is no
significant improvement.
For execution times of 512bit curves figures 4.21(a), 4.21(b) and 4.21(c) show the
results for the small, medium and large sets. As for the large set with the 192bit curve
Tmote and Z1 did not have enough RAM to successfully run the experiments. The
CP-ABE operations show a similar footprint in this experiments as for the 192bit case,
just the absolute timings are higher. Looking at them reveals for the Stargate values of
1,848ms, 5,360ms, 4,801ms and 2,266ms for the four operations of CP-ABE with the
large property set. This shows that the algorithm is definitely feasible on more capable
platforms, and can handle even larger property sets with tolerable execution times.
Energy Consumption.
An important issue in WSNs is energy consumption. Therefore figures 4.22(a) and
4.22(b) show energy consumption estimations for Z1 and Stargate. For Z1 we used the
ENERGEST framework [28] to retrieve the data for our calculations. For the Stargate
we used the timings we got from the previous experiments. We omit the results for
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Figure 4.21: CP-ABE execution time for 512bit curves.
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Figure 4.22: CP-ABE energy consumption.
Tmotes here as they use the same microcontroller family as the Z1s and their current
draw by frequency scales linear, so the results for 8MHz are the same for both platforms.
As mentioned before the datasheet for Z1s microcontroller [125] specifies a current
draw of 0.41 for 8MHz and 0.82 for 16MHz what results, with the previously observed
doubling of performance with a doubling of frequency, in the same energy consumption
for 8 and 16MHz, shown in figure 4.22(a). For the Stargate we got 178mW for 200MHz
and 411mW for 400MHz from the datasheet [52]. The results in 4.22(b) are all much
smaller than the ones estimated for Z1s, even the values for the large properties set is
smaller than the values for Z1s on the medium set. On the other side the current draw
in sleep mode for the Stargate’s microcontroller is 100 times higher than the one from
the Z1s. What was also nicely reflected here was the same performance of decryption in
the medium and large sets. Here you also have roughly the same energy consumption.
Memory Consumption.
After evaluating the runtime characteristics, figures 4.23(a) and 4.23(b) show the
ROM sizes of the implementation. The data shown is for all platforms except the PC,
as the PC platform is not constrained in memory. Compilation for Z1s with the 512bit
curve did not work out, because of the static RAM demands. Three sizes are shown
per entry. These are TinyECC for all code that comes from it. TinyECC ext. includes
all extensions done to TinyECC, these are minor additions for CP-ABE, but also the Tate
pairing. Last CP-ABE is all code implementing this algorithm. This categorization is also
used for static RAM evaluation (figure 4.24).
First thing to mention, compiling the code for 192bit or 512bit introduces no big
changes, so ROM size is stable. In general ROM sizes for Z1 and Tmote should be the
same, however the code for Z1s is compiled using a more recent major version of the
compiler that employs better code optimizations, which results in slightly smaller code.
With the Stargate we change from a 16-bit to a 32-bit architecture which introduces also
a doubling in ROM size. The 25kB for the Tmotes occupy more than half of its ROM, on
the Z1s the ratio is better, here only a quarter is used. For the Stargate with 32MB flash
the 50kB are no problem.
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Figure 4.23: CP-ABE ROM size.
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Figure 4.24: CP-ABE static RAM size.
For the evaluation of RAM we decided to split it into static RAM, that is included in
the sensor node image, and dynamic RAM, that contains only the keys that are used. As
we only have node images on Tmote and Z1 figure 4.24 contains only values for these
platforms. Actually most of static memory is allocated by TinyECC for optimization pur-
poses. CP-ABE or the Tate pairing use only a small amount of static RAM. Of course with
the increase to a 512bit curve this amount also increases. The static memory is inde-
pendent of the three property sets. In table 4.7 we show the different key sizes for the
different elliptic curves and platforms. Besides the master key and public parameters,
which have a static size, the secret key and ciphertext depend on the number of proper-
ties or elements of the policy tree. For example, together with table 4.5 we calculated,
that the secret key in the large set, for 512bit on the Stargate had a size of 2384 bytes.
For the small set these were still 424 bytes.
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Size in byte 192bit 192bit 512bit
Tmote, Z1 Stargate, PC Stargate, PC
Master key 78 84 204
Public params 208 224 544
Secret key 56 64 144
Property elem. 108 120 280
Ciphertext 108 120 316
Policy node 130 164 324
Table 4.7: CP-ABE key structure sizes.
4.3.2 SecScopes Framework
In the following we will evaluate the SecScopes Framework, the cryptographic en-
hanced version of the Scopes Framework. As most of the Scopes Framework is reused,
we will especially highlight the differences between the two Frameworks and discuss the
integration of the security measures.
4.3.2.1 Implementation details
The need for security in WSNs and for the Scopes Framework was motivated in chap-
ter 1. While the need for integrating security and the Scopes Framework appeared to
be obvious, finding the right algorithms that support the scopes concept was not at all
obvious. Finally, we chose CP-ABE as described above, even if it stretches the capabil-
ities of very small sensor nodes. On more capable nodes it can easily be handled and
the advantage of perfectly fitting how the Scopes Framework works in a distributed way
and using properties for authentication makes CP-ABE a very good choice.
The integration in the workflow of the Scopes Framework is shown in chapter 3. The
integration in the code base is split in two parts. First, the extension of the Scopes
Framework’s API and second, the addition and extension of an elliptic curve math library
and the implementation of the CP-ABE algorithm for small-scale devices, such as sensor
nodes. The implementation details of the TinyECC library and the CP-ABE algorithm
were explained earlier in section 4.3.1.1.
As of the extension of the SCR depending on the properties specified for a scope the
message does not fit anymore into one packet. To be able to transfer such an oversized
SCR we implemented an automatic fragmentation that splits messages that are larger
than 90 bytes into maximum 6 fragments of the same size. This led in our experiments
to a high number of dropped SCRs as the corruption of one network packet of the frag-
mented SCR disrupts the whole SCR. In consequence the join rate dropped drastically
for the SecScopes Framework. Therefore, we inserted an integrity layer in the routing
stack to provide a checksum for each SCR fragment. This way we can drop single cor-
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rupted network packets and recover them from another source in the network. With
this small extension we achieved comparable join rates to the previous implementations
with no further influence on the protocol and almost no influence on performance as the
calculation of the checksums is done in hardware.
Besides introducing security in Scopes it was also important to be backwards compati-
ble with the Scopes Framework, so tiny sensor nodes can still be part of a network, even
if they are not capable of encryption or do not require it. Therefore, the APIs shown in
listings 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 are still valid. We only extended the task API to support secured
tasks and connections.
1 /* i n t e r f a c e f u n c t i o n d e c l a r a t i o n s */
2 in t s c o p e s _ r e g i s t e r _ s e c ( subsc r i be r_ id , s t ruc t s cope s_app l i c a t i on * task ,
3 cpabe_prv_t *prv , cpabe_pub_t *pub ) ;
4 bool scopes_open_sec ( subsc r i be r_ id , superScope_id , scope_id ,
5 char * sec_po l i cy , void * specs , spec_len , f l ag s , t t l ) ;
Listing 4.12: SecScopes Framework task API.
With the scopes_register_sec call a task registers itself with the SecScopes Frame-
work as with the previous scopes_register call. But in addition each task can specify
its own private and public keys to be used by the CP-ABE algorithm. This allows different
tasks to co-exist not just on the same network, but also on the same sensor node and
keep their sent and received data concealed from each other.
To create a secure scope the call scopes_open_sec is used. Besides the standard
parameters the CP-ABE decryption policy is added here. As described in chapter 3 the
decryption provides the two AES scope-keys. Each message sent via the secure scope
is encrypted by AES using one of the two keys. Which one to choose is stored in the
key-id field of the message header. The key id is generated for each key by computing its
hash value. The two keys enable the exchange of the used scope-key on a configurable
regular basis or on demand, if a scope-key is suspected to be compromised.
Details of the different algorithms and libraries used to achieve the security needs are
explained in section 4.3.1. Here we explain some peculiarities that came up while set-
ting up the following evaluation. These are due to resource constraints on our sensor
nodes. As we have seen before, the time for execution highly depends on the microcon-
trollers’ frequency. Mostly sensor nodes are limited to 8 or 16MHz if you are looking for
power saving chips and extended life-time of batteries. But you also have powerful mi-
crocontrollers with 50MHz, 200MHz or even more. They have way less life-time while
on standard batteries, but this may be dealt with by using larger, non-standard batteries
to achieve the same life-time or even rechargeable power supplies.
To support even quite small sensor nodes the CP-ABE algorithm is kept modular.
Therefore, depending on the role and capabilities of a sensor node it may only be
configured with a subset of functionality. For example, a small sensor node that just
senses data and does not need to create a scope may only get the decryption routines
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of CP-ABE to save space in the microcontroller’s code space. It can be part of a Sec-
Scopes network, but it only joins a scope and not creating one. The node can still create
data and send it encrypted, forward encrypted data and process it. Other, more capable
nodes, can use encryption and decryption. Thus, they can additionally encrypt, they can
create new scopes, but use more code space. Functionality like creation of keys is most
likely located on a computer outside the sensor network for security reasons on the one
hand, and the lack of use of these functions in the sensor network on the other hand, as
these are only needed to enable new sensor nodes to join the network.
The sensor nodes available in our testbed are quite limited in code space. This means
that the code for the complete Scopes Framework and the CP-ABE algorithm does not
fit together on a sensor node. Even a reduced set, like the aforementioned limitation on
the decryption only does not fit. Therefore, we implemented a stripped CP-ABE module
that allows the use of all the functionality of CP-ABE, such as setting and evaluating the
access-structures. While the stripped CP-ABE module has the same memory footprint as
the original module, it allows us to leave most of the TinyECC math library out of the
firmware image to save code space. The encryption and decryption functions of CP-ABE
are replaced by a simple xor-function thus we do not use plain-text for transmission of
the SCR data. The AES transport encryption is still in place and is fully functional. In
summary, the only thing we replaced is the CP-ABE encryption/decryption calculation:
the evaluation of the access structure is still in place and fully functional. The time
needed by the nodes to calculate encryption or decryption of the CP-ABE algorithm is
not assumed to have a significant influence on the evaluation results. Let us analyze this.
First, encryption is done on a node that wants to create a scope. It has to encrypt the
scope properties. As the encryption takes place before the SCR is sent, the difference in
time of sending the SCR has no influence on the performance of SecScopes. The message
is just sent some time later, when the encryption is in place. Second, when receiving an
encrypted SCR the routing schedules a potential resending of the SCR independently of
the processing of the SCR with SecScopes. This means, a received SCR can be forwarded
instantly, after receiving it completely. Therefore, this is not influenced by a working CP-
ABE decryption at all. Third, processing a new encrypted SCR in SecScopes with the
working CP-ABE decryption takes some minutes, after which the node may join the
scope. Iff it joined, the scopes group key was obtained and the following data exchange
is encrypted with this key and AES in a secure way. With our stripped version the
computation of the decryption is done very fast due to the xor-operation and the node
may join the scope. Still, it may join the scope only if the node’s CP-ABE key matches
the access-structure, as with the full CP-ABE. After this operation, the scope group key
is obtained, and the data traffic is also encrypted with AES. This way the evaluation
below does not take into account that the decryption would introduce a delay of some
minutes before the nodes join the scope, but this has no influence on the decision taken
if the node joins or not, and it has no influence on the data traffic inside the scope
as this traffic is AES-encrypted. Fourth, the computation time of a CP-ABE encryption
or decryption operation takes several minutes. This may render the microcontroller
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unresponsive to other requests, as Contiki employs cooperative multitasking. But, as the
CP-ABE algorithm is not a monolithic computation, but consists of many calls to different
functions that also highly rely on loop-processing, the code can be split into smaller parts
with short run-time, handing control back to the main processing. Here processing of
other requests or triggering the next processing step in CP-ABE computation can be
executed. Our implementation is currently not prepared for respecting the cooperative
multitasking, but this is a standard and well-known procedure in the embedded industry.
4.3.2.2 Methodology and Setup
To evaluate the influence of the security measures we employed in the SecScopes
Framework we repeat the same tests that we have done for the Scopes Framework
version, see section 4.2.2.2 for test methodology and setup. We use the same scope
definitions as listed in section 4.2.2.2. For data logging we use the Motelab infrastruc-
ture of our testbed as before.
4.3.2.3 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we use the results of the Contiki version of the Scopes Framework as
baseline for our security enhancements (see section 4.2.2.3). The evaluation of Sec-
Scopes itself was carried out in the same way as the one for the Scopes Framework and
therefore, we only summarize the evaluation parameters.
Scope Creation, Removal and Maintenance.
This paragraph looks at the operations of scope creation, maintenance and deletion. To
evaluate the reliability we employ the same measurements as with the former Contiki
results. We show the average of 5 test runs φav g , the minimum φmin and maximum
φmax percentage of memberships achieved over all test runs. Of course, this does not
reflect the single experiment run, but shows worst and best case.
In our experiments with the SecScopes Framework we send the scope creation at t =
30 seconds. The scope is then kept alive for 68 seconds and is then deleted by a deletion
message at t = 98 seconds. The scope refresh interval is set to 6 seconds like in the
Scopes Framework experiments and reflected in the graphs by light grey vertical lines.
The time span the scope is alive allows for 11 scope refresh cycles. If a node misses the
scope deletion message the scope times out 20 seconds after the last refresh message
and is then deleted at t = 116 seconds. This is also shown in the graph by the last
vertical line on the right.
In figure 4.25 we show the results for the reliability tests using scopes S1 and S2. First
thing to mention is that we again reach almost steady the 100% scope memberships
of nodes in the network. Although it takes some time while creating a scope to reach
it. Flooding (FLD) achieves a faster startup behavior then our selective flooding (SEL).
FLD needs 1 second to reach more than 80% membership, SEL takes 3 seconds. For the
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Figure 4.25: Scope creation, removal and maintenance with SecScopes
removal of the scope FLD takes 2-3 seconds while SEL takes 3-4 seconds. FLD is a bit
faster compared to SEL with our security enhancements, but the results are still similar
as SEL also uses a flooding algorithm.
Compared to the results of the Scopes Framework it is obvious that the creation, main-
tenance and deletion process is less stable, especially for creation. But this is what has
to be expected, as the creation process has to transfer a much bigger SCR than without
the security enhancements. This can lead to multiple messages sent and these messages
have to be received by each node before they can decrypt and evaluate the data. As
the decryption of messages adds some additional time to all processing it explains the
growth of overall processing time.
Nested scopes.
For the evaluation of the reliability of nested scopes with FLD and SEL we create the
scope S3 as the parent scope with the same timings as in the setup before. 15 seconds
after the creation of S3 the nested scope S31 is created. Also 5 seconds before the scope
S3 is deleted the nested scope S31 is deleted.
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Figure 4.26: Scope creation, removal and maintenance for nested scopes with SecScopes
Figure 4.26 supports the observations from the previous paragraph that the process
of creation, maintenance and deletion it less stable compared to the Scopes Framework
and a single operation takes more time to execute. The used routing algorithm seems to
make no difference, as the graphs are very similar.
The stability of the nested scope depends on the stability of the parent scope. The
parent scopes here are quite stable, but when a node gets removed from the parent
scope the nested scope reacts sensitive to this instability. On the one hand it may loose
the nodes removed from the parent scope as members, if they are also member of the
nested scope and on the other hand the nested scope may suffer from instabilities in its
own refresh mechanism.
In comparison to the Scopes Framework evaluation the average scope reliability is
not as constant as the results of these experiments, also ignoring the extended time for
creation and deletion. But the minimum curve of scope S31 shows that the larger refresh
messages lead to a higher probability of being missed by some nodes. As this drop can
be seen in both figures for FLD (see figure 4.26(a)) and SEL (see figure 4.26(b)) in
the same distance to the creation of the nested scope, it seems that the refreshes for
the nested scope do not reach all the members right after creation of the scope. This
hypothesis is supported by the time window of 20 seconds between this drop and the
creation of the nested scope. A definite cause for this behavior could not be found in
our data. Presumably the number of messages after creation of the nested scope leads
to collisions and consequently the loss of refresh messages.
Network density.
For this evaluation we use the same node densities ρA = {1,2,4} as specified for the
Scopes Framework previously in table 4.4. The graphs for scopes S1 and S2 are similar
to scope S3, therefore, we omit them and just show the graphs for the nested scopes S3
and S31. Figure 4.27 shows the graphs for ρA = 1 and ρA = 2, the graphs for ρA = 4 are
the same as shown for the nested scope evaluation in figure 4.26.
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Figure 4.27: Scope density for S3 and S31 with SecScopes
As we have seen in the evaluation of the Scopes Framework, here also density ρA = 1,
figures 4.27(a) and 4.27(b), is not suitable for our system. The average curve for scope
S3 shows that clearly. It may not be obvious, but the performance of the subscope S31
is the same for FLD and SEL. The nodes joined in the FLD test-runs are all the nodes
belonging to the scope, whereas the nodes joined in the test-runs for SEL are not all
nodes that may belong to the subscope. Therefore, the subscope with SEL cannot reach
the maximum percentage of members compared to FLD.
The difference between SEL and FLD for ρA = 2 and ρA = 3 is just minor. In the
raw numbers there is a visible difference between the two densities. Unfortunately, it
is not clearly visible through the graphs. It can be observed that the density of 4 is
getting less stable than the density of 2, but compared to the density of 1 these two
can be considered stable. At first sight this appears strange, since more nodes in the
area seems like a better coverage and a better chance to forward messages. But starting
somewhere in between the densities of 2 and 4 there is a tradeoff between this enhanced
coverage and the number of collisions of messages. This means a number at the higher
end between 20 and 32 nodes in the area of our experiment is the sweet-spot in terms
of scope reliability.
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Compared to the previous results for the density measures this was not observed, but
this can be explained by the increase of messages in the SecScope version. Depending on
the scope definition 3 times the number of messages is exchanged during scope creation.
This behavior could not be observed with the smaller number of messages in the Scopes
Framework version.
Scope resource costs.
The resource costs for SecScopes include the scope software modules and routing
modules, like in the previous evaluation (see 4.2.2.3) plus the additional code for the
security algorithms.
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Figure 4.28: Resource costs with SecScopes (RAM / ROM)
The RAM and ROM usage for the scopes modules, see 4.28, is quite static, compared
to the previous evaluation. This is ok, as the code only changed to call the new security
measures and some minor bug fixes. More interesting is the increase of the routing
algorithms’ ROM usage of about 3.5kB. This increase includes the implementation of
fragmentation and CRC checks in the routing algorithms to compensate for the larger
messages, that are sent in SecScopes Framework. The additional amount of RAM is
about 0.8kB. The security algorithms themselves introduce additional 4kB of ROM and
1.2kB of RAM. This includes the stripped CP-ABE and interface code for the hardware
AES-unit. For the full version of CP-ABE the ROM footprint would increase about roughly
25kB for the 192bit curve. Compare results from figure 4.23.
In total the security measures implemented and supporting measures to compensate
for the higher network load result in 7.5kB more ROM and 2kB RAM usage in this
firmware image.
Scope traffic.
The scope traffic tests for SecScopes are carried out the same way it was done for
the Scopes Framework tests. It is described in detail in chapter 4.2.1.3. A small differ-
ence had to be implemented. The intervals used to distribute the messages and which
are used to form the different traffic shapes had to be enlarged to 4 seconds. In the
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previous tests the intervals were set to 2 seconds. This was necessary due to reliability
issues. With the smaller intervals we were not able to achieve 5 complete test-runs, as
the increased SR traffic collided more often with the test patterns for our evaluation.
Stretching the time frame spreads the network traffic and lowers collisions. As the gen-
eral setup stays the same the test runtime is also extended to 160 seconds. Intervals
without activity are not shown in the figures. Unfortunately the extended intervals lead
to jumps in the graphs, as you will notice below.
We evaluated the two directions root-to-member (RtM) and member-to-root (MtR)
with two common communication patterns found in wireless sensor networks: burst
and periodic. After creation of the scope we allow it α = 15 seconds to stabilize. After
this our traffic tests are carried out. In the end a tear down phase of β = 23 seconds
allow remaining messages to be delivered before the scope is closed.
These tests show the performance of data transfers inside the scope. Compared to the
Scopes Framework without security the only change here in SecScopes is the encryption
of data. But, the AES encryption does not significantly change the size of the data. In
contrast to the added CP-ABE encryption for scope creation, where the size of the SCR
was, e.g., tripled depending on the access structure used. Therefore, we expect only
minor performance changes due to the added stability features, like CRCs, and the AES
encryption.
Periodic traffic.
The RtM tests, send M = 31 messages to the member nodes, whereas in MtR tests
each scope member sends M = 31 messages to the root node. As described before, each
sending node posts a timer that is triggered with a frequency λ = t3−t2
M
= 4 seconds.
To reduce network collisions, message transmission is still delayed randomly by " (with
λ
8
≤ " ≤ 7λ
8
) by the sending application if sending direction is MtR. We again use the
scope S1 to stress the routing protocols.
The first two figures in 4.29 show the results of the goodput experiments. As already
mentioned the messages are shown in a 4 seconds interval. Compared to the previous
Contiki version without security the figures look quite similar. Figure 4.29(a) shows
the RtM messages and a performance of 96.80% for FLD and 94.18% for SEL. FLD is
still slightly better than SEL, but the difference to the previous experiment is -1.90%
for FLD and +6.68% for SEL. Figure 4.29(b) shows the goodput results for the RtM
direction. Here FLD reaches 28.66% and SEL 87.33%. This is a difference to the previous
experiment of +13.68% for FLD and +9.59% for SEL, which is roughly a double of
goodput for FLD and a good improvement for SEL. Besides the improvements the results
are comparable to the one of the Scopes Framework experiment without security. The
next two figures show the link-level traffic in the periodic traffic scenario. Both figures
show the same behavior as in the Scopes Framework experiment without security, with
a less distinct decrease of messages in figure 4.29(d). The integrity layer introduced to
stabilize the scope join rates also enhance transfer rates, as the overall improvements
shown by these figures suggest.
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Figure 4.29: Goodput and link-level periodic traffic with SecScopes
Bursty traffic.
The bursty tests use the same procedure used in the tests of insecure scopes. The
message bursts are modeled after a gaussian function with center=5, standard devia-
tion=3.2 and a peak value of 7. This amounted to a total of M=15 messages. As with
the SecScopes periodic tests the bursts are ideally sent in intervals of λ = 4 seconds.
Scope S1 is used for the experiments. As seen in the experiments before, in the RtM
setup only the scope root sends the bursts, while in the MtR setup, all 31 (member)
nodes sent the bursts back to the scope root. The messages in the figures of 4.30 are
evaluated in 4 second slots for the same reason as it was done in the periodic tests
before.
The RtM figures 4.30(a) and 4.30(c) look a bit awkward, but this is due to the dif-
ference in analysis compared to the Scopes Framework tests without security. In this
tests we had to use 4 second intervals for the tests due to the large messages in the
scope creation process. The larger intervals allowed less collisions in the process and a
comparable result. Unfortunately, this increases the impact of timer deviations on the
embedded sensor nodes compared to the PC real-time clock. In the two figures the data
from the time slot with the burst-peak and the time slot after that fall together into the
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same point value of second 29. Therefore, the following entry is roughly 0 and the
previous slot exceeds the theoretical maximum.
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Figure 4.30: Goodput and link-level bursty traffic with SecScopes
The curves in figure 4.30 represent data and scope management traffic in the link-
level and data-traffic only for the goodput figures. The theoretical goodput values of the
data-traffic are represented by the gaussian curve. Figures 4.30(a) and 4.30(b) show
the goodput for RtM and MtR burst traffic.
For the RtM tests both routings could improve their goodput, see 4.30(a). SEL
achieved 93.46% and FLD 97.63%. This is an increase of 18.02% and 15.40%, re-
spectively. The figure for the link-level traffic reflects the same results, figure4.30(c).
The graphs for SEL and FLD are almost identical, this is possible as for the RtM com-
munication but routings use flooding. With the newly introduced integrity measures
collisions and such things are highly reduced and the influence on the result is reduced.
FLD is still ahead of SEL, but it is only 4.17% difference.
For the MtR tests with SecScopes SEL could improve its performance compared to
the Scope Framework tests by 16.01% to 92.44% goodput, see 4.30(b). This is the
result of the integrity measures that were taken in this version of the Framework. In
contrast FLD lost 4.51% compared to the previous test and only achieved 23.01%. The
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MtR communication of FLD does distribute each message through the whole network
and with the additional load of the large SCR messages for SecScopes it is not able
to keep its performance. This can also be seen in the link-level traffic, figure 4.30(d),
the integrity measures could reduce the number of sent messages for FLD roughly by
half, due to decreased collisions and resends, but the huge number of messages in the
network still get many messages dropped and decreases the received goodput.
4.4 Summary
In this section we first showed the feasibility of scopes with the initial version of the
Scopes Framework for the SOS operating system. We evaluated different aspects of
Scopes and found it feasible for common low power wireless sensor networks. The
mechanisms for our scoping approach worked stably and the resource requirements
were acceptable. With the experiences from the SOS-version we built an enhanced
version on the Contiki operating system including lessons learned, especially in the area
of routing and scope creation. The evaluation showed slightly better results than our
initial version. The better performance and stability lead us to use it as basis for our
security enhancements.
Evaluating security algorithms matching our requirements showed quickly that they
are quite computation intensive. As the sensor nodes we had available in number lack
memory space and computation capabilities we had to replace these parts of the algo-
rithms with a stripped version that use the message size, RAM footprint and traffic as
the original algorithm for our evaluation. This replacement has no major influence on
our further results, as the evaluation of the algorithms on more capable systems showed
that they are feasible in low-power systems, like todays ARM Cortex-M Series, espe-
cially as most of them have hardware support for extended math operations used in the
computations.
Adding the security mechanisms to the Scopes Framework and creating SecScopes,
we expected computational limits as mentioned before, but what was unexpected in the
first place was the large increase of data to exchange while creating a scope. Besides the
ciphertext the access structures for the data are quite large. Therefore, with the size of
data we had to introduce fragmentation of packets to the data exchange. And with the
larger number of packets we generated more collisions. This resulted in less connection
stability and in some early experiments in the inability to establish a scope. To ensure
packet integrity, we had to introduce additional CRC checking to the routing process to
achieve a better performance than the previous Scopes implementations. Finally, the
larger messages and the cryptographic operations introduced also a longer computation
time. This led to an increased slot time for the SecScopes tests to achieve comparable
results.
The trends observed in our previous evaluations on SOS or Contiki, like the connec-
tion stability at different densities of the network, are now more clearly to see in the
SecScopes evaluation. E.g., the SEL routing algorithm is less stable than in the non-
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secure implementations and performs well at medium density, slightly worse at high
density and poorly at low density.
In the creation and deletion phases of scopes FLD routing is more stable than SEL,
but this is due to a huge number of messages compared to SEL. SEL still has a better
goodput of messages than FLD due to fewer collisions. Therefore, SEL performs better
than FLD, but still the density of the network influences the performance of the whole
system and has to be taken into account when creating such a system.
Security not only requires more resources in memory and computation, but also in
communication which leads to instability due to more data to be exchanged. Counter-
measures for the loss of stability in communication have to be taken, like CRC checking
or fragmentation of packets. With these measures stability improves beyond the stability
of insecure scopes.
From the above experiments we learn that the Scopes Framework works best in an
environment of medium density, as shown above. The size of messages sent in the
network should be below 100 bytes. We used this maximum size for the SecScope
experiments and observed fewer collisions with smaller sizes. The traffic pattern used
(we used bursty and periodic traffic) has no direct influence on the performance, unless
a high load of messages transferred increases the probability of collisions and message
loss in general. Thus, saving bandwidth is mandatory for this kind of applications.
The Scopes Framework does not have special performance requirements, whereas Sec-
Scopes demand a capable processor with up to 200MHz for the cryptographic calculation
to be finished in a reasonable amount of time. What time is reasonable depends on the
scenario. We choose to evaluate the possibilities on low-power sensor nodes. As the ma-
jor computational work has to be done at scope creation and maintenance it is important
to configure the respective scope module parameters to match a given scenario.
To adjust the Scopes Framework or SecScopes to a scenario there are modules that
can be customized and a choice of parameters of the scope module. The modules for
routing, membership evaluation and scope application can be tailored to a scenario’s
needs.
To provide a high degree of freedom for users of the Scopes Framework the interfaces
to the modules have been kept very simple. For example, the membership evaluation
module receives the unprocessed data as byte-string and parses this string. The structure
and data in this byte-string is owned and defined with this module. The framework only
processes the binary result of the evaluation. Similarly, the scope properties that may be
used in conjunction with membership evaluation is kept as a repository of configurable
key/value-pairs. The scope applications contain the scenario-specific program logic, also
called tasks. The routing can also be adjusted to the scenario’s needs and its intended
communication behavior. But here the Scopes Framework has some limitations that
have to be fulfilled to work properly. For example, for scope creation there has to be a
mechanism to send the SCR to all potential scope members. The data communication
can then be defined independently, but the routing must manage the needed routing
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information by itself. For these three modules interface definitions are provided by the
Scopes Framework.
The ScopesManager module has a small set of parameters to optimize its behav-
ior. Especially for SecScopes these parameters are vital for performance. In general
these parameters should be set the same on all nodes of the network. First, we
have SCOPES_MAX_SCOPES, which limits the number of concurrent (sub-)scopes in the
network. The default is 5. Then there is the SCOPES_MAX_SUBSCRIBER, which lim-
its the number of tasks that subscribe to a scope, the default is currently 3. With
SCOPES_TIMER_DURATION the time of reevaluation of dynamic properties can be con-
figured, the default is 15 seconds. The parameter SCOPES_REANNOUNCE_FACTOR con-
figures the time intervals of scope refreshes, which is calculated by TTL of the scope
times the factor in seconds. The default is 0.3. And specifically for SecScopes the
SCOPES_KEY_RENEWAL_INTERVAL defines after how many scope refreshes the AES keys
are renewed, the default is 0, which means every scope refresh is used to renew the
keys.
4.4 Summary 105

5 Related Work
Contents
5.1 Structuring Computer Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.1.1 IP Multicast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.1.2 Publish/Subscribe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.2 Structuring Wireless Sensor Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.2.1 Routing algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.2.2 Frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.3 Mixed Mode Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.3.1 RUNES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.3.2 COSMIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.3.3 PhysicalNet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.3.4 PEIS-Ecology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.3.5 RoboFrame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.3.6 DepSys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.4 Security in Computer Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.4.1 Capability Based Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.4.2 On-Demand Multicast Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.4.3 MundoMessage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.5 Security in Wireless Sensor Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.5.1 Cryptographic libraries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.5.2 Security Frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
In this chapter related work to our Scopes Framework will be presented. First, we will
look at closely related approaches of network node grouping algorithms in common net-
working. After that we summarize important approaches in WSNs related to the Scopes
Framework. Next is an overview of approaches that use so called mixed mode systems,
these are systems encompassing components of widely varying capabilities in common
wireless and non-wireless networks. Section 5.4 shows selected security approaches in
common networking, and after that we summarize approaches introducing security to
WSNs as librarys or similar to the Scopes Framework.
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5.1 Structuring Computer Networks
The Idea of structuring a computer network is as old as the Internet. IP addresses are
grouped in different classes and the Domain Name System (DNS) represents the Internet
in a hierarchical naming scheme. The topology of the Internet with border routers and
gateways reflects the physical structure of different organizations interconnecting their
networks. But structuring in the sense of creating groups that can be reached by an
identifier is not included in the end-to-end nature of IP-based networks.
We selected two important approaches that are related to our Scopes Framework.
First the IP multicast that supports dynamic grouping in IP-based networks. And second,
the Rebeca publish/subscribe middleware as representative for the general publish/sub-
scribe mechanism, which is also a key building block of our framework.
5.1.1 IP Multicast
The idea of multicast was proposed by Deering [25, 26] to support sending data to a
dynamic group of receivers via the Internet Protocol (IP). Key concepts in IP multicast
are IP multicast group addresses, multicast distribution trees and receiver driven tree
creation.
IP multicast enables one-to-many or many-to-many communication over an IP net-
work. For multicast special blocks of IP addresses (ranges) are reserved. The sender
uses one of these addresses to send its messages, and the receiver joins this multicast
group by notifying a network router that it is interested in the multicast group with this
specific address. This mechanism scales well without prior knowledge to whom the mes-
sages have to be sent or how many members belong to a group. The sender has to send
its messages only once, the routers in between will take care of duplicating the data if
necessary. The most commonly used transport protocol is UDP, but others are available.
The process of joining a multicast group is managed by the IGMP protocol [14,25,31].
The message routing is controlled by other protocols. To join a group a client has to
send a request to its router. The router then tries to connect to the next router until a
path from the client to the data source is established. If there are routers in between
that do not support IGMP or multicasting, these routers can be tunneled by forwarding
messages in a unicast packet to a router that supports multicasting. In newer versions of
the protocol besides joining a multicast group also leaving and selection of data source
were added.
Discussion
The multicast grouping scheme is one of the basic building blocks of many approaches
proposed for WSNs. Especially for grouping of network nodes multicasting is essential,
as this mechanism allows efficient communication in a group.
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Multicasting in WSNs is not the same as in IP networks, as most of the time there is
no infrastructure in WSNs like routers or gateways in IP networks. Therefore, the WSN
nodes themselves have to take care of the join process. In WSNs you encounter mostly
scenarios where many senders (sensing nodes) are sending to a small number of data
sinks (e.g. base stations or cluster heads). In IP based networks this is vice versa, most
of the time a node sends data to many data sinks, e.g. a streaming server serving several
clients.
5.1.2 Publish/Subscribe
Over the last one and a half decades there were many publish/subscribe systems in
conventional networks and peer-to-peer-networks, such as Siena [16], Scribe [17], Her-
mes [102] or PADRES [58] in conventional networks. And SpiderCast [20], StAN [83]
or Vitis [105] in peer-to-peer-networks. But still, as the Scopes Framework was inspired
by Rebeca, we will focus on a discussion of this approach for the pub/sub domain.
Rebeca
The Rebeca publish/subscribe (pub/sub) middleware was started in 1999 as a PhD
project by Gero Mühl and Ludger Fiege [87]. Since then it was used by different re-
searchers and was therefore extended and changed several times. The last version was
built by a team from Berlin Institute of Technology [95].
Rebeca provides so called components. These can be publishers or subscribers depend-
ing if they act as producers or consumers of information. The communication between
components is done by notifications. They consist of name-value pairs and are specified
by the producer or derived automatically from the fields of the notification to be pub-
lished. Components can use an interface to asynchronously publish notifications. The
notifications are transmitted by the notification service provided by Rebeca. This service
transmits notifications from producing components to the consumers with matching sub-
scription. The notification service is implemented by Rebeca using a set of cooperating
brokers distributed over the network and each locally managing a set of components.
The brokers are connected among each other via an overlay network and exchange
published notifications and information about issued and revoked subscriptions. Addi-
tionally each broker keeps track of active subscriptions of connected neighbor brokers.
This information is gathered in a content-based routing table. Hence, a published noti-
fication can start at the publisher’s local broker and then hop-by-hop be transmitted to
every broker and their local components that have a subscription for the content of the
notification.
Discussion
Scopes were defined as part of Rebeca to provide structuring to an otherwise unstruc-
tured Pub/Sub environment. Providing the means for managing a distributed event
based system and restricting the visibility of events to provide a first level of privacy. In
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the Scopes Framework the ideas of Scopes from Rebeca were transferred to WSNs. Here
nodes can subscribe to a group by matching the properties of a sensor node to the group-
properties. If they match, the node is allowed to join. As WSNs are self-configuring and
highly distributed this is a decision taken on the node itself. This also assumes a friendly
network where no adversaries are present. For hostile network environments further
measures have to be taken as we have seen in the SecScopes extension in section 3.
5.2 Structuring Wireless Sensor Networks
In wireless sensor networks there are different needs to structure a network. Mostly
it is to reduce the use of bandwidth or send-time (and thus energy) in a network with
scarce resources. Structuring can even be achieved using a single routing algorithm.
By creating local clusters that are connected by a backbone network of so called cluster
heads, this is a simple approach to reduce the load in the network as local sensor nodes
only talk to their cluster head and the cluster heads then talk to the base station. Other
approaches, such as the use of location-based routing, are valid alternatives for struc-
turing a network. The structuring achieved by routing algorithms is done mostly for the
purpose of the previously mentioned reduction of network usage or optimizing routes to
better utilize the wireless medium. Therefore, we will look at different routing schemes
used in WSNs that have a structuring component.
From the routing algorithms in WSNs more advanced approaches and frameworks
have emerged over time and serviced WSN applications with different kinds of structur-
ing notions. The structuring in these approaches is less dependent on the underlying
routing, but provides a more abstract view of the WSN. Structuring here can be de-
fined via node properties, regions of the network or just by node neighborhoods. In
section 5.2.2 we will show the development of such approaches related to the Scopes
Framework.
5.2.1 Routing algorithms
Routing algorithms build a first layer of structure in a network. This structure is
important for WSNs with a high number of sometimes randomly placed sensor nodes.
In WSNs with several hundred sensor nodes it is not feasible to address every single node
with a numeric address, the routing tables would easily exceed the storage capacity of
the small nodes. Instead, often the data that is interesting for an application or regions
of interest are used as unique but universal addressing scheme. A simple solution to
reach all nodes of a network is classic message flooding, but with these numbers of
nodes in the network and the scarce resources of a WSN this will lead almost instantly
to a drastically reduced network lifetime. Therefore, approaches with, e.g., tree, mesh
or other structures are used in WSNs.
There are numerous routing algorithms specifically designed for wireless sensor net-
works, so we can only introduce a small number of important representatives. First
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(a) Interest processing (b) Creating gradients (c) Data transfer with reen-
forced path
Figure 5.1: Scheme of Directed Diffusion [51]
we show algorithms based on trees, meshes or other structures. We have chosen
Directed Diffusion and Gradient-based routing as the routing algorithms used in the
Scopes Framework were inspired by them. We then show examples of hierarchy- and
location-based routing algorithms. These three categories can be seen as the major
routing approaches used in WSNs, but of course they are not limited to these.
5.2.1.1 Content-based Routing
A content-based routing scheme uses regular node addresses only to differentiate local
neighbors of a node from each other. The global routing task is, for example, expressed
in key/value pairs that describe the data that is needed for the current task. This descrip-
tion is then sent to the WSN and nodes that have data matching the description start
sending the data back to the sink, the originator of the data description. Well known al-
gorithms in this field are, for example SPIN [47], Directed Diffusion [51], gradient-based
routing [114], Cougar [147] and ACQUIRE [111]. In the following we will discuss Di-
rected Diffusion and gradient-based routing, as these two approaches highly influenced
the design of our routing algorithms.
Directed Diffusion
Directed-Diffusion [51] is a case of content-based routing. It uses different elements:
interests, data, gradients and reinforcements. The interest is a request for data that uses
the aforementioned key/value pairs to specify the kind of data needed in the current
task, but other naming schemes for data are also possible. The data description can
include location information, frequency of data sampling, a timespan of interest and
other properties. The interest is repeated in intervals and can reflect changes of the
data description. Flooding an interest through a WSN, figure 5.1(a), creates gradients,
pointing from the receiving node to the sending one. These gradients are used to find
the best route from the data source back to the sink, see figure 5.1(b). To enforce the
usage of a specific path it can be reinforced, e.g. to use a higher bandwidth. This can
also be done with multiple paths to spread the load of a query over several nodes and
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paths. Data in a WSN consists mostly of sampled sensor data related to a physical event.
After the steps described above, the data source can send data to the sink, see figure
5.1(c). To cope with problems in the network like failing links or loops, a path can also
be negatively reinforced. This way a former best path can be deselected and a new path
can be reinforced. As the nodes in the network keep a list of neighbors they got an
interest from, it is easy to choose a new path if the old one is blocked for some reason.
But multiple links contain the risk of loops. These can also be avoided using negative
reinforcements.
Gradient-based Routing
In [114] Schurgers et al. propose an extended version of directed diffusion where the
interest and gradient interaction is changed. The interest includes the number of hops
it has traveled. With this information each node in the network knows its distance to
the sink. The difference between its own height in the network and the height of its
neighboring node forms the gradient. This way the gradient is no abstract value but
reflects the shortest path to the sink.
Discussion
We chose directed diffusion as base for our own routing implementation as it is closely
related to the features we need in our framework. It supports sending of interests and
building a routing tree while the nodes subscribe to an interest. But this routing tree
is only capable of sending data from the sensor nodes to the base station. Therefore,
we had to extend this feature in our own implementation to achieve a bidirectional
communication, see [53]. Also we had to change the interest handling as we send our
own messages from the scopes layer, see chapter 2.5.1, and do not want two messages
of the same kind in the network.
5.2.1.2 Hierarchy-based Routing
Hierarchy-based routing algorithms are often based on clustering, see figure 5.2. This
means that for each group of local nodes one is defined as cluster head. All other nodes
of this group send data only to their cluster head. How the cluster head is chosen
depends on the actual algorithm. The cluster heads can form their own subnetwork
that sends data to the base station or there can be additional hierarchy levels. The
graph of such a clustered WSN is a tree. Examples for these algorithms are LEACH [46],
TEEN [78], energy aware routing for cluster-based WSNs [148], or [134,146] as further
advances in energy-efficient clustering. Here different approaches are taken to reduce
energy consumption or distribute the energy consumption more evenly over the WSN.
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Figure 5.2: Schema of hierarchy-based routing [1]
5.2.1.3 Location-based Routing
The approaches discussed above build routing structures before they send any data. In
location-based routing no fixed routing paths are used. The only assumption is that every
node in the network knows its location with a specific precision. This can be achieved
quite accurately with GPS-receivers [108] or less accurately with relative distances to
other nodes gathered from the received signal strength indication (RSSI) values of
received messages [145, 151]. Messages are then addressed to a region or a specific
location, see figure 5.3. Depending on a node’s location and the location of its neighbor-
ing nodes it is known where to send the message next. With this algorithms single nodes
and groups are addressable. This approach saves the effort of establishing a routing tree
or mesh, but has to spend extra energy to determine the location of a node.
Figure 5.3: Schema of location-based routing [145]
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5.2.2 Frameworks
A framework is an abstraction of generic functionality that can be accessed by a de-
fined API. It is often configurable so that the framework can be reused in different sce-
narios. The configurability may be static at compile time or dynamic at runtime. WSN
applications can be implemented with less effort as they can be written on an abstract
level on top of the framework.
In this section approaches with framework characteristics for WSNs are discussed that
do not include any system outside the WSN, like laptops, servers or the Internet. The
following approaches are trying to solve similar problems as the Scopes Framework.
They differ in aspects like a different systematic approach or are used in different areas
of WSNs. We also want to show the advances over time in the area of grouping schemes
in WSNs. Therefore, we start with some approaches that were presented at the time the
work on scopes began and advance through time until the most recent developments.
5.2.2.1 Hood
Hood [142] provides two abstractions that are commonly used in sensor networks.
First, the notion of a node’s neighborhood, and second, sharing of named variables and
its data among neighbors. A key mechanism of Hood is broadcast/filter. It is used for
both data sharing and neighborhood discovery. When data is shared it is always sent as
broadcast. Nodes receiving data filter them to determine valuable data and what data
may be cached. The receivers of data can decide what nodes to add to their neighbor
list and what data to store. The owner of an attribute has no control over the storage
behavior of its neighboring nodes.
Shared attributes define the elements of a node’s state offered to its neighbors. These
may be sensor readings or its location. After an update of an attribute value it is broad-
cast, other behaviors are possible depending on the push policy used. Is a co-neighbor
receiving an updated attribute value, it is passed through all filters defined on the node.
The filters then evaluate if the node is still valuable to be kept on the neighbor list and
updates or removes its cached attributes. For a node in the neighbors list a so called
mirror is instantiated where the node’s observed status is stored. This comprises not
only the reflected attributes, but also scribbles. These are local annotations about the
neighbor node, like a quality estimate.
The definition of a neighborhood determines if a node is valuable enough to be added
to the neighbor list. A node can define multiple neighborhoods and each of them have
their own notion of a valuable neighbor and which attributes to cache. The decission
if a node is valuable is taken depending on its shared attributes. This leads to poten-
tial asymmetric neighborhoods. Let’s suppose node A’s neighborhood definition accepts
node B’s shared attributes as valuable. This does not mean that node B also has a neigh-
borhood where A’s attributes would make A a neighbor of B. In this scenario B is called
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a neighbor of A and A a co-neighbor of B, but not vice versa. So A is not a neighbor of B
and B not a co-neighbor of A.
The definition of different neighborhoods with different attribute sets needs slightly
different algorithms and data structures, which are difficult to parameterize. To en-
able this the authors defined a new command generate, so the code needed for the
parameterization can be automatically generated.
Discussion
The biggest difference between the Scopes Framework and Hood is the restriction of
the grouping scheme. This limits Hood to one-hop neighbors while Scopes provide a
grouping scheme that can use multi-hop connections over the whole WSN. Hood is a
very early approach and is limited in its functionality. Nonetheless, it enables different
neighborhoods on one node and thus neighbors and data for different operations. This
is also a feature of the Scopes Framework represented by the ability to define multiple
scopes.
5.2.2.2 Abstract Regions
The Abstract Regions programming model [137,138] is based on the model originally
proposed by Hood. Abstract Regions is able to create a neighborhood relationship be-
tween a node and others in the same region. This makes neighborhoods (or regions) like
“the set of nodes in k hops” or “the set of nodes with maximum distance d” possible. The
major goal of Abstract Regions is to provide programmers with a programming abstrac-
tion that hides the complexity of underlying mechanisms, but still be able to optimize
the application, and to perform local spatial operations in the sensor network by shar-
ing data and coordinate activities between nodes in the neighborhood. For this purpose
it provides a set of operators: neighborhood discovery, enumeration, data sharing and
reduction.
Before performing any other operation on a region a neighbor discovery is performed.
This process is initiated on every node and is a continuos activity, where every node is
informed about changes in the membership set, due to joining, leaving or moving nodes.
The process can be terminated by a node at any time to prevent further neighborhood
discovery messages. In this case the operation returns a quality metric, for example the
percentage of responses of candidate nodes. The enumeration operator returns the list
of nodes participating in a region to be able to directly interact with them. With the data
sharing operator it is possible to define name/value pairs to be stored and shared within
the nodes of a region. Therefore, two functions are supported: get and put. With these
functions, variables can be stored and queried from the local cache and also from nodes
in the same region. To reduce a shared variable the reduction operator takes a shared
variable key and an associative operator, like min, max or sum, gathers the shared values
in the region and makes the result also available in a shared variable.
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The authors implemented Abstract Regions on top of different routing paradigms, like
location-based routing, a planar mesh or a spanning tree.
As one special feature Abstract Regions provides a quality measure to the application.
This measure specifies the completeness or accuracy of an operation. Applications can
use this feedback through a tuning interface to set low-level parameters for the Abstract
Regions implementation. The application designer has to study the impact of parame-
ters on application performance, as the parameters and their influence depend on the
Abstract Regions implementation and the application behavior.
Discussion
Abstract Regions is still a very basic approach, but it is much closer to the Scopes
Framework than its ancestor Hood as it supports grouping over nodes in a region. It
also provides a static neighborhood definition. However, abstract regions are limited
to variable sharing while the Scopes Framework is much more generic and allows even
tasks to be shared.
5.2.2.3 Generic Role Assignments
Römer et. al created with Generic Role Assignments [110] a role-based approach to
program sensor networks. The general assumption of the authors is that when program-
ming a node not all parameters are known in advance, so it is hard to decide which node
should get the code for which role. This means a modus for in-situ configuration of roles
has to be found. For this purpose four core elements are defined and every node must
support Generic Role Assignment.
The first element is the property directory, here the properties of an individual node
are stored. This ranges from properties like the available sensors and other hardware
features, to static or dynamic properties that can be assigned on an application basis.
There is a directory on every node and the different directories are independent of each
other. The next element is the role specification, it is created by an identifier and optional
properties to further refine a role. A set of rules defines the conditions for the assignment
of roles. The decision which role is assigned to a single sensor node is typically based
on properties of a set of nodes. It is assumed, that all sensor nodes have the same set
of roles and same related rules. The role assignment algorithm assigns roles to a sensor
node, taking role specifications and node properties into account. Depending on the
application it is possible to assign multiple roles to one node. Because of the harsh
energy restrictions this assignment algorithm is a distributed and localized one that only
requires a limited amount of communication within a node’s neighborhood. The last
element are basic services. This stands for the additional functionality that is needed by
the application and for role assignment, like localization, time synchronization and so
forth.
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Discussion
This approach is very interesting, as its focus is on the different roles that are present
in a WSN. Generally there will be, e.g., a base station, sensing nodes and nodes that
are just forwarding data between the other two. So, when deciding at run-time which
node gets which role this is a kind of grouping into the different roles. The grouping in
this approach is not based on communication or network location but on the roles the
nodes chose. This has obviously influence on the network and how to communicate.
With this grouping Generic Role Assignments is orthogonal to the Scopes Framework
as the network is not structured in the sense of a communication group based on node
properties, but by specific functions carried out on the nodes.
5.2.2.4 Region streams
In [91] Newton et al. present regiment, a functional macroprograming language for
sensor networks, which is based on the region streams data model. Macroprograming is
here understood as an approach to program a sensor network as a whole and not every
sensor node separately. This means that from the high level macroprogram the local
behavior for the individual node is decomposed automatically by the regiment compiler.
Region streams represent spatially distributed, time-varying collections of node states.
With some geographic, logical or topological relation the interest in a specific group of
nodes is expressed. The related region stream represents the sensor data of the included
sensor nodes. E.g., one could specify a relation like “k-hops from an anchor node n”.
Operations supported on a region stream include fold and map. Fold represents an
aggregation function that fetches sensor values all over the region and aggregates them
at an anchor node. Map applies a function to all values of a sensor node in a specified
region. Map does not require additional communication, in contrast to fold, where all
sensor data has to be gathered at one physical location.
The goal of regiment is to write a complex sensor network application in only a few
lines of code. To do this, the regiments compiler transforms the global network-wide
macroprogram to a nodal program based on a token machine. A token machine is a
simple distributed machine that acts upon arriving named tokens, received via network
or generated locally. The tokens initiate local sensing and computation. Depending on
its type the related token handler is executed. Token handlers themselves can create
new tokens or call other local handlers. These token machines are a simple mechanism
of local execution, remote function calls and data storage.
Discussion
Region streams are an approach to specify a location or region an application is inter-
ested in. To get the sensor data of the nodes located in such a region it is transferred to
the origin of the region stream. Transferred data can be pre-processed by using a macro-
programming language. These region steams are statically defined and are distributed
to the local set of WSN nodes with a special program-image for every single node. The
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basic idea of region streams is similar to the one of the Scopes Framework. It defines
the sensor nodes of interest, but this is done statically and the WSN application has no
influence at run-time. Also the retrieval of sensor data is one of the core functionalities,
but retrieval only, whereas Scopes is built for bi-directional transfers.
5.2.2.5 Logical Neighborhoods
With Logical Neighborhoods [86] Mottola and Picco propose an approach that also de-
fines a notion of scoping. Logical Neighborhoods are quite high level for the application
programer and consist of three parts: the Spidey language, the logical neighborhoods ab-
straction and the underlying routing algorithm. These components are tightly integrated
with each other.
The Spidey language abstracts two concepts: logical nodes and neighborhoods. For
the logical node you first specify a template to define what properties, sensor data, etc.
can be gathered. And second you instantiate the template and connect the defined
properties in the template with the calls and constants used in the code to retrieve these
values. The specified attributes in the template can be static or dynamic, but this has to
be decided when creating the template. A logical neighborhood is defined the same way
as a node. The template defines which attributes a node has to match to be a member
of the logical neighborhood. The neighborhood can be parameterized. For example,
in the instantiation of a neighborhood, a threshold can be adjusted to the needs of the
application. The logical neighborhood is then composed by the nodes in the network
that match the specified criteria. With the instantiation of the logical neighborhood
a maximum hop distance for the neighborhood can be defined and also a number of
credits that can be spent by the cost function of the routing algorithm.
The authors show a very specialized routing algorithm that is structure-less and built
upon a notion of local search. Nodes advertise their profile, which is the list of their
name/value pairs specified by their template. In doing so the nodes build a distributed
state space containing information about the cost of reaching a node with given data.
Messages sent to a neighborhood contain its template, which determines the parts con-
sidered for matching. So, messages navigate towards members of a neighborhood by
following paths along which the cost associated with a given neighborhood template is
decreasing.
Discussion
In Logical Neighborhoods the specification for a logical node and the neighborhood
definitions are defined at compile time. This means that no new attributes can be defined
at runtime and the neighborhood cannot be changed. As a state space is distributed in
this approach only a small set of attributes is feasible. The more attributes are ex-
changed the more overhead for routing is introduced. The overhead results from the
way the routing works, as for every attribute a new routing request is generated. The
tight integration between the different components of the system make it hard to adapt
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Logical Neighborhoods to other scenarios, e.g. only very specialized routing algorithms
can be used, even if it is in principle possible to exchange them. Another difference to
the Scopes Framework is that scopes not only allows grouping of nodes, but also creating
a hierarchy of groups that can be nested. Although Scopes and Logical Neighborhoods
appear to be similar from an abstract point of view, many differences exist when looking
at the details.
5.2.2.6 TinyDB
In TinyDB [76] the sensor network is seen as a database where you can query data
from it with a SQL-like language. There are also other approaches like [11], a prede-
cessor of TinyDB. TinyDB is a distributed query processor that runs on each node in the
sensor network. A query is parsed, optimized and sent to the sensor network from the
base station and then disseminated and processed in the nodes on the network. The
results are flowing back up the routing tree that was built as the query was propagated,
and possibly get aggregated. As these queries are executed thru a period of time and
a stream of data is generated for it, time is divided into epochs, where for each sensor
participating in a query a value is generated and sent per epoch. Each epoch takes the
same amount of time.
The query language proposed in TinyDB is a subset of SQL where the whole network
is seen as one table with every node and sensor adding a new entry. The semantics
of SELECT, FROM, WHERE and GROUP BY are the same as in SQL. Some extensions were
added like a SAMPLE PERIOD clause to be able to specify the sampling period for queried
sensors or a LIFETIME clause to set a lifetime for the sensor network. TinyDB then
estimates sensor sample rates and transmission rates with the given energy to meet the
lifetime goal. Further additions are ON EVENT queries and STORAGE POINTS that are
related to materialized views in common databases.
TinyDB uses semantic routing trees (SRT) to disseminate the queries and collect all
the data. SRTs are designed to allow each node to locally decide if any node below it
will need to participate in a given query over a constant attribute. To do so, an SRT is
an index over the attribute values stored in an unidimensional interval representing the
range of attribute values beneath each of its children. With this information the decision
to further disseminate a query or not is possible. If the attribute of the local node match
the query, it is executed. The creation of an SRT is done in a two step process: First
the SRT build request is flooded through the network. It contains information about the
attribute the tree is used for. After forwarding the request, a node waits for answers from
its children. If a node has no child it sends a parent selection message to its chosen parent
including the attribute value of it. When a node receives a parent selection message and
the given attribute value changes the stored value range, this node also forwards the
change. The tree is further maintained to cope with joining and leaving nodes.
The execution of a query is done with always the same steps for each epoch: Nodes
sleep mostly to save energy during epochs. To sleep as long as possible but still to be
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able to aggregate values each epoch is slotted in multiple slices and due to time synchro-
nization each node knows when to awake and receive messages from their children. In
the awake phase the sensors are also sampled and if needed the values are aggregated.
As last step a received message is forwarded or a newly created one is sent. This scheme
may change a bit for special demands, e.g., with ON EVENT queries.
Discussion
TinyDB has a vision of a WSN that each node in the network is a sensing device.
And the data of these sensing devices can be transformed into a huge database table.
Depending on the query to this table it is possible to query just a subset of nodes, a
group. But, even when TinyDB supports actuation, this support is limited to a small and
predefined set of methods. In [57] we have shown, that the Scopes Framework can be
used to create a very similar WSN application called TikiDB, that also uses a database
view on the WSN. In contrast to Scopes, TinyDB cannot be used in scenarios where the
scenario logic cannot be fitted to a database approach. Nevertheless, for data retrieval
scenarios TinyDB is a good candidate because of the different operations it supports.
5.2.2.7 TinyCubus
The overall goal of TinyCubus [79,80] is a generic reconfigurable framework for wire-
less sensor networks. It is composed of three components. The Tiny Data Management
Framework, Tiny Cross-Layer Framework and Tiny Configuration Engine.
The Tiny Data Management Framework provides several system and data management
components, like time synchronization or aggregation. Each component has several im-
plementations that are classified in three areas, the dimensions of a cube. First, these
are optimization parameters, such as energy consumption; second, application require-
ments, such as reliability; and third, system parameters, like mobility. Depending on
these parameters the Data Management Framework decides which component imple-
mentations are the best for the current situation. The evaluation of the best suited
choice has to be executed over the whole lifetime of the sensor node.
To be able to retrieve information from other layers of the architecture Tiny Cross-
Layer Framework provides callbacks and a state repository. Using the state repository
the cross-layer framework acts as a mediator between the different components. This
way cross-layer data is not accessed directly, but stored in the repository. Components
using the cross-layer data are not depending on the implementation of the component
providing the data, given a new implementation offers compatible data. To be able to
retrieve data from the repository, it has to be known what data is available. For this
purpose the authors provide a specification language with which each component can
express what kind of data it provides and what data it needs.
In case new components have to be installed or swapping of some functionality is
needed the Tiny Configuration Engine provides a way to distribute and install new code
in the network. It supports the configuration of both system and application components
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with assistance of the topology manager. It is responsible for the self-configuration of
the network and assigns roles to each node with the help of a role assignment algorithm.
Discussion
TinyCubus is not a strucutring approach in the sense of grouping different parts of
the network, but it offers structured access to the network and this is where the Scopes
Framework and TinyCubus are comparable. Both approaches are designed for applica-
tion or system module updates while deployed in the field. While Scopes is a commu-
nication framework and leaves the data handling to the applications, TinyCubus also
provides a datastore where system and application modules can retrieve data in a con-
trolled way. Another difference is the use of roles in TinyCubus, where Scopes just use
states to reflect different behavior in the network.
5.2.2.8 Melete
Melete’s [152] main goal is to support concurrent applications in a wireless sensor
network. Therefore, it extends the Maté [68] virtual machine to support concurrent
applications and adds a dynamic grouping technique and code distribution support for
spatially uneven and temporally changing deployments. With the extension of the vir-
tual machine to support multiple concurrent applications the authors also introduce
protection for the application’s execution space. This is achieved by preventing variable
sharing between different applications. On the positive side this makes the applications
independent of each other, so rebooting one application does not influence others, but
it also prevents information sharing between them.
The grouping mechanism is, in the first place responsible for connecting nodes that
have to execute one particular application. A node can be member of multiple groups
and each of them is connected to an application, referred to as associated groups. The
memberships of multiple groups may overlap. A sensor node can also dynamically join or
leave a group, as needed by the application or user. The deployment via a group is done
in two steps, first grouping the nodes for the application and secondly disseminating
code onto the group members.
The code dissemination is done with an altered trickle algorithm [69]. The authors
added the so called passive code dissemination policy with active advertisements. Ver-
sion information of all groups and so all applications is disseminated via advertisements
throughout the network and maintained at each sensor node. Applications are only pas-
sively transferred on request from a node. In this modified trickle algorithm versions
are forwarded right after a node received it and not after transmission of the application
code.
Discussion
First of all Melete uses a virtual machine (VM) as basis, so the applications for the sys-
tem are limited to the functionality of the VM. Of course, it has the advantage of isolated
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concurrent applications. The Scopes Framework is a native program and applications
using scopes are also native and can use the whole functionality the hardware or operat-
ing system provides. The grouping used in Melete is directly connected to applications,
this means in reverse that every application has its own group. In Scopes the grouping
scheme is much more universal. Of course, it can also be used as an application and
distribution group like in Melete. But if an application needs an additional group for
some special functionality, e.g., an actuation group, the application is free to create as
many groups as it needs for its purposes.
5.2.2.9 MQTT for Sensor Networks
MQTT for sensor networks (MQTT-SN) [122] is a classic publish/subscribe protocol
adapted to the WSN environment. Data is published to a topic-id towards a MQTT
broker. This broker is outside the WSN, but may be talking directly to the WSN via
MQTT-SN or via a gateway with MQTT. Therefore, MQTT-SN resembles an advanced
connection management with a gateway. It brings no routing with it, but can sit on top
of, e.g., 6LoWPAN [118].
As in standard pub/sub-systems the subscriber tells the broker which data topics it
subscribes to. This can also be a node in the sensor network. Sensor nodes publish data
that they produce to a topic on the broker. To do so, the nodes have to connect them-
selves to the broker by first finding a suitable gateway. This is done via advertisements
from the gateway and search messages from a client. After that they can register for a
topic and publish data. All these functions are quite compressed and often ids are used
to keep network messages small to cope with the constraints in WSNs.
Discussion
MQTT-SN builds groups, like the Scopes Framework, via the topics. But these groups
are built solely by the sensing clients, that register for a topic. The subscribers have
no influence on them. In contrast in the Scopes Framework the subscriber is the one
issuing the definition for a topic/scope and can this way select the specific data and node
properties it needs. As the broker is outside the WSN, the energy intensive managing
and messaging towards the subscribers is done outside the WSN. In this system it is
assumed that the WSN is only used to publish data, subscribing to topics is possible but
expensive, as the data traverses out of the network and than back.
MQTT-SN includes only one security measure. That is the authentication while con-
necting to the broker. If there is further security needed the underlying routing has to
provide this. Whereas SecScopes provide integrated and extensive security measures.
5.2.2.10 RushNet
RushNet [70] is an interesting, but somewhat brutal approach. It aims at traffic priori-
tization in WSNs with a low priority (LP) and a high priority (HP). The LP transmissions
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are straight forward. They use a low power CSMA (carrier sense, multiple access) trans-
mission and a token-based routing algorithm. This means that a token is passed to every
node and only the node with the token is allowed to transmit. This way there should be
no collisions or congestion for LP transmissions on their own. Now, the HP transmissions
use instant sending and forwarding with a high transmission power. This means the low
power LP transmission is pushed aside by the HP transmission, using the capture effect.
To use this effect reliably the authors proposed the so called preemptive packet train.
This means that an HP message gets sent several times in a row, the authors propose
4 times. The first time may collide with an ongoing transmission, depending on the
length of the transmission the second one may also be corrupt, but after this the CSMA
LP transmission will be stopped and the following retransmissions may be received on
the parent node. After this the parent node also instantly retransmits the HP message to
its parent, and so on. Is the message sent far enough the normal LP transmission can be
restarted with a retransmission of the failed message from the beginning.
The authors also showed evaluations on coexistence with other 802.15.4 and 802.11
networks and the capture effect mechanism works also in these combinations.
Discussion
Obviously the RushNet does not use a very kind behavior. And we doubt that two
networks of this kind can coexist with each other without interference. This mechanism
only works on the kindness of others. RushNet is not structuring the network in different
parts, as Scopes do it, but it structures its data with its LP, HP approach. Looking at the
characterization of the LP and HP traffic in this paper we see some similarities to our
evaluation of Scopes: The LP traffic is characterized as continuous bulk transfer and
the HP traffic as single peaks. These are the same traffic patterns that we used for our
evaluation. But we evaluated the traffic patterns independent of each other and in this
approach they are evaluated simultaneously.
5.3 Mixed Mode Systems
Compared to the WSN frameworks of the last section, Mixed Mode Systems support a
much wider range of computing devices, while WSN frameworks are focused on sensor
nodes as hardware platform. The worst case situation for a WSN may be when it has
to cope with a heterogeneous WSN. The different devices in such a WSN are connected
via a common network interface, mostly an IEEE 802.15.4 radio. So, all the platforms
are more or less scarce in regard of the computing capabilities and the available RAM or
ROM space.
Mixed Mode Systems comprise much more diverse computing devices. They can in-
clude small sensor nodes, powerful personal computers and also large server-like sys-
tems. But not all of them have to be present in one system. As the range of systems can
be huge, also the available resources are highly varying. This makes it obvious that not
all functionality may be available on all devices of the system. Most of the Mixed Mode
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Systems presented here have their roots in ether the PC-world or the WSN-world. To be
able to span the missing parts each system has to be scaled up or down depending on
their origin.
The scaling up of a former WSN approach brings fewer problems, as the resources
available are much larger than on a small sensor node. Scaling a system down to a
WSN node introduces several problems. The most obvious is the scarcity of resources
on a sensor node. This necessitates a reduction of functionality and the optimization
of data exchange formats, e.g., the full spectrum of functionality is basically not fitting
into a 24kB flash-ROM, or the XML data exchange format is simply too expensive for the
nodes with limited energy and bandwidth. Infrastructural differences may also result in
architectural changes. In WSNs mostly distributed algorithms are deployed compared to
many client/server architectures on the PC side. Also the change to MCUs as platform
may result in a new implementation, when the PC-side software was written, e.g., in
Java. A JVM is normally not available on these small scale systems. Additionally, sen-
sor nodes and PCs generally do not use the same communication medium, a wireless
medium is used for WSNs (IEEE 802.15.4) and different wireless or wired networks are
used for the PC-type devices, so the complexity to communicate with each other is also
increasing.
In the following we will see different approaches of these Mixed Mode Systems. Both
scaled up and scaled down frameworks, e.g. 5.3.2 and 5.3.4, but also some developed
specifically for the mixed nature of these systems discussed in 5.3.3.
5.3.1 RUNES
The RUNES Middleware [21, 22] focuses on heterogeneity, scarce ressources and dy-
namism.
It is based on a kernel that is implemented on multiple systems. All kernel implemen-
tations, namely one for Contiki, C and Java, share the same component model, but with
slight differences depending on the capabilities of the underlying system. This provides
a unified programming model over a wide variety of devices. To communicate the sen-
sor network can send messages through a gateway to other networked hardware, e.g. a
PC. The gateway uses the C implementation of the kernel, where PC’s can use the Java
version. On each device different components can run to fulfill the application’s tasks.
These components can also be dynamically loaded and unloaded at runtime.
The authors have implemented a Publish/Subscribe component for the scenario pre-
sented in [22]. This component is in charge of the following two tasks: creating and
maintaining a tree-shaped overlay, and setting up message routes on top of the overlay,
and reconfigure them in case of topology changes.
Discussion
RUNES has a focus not just on heterogeneity, but also on reconfigurability of the sys-
tem. Therefore, they introduced a consistent Kernel API that is the same over all the
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different platforms and implementations. So called components, similar to tasks in the
Scopes Framework, can be created very easily and deployed throughout the system. But
RUNES does not provide any grouping mechanisms for the network, it uses a pub/sub
approach where the network is connected by a tree-like structure.
5.3.2 COSMIC
The COSMIC Middleware [48, 60] was originally designed for fieldbus systems, like
the CAN bus. It uses an event based Publish/Subscribe approach, and enables content
based addressing of event data. Events are created in two ways. Either a sensor reading
triggers a new event, or a periodic timer can do this. An event is composed of three
parts. A unique identifier of the content that is globally unique for all subnets used;
the data itself, current state information of the node or sensor readings; and additional
attributes, e.g. sensor position or quality of data.
COSMIC provides event channels for event transmission in an unidirectional way. The
definition includes the unique id of an event, attributes for data dissemination and han-
dlers for an exception or message arrival, the latter is only available to subscribers. Event
channels can provide different qualities, like hard, soft or no realtime. The middleware
can use this information to reserve resources to meet the requirements. The resource
reservation is done transparent for the application. Heterogeneity of the underlying
network is also hidden by the middleware.
Different subnetworks are connected with a gateway. COSMIC supports CAN, TCP/IP
and ZigBee networks and is available for 8- / 16-bit MCUs, Linux and Windows.
Discussion
COSMIC is a straightforward approach. It provides classic pub/sub functionality to
establish so called event channels. These channels are used to forward events through
the network. Because of the different network types supported, each of them creates
its own subnetwork and events that do not have to leave their current network are not
forwarded to the other subnetworks. In this sense there is a coarse grouping of devices.
Another interesting point is that the event channels can be used to reserve bandwidth
in the network for transmitting the events of the channel. So COSMIC is one of the few
approaches doing some kind of traffic shaping.
5.3.3 PhysicalNet
The idea of PhysicalNet [131,132] is to enable applications in dynamic environments,
where heterogeneous resources from different users coexist. Devices can be mobile
inside and between networks. Multiple applications are concurrently running on the
same resources, where users can safely share their own resources.
To achieve this, PhysicalNet is based on a centralized design that was developed as a
four-tier service oriented architecture. On the first and lowest tier service provider pro-
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cesses are located, these enable the utilization of the different sensors and actuators of
a device. The second tier contains gateway processes that are responsible for media con-
version, e.g. ZigBee to IP or vice versa, and connects a local device with its negotiator.
On sensor network nodes only the service provider tier can be used because of compu-
tation constraints. The second tier can be combined with the first one used on PDAs
or more powerful devices that provide sensors or actuators and have multiple commu-
nication devices. The third tier contains negotiators. They are responsible for tracking
the registered devices, handle access control and administer the shared resources. The
fourth and last tier contains application processes that create or cancel requirements for
remote sensors and actuators. Multiple applications can run on one negotiator, same as
one application can use multiple negotiators to access the addressed sensors.
The negotiator is the core component of PhysicalNet. There can be multiple negotia-
tors, each is creating its own administrative domain where it exclusively is responsible
for managing resources the registered devices are providing and the applications and
their demands in the sense of access restrictions and resources. Therefore, the demands
from applications are checked against an access rights specification, but still conflicts
can occur when more than one application tries to access the same resource. To handle
this, PhysicalNet provides conflict resolution modules.
Besides the negotiator as core component, Bundles are the core programming abstrac-
tion used in PhysicalNet. It includes two parts, the definition of a group of services and
a specification of the functionality of these services. The definition of a group can be
arbitrarily complex, as long as it can be expressed in Java code. The membership evalu-
ation is done dynamically, so nodes that do not match the specs at a given point in time,
but did before, are removed from the bundle. And bundles can span across different ad-
ministrative domains, same as applications can require services from different domains.
The evaluation of bundles is done on the negotiator, as it knows the requirements of the
applications and as services report their state in regular intervals, all needed information
is easily available.
Discussion
PhysicalNet is a higher level approach that is based on the internet and central servers.
It has the notion of administrative domains and can utilize multiple networks of sensor
nodes, smart devices or laptops. It has a similar approach with its Bundle abstraction as
the Scopes Framework. Bundles are used to select specific devices to gather data from
and Bundles can also be created with a set of parameters, like a scope. The evaluation
of the parameters and the grouping of the network is then done on a centralized server.
The Scopes Framework can make these decisions in-network and on the single node.
So, a WSN in PhysicalNet is used just like a data source as no decision taking is done
on the nodes. PhysicalNet has the group-building strategy in common with the Scopes
Framework, but as it operates from a server-size machine outside the WSN their targeted
environment is very different.
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5.3.4 PEIS-Ecology
The concept of a PEIS-Ecology [112] includes robotic technologies in a smart envi-
ronment and was extended to also include wireless sensor networks [12]. The basic
principles are a uniform notion of a PEIS (Physically Embedded Intelligent System), a
uniform communication model for communication between the devices that copes with
the dynamic joining and leaving of them, and a uniform cooperation model, which is pro-
vided by a publish/subscribe mechanism. The PEIS-Ecology is built on the PEIS-kernel
and the PEIS-middleware it is part of.
The PEIS-Ecology middleware consists of the PEIS-kernel and some additional com-
ponents. The kernel provides a distributed tuple-space where every PEIS in the network
can read from and write information to. This information is accompanied by meta data,
e.g. a timestamp or the creator. Under the tuple-space a peer-to-peer (P2P) network
is maintained among all detected PEIS. The network allows every PEIS to access tuples
from other PEIS, even if there is no direct route between the two and it is updated dy-
namically to allow leaving and joining the ecology. The additional components of the
middleware are performing advanced meta-level action on the ecology as a whole, like
planning, self-configuration and monitoring.
To support WSN type sensor nodes the PEIS kernel was down sized, this version is
known as tiny PEIS kernel and has in principle the same functionality. The most changes
were done on the sizes of fields, identifiers and timers, but also on shrinking the network
messages to a size IEEE 802.15.4 can handle. This change and the switching of network
media made it necessary to implement a bridge-like component called tiny bridge to
convert messages back and forth.
Discussion
PEIS was developed to interoperate with robots via a network connection. It was then
scaled down to match the capability of sensor nodes. The data that is exchanged are
events that are composed of key/value pairs. The PEIS-Ecology does not provide any
notion of a grouping scheme or applications, it allows to exchange basic data. And this
way it has nothing directly in common with the Scopes Framework.
5.3.5 RoboFrame
RoboFrame [101] is a framework to control a single or a group of autonomous
lightweight robots. It is written in ANSI C++ and targets platforms running Win-
dows or Linux. It is based on two extendable components, RoboApp and RoboGui.
One as base for any higher level functionality, the other for graphical user interfaces.
Some other tools and packages are available, like the behavior specification language
XABSL [74] or modules for laser-range finders and other hardware.
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RoboApp uses a platform abstraction layer to handle system specific calls, threading,
synchronization and so on. An application that extends RoboApp introduces modules
to execute different tasks. These modules are independent of each other, but define
their demands and what they provide in a descriptive manner. Messages between the
modules can be exchanged directly with defined types, that have to have the ability to
serialize and deserialize themselves, and a blackboard approach for large data structures
is available. Data providers and receivers have unique identifiers, so the router process
can dynamically route the messages between modules not only on the local robot. The
framework allows to extend the router, so that messages can be exchanged, e.g., via a
network socket. The execution of a module can be done event-based or in a sequential
way.
RoboGui uses the Qt toolkit to provide an easy way for debugging, monitoring and dis-
playing. It uses the same messaging subsystem and so can easily access all information
available in RoboApp.
Discussion
RoboFrame is very successful in the robotics area, but it is more focused on high end
equipment and robots compared to a sensor node. As mentioned above it runs on a
Windows or Linux machine and its focus is on the robot and its control. It has the ability
to communicate with other robots but this is used as a point to point communication
and not for communication with groups or perform grouping in a network.
5.3.5.1 Constrained Application Protocol
The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [13, 119] was designed with WSNs as
target platform in mind. CoAP provides a REST-like interface and duplicates features of
HTTP in WSNs with respect to the constraints in this environment. It is designed for easy
conversion to HTTP and thereby an easy connection to the Internet. This brings URIs
and HTTP’s GET, PUT, POST and DELETE commands to resource constrained networks.
CoAP builds on top of IPv6 (6LoWPAN [118]), but uses UDP in contrast to HTTP’s TCP
connections. UDP matches better as TCP with it’s low overhead for transmitting data.
Besides this, there are further options to cope with the peculiarities of sensor networks.
We will show only two of them in this summary: Block and Observer. The Block-option
allows block transfers for large amounts of data, like firmware updates. Regular CoAP
messages are suitable for small message sizes, but UDP limits these to a maximum of
64 kB. The Observer-option optimizes the client-initiated transfer pattern known from
HTTP. If an HTTP-client wants to keep up to date information about the status of a
resource it has to constantly poll the resource. With the Observer-option the client has to
specify only one request and gets constant updates on changes of the requested resource,
if it is modified. This results not only in the client always being up to date on that
particular resource, but also in savings of network bandwidth since update messages are
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only sent when a change occurred. Security is also an option in CoAP, here a lightweight
version of DTLS is used.
Besides the CoAP specifications there is also potential for optimization in the lay-
ers below CoAP, as shown in [65]. And there are further refinements, e.g. for group
communication [106].
Discussion
CoAP is a widely adopted approach and highly optimized for the WSN environment,
but with all the features above it also adopts the point-to-point philosophy from HTTP.
This means, for example, with the introduction of URIs it gets easy to address a resource
in the network, but also you address mostly single resources. Still, CoAP is able to use IP
multicast, but only with a restricted feature set, e.g. no security. The Scopes Framework
always addresses groups or types of resources. In this way standard CoAP and Scopes
are designed on orthogonal principles.
But there are efforts to enhance group communication in CoAP, until now this is an
experimental RFC created after the Scopes Framework.
5.3.6 DepSys
DepSys [89] is an application level system that aims at resolving dependencies or
collisions when using Smart Home network actors or sensors. DepSys defines apps for
the different tasks in a smart home and also an app-store, like those available in the
mobile phone domain. These apps have meta-data attached to the firmware itself that
describes, for example, what sensors/actors are used, and how they are used. The meta-
data is then used to check for different dependencies, like requirements on resources,
control dependencies for sensors and actors, or missing dependencies. The dependencies
are than checked at installation time of the app and at execution time.
The meta data contains besides regular parameters, like types of sensors/actors and
usage frequency, data on effect, emphasis and condition. These three parameters are used
to define the effect of an app on its environment, the emphasis describes the importance
of a control operation, and condition allows to define the conditions when the app is
active, e.g. in the morning or at sunset.
Discussion
Even though DepSys has been developed for a specific domain, the smart home, the
problems mentioned arise in every multi-application sensor/actor network, wired or not.
The Scopes Framework manages the life-cycle of in-network tasks, but does not check
the actions that the different tasks try to execute on actors or sensors. Therefore, the
Scopes Framework and DepSys complement each other, one enabling the access to the
underlying network and the other by checking the dependencies of WSN applications.
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5.4 Security in Computer Networks
Security is a hot topic in computer networks. We will concentrate on approaches from
areas such as publish/subscribe and mobile networks. Approaches proposed for these
domains must cope with similar security problems and utilize similar security algorithms
as our SecScopes Framework.
5.4.1 Capability Based Access Control
In [99, 100] Pesonen et al. propose a multi-domain publish/subscribe system with
capability based access control and event data encryption. In this decentralized pub/-
sub system a broker network of several broker nodes provides an event service which is
responsible for publishing events, managing subscriptions and routing of events. A do-
main is composed of a broker network, clients and an access control service. The access
control service grants access rights to broker nodes and clients according to a domain
internal policy. To form the shared multi domain system, one domain is the so called
coordinating domain. It coordinates the formation of the shared pub/sub system and
invites other domains to join. It can be seen as the owner of the shared system who
manages access to it. The main idea is to decentralize access control decision making
and policy and credential management over all participants of the network. Therefore
a simple public-key infrastructure is used and it results in a scalable system. The certifi-
cates are used to authorize a subject for specific actions. These actions are: Connection
to the broker network; introducing new event types to the network; extending existing
event types; and access to the pub/sub API, that consists of publishing and subscribing
to events of a given event type. To be able to restrict the access to events, secure event
types are introduced. These are events of predefined types that provide integrity and
authenticity of type via digital signatures. They also have attributes that may contain
confidential data. Therefore, each attribute is encrypted with its own key. This way only
broker or clients with access rights for a specific attribute are able to decrypt. As for the
encryption of attributes symmetric keys are used. Clients do not access keys directly, the
access rights are enforced by the brokers according to their own access rights. Events
are transferred to clients via an encrypted connection and attributes for which the clients
have no access rights are set to a default value by the local broker. The clients have to
connect to a broker with sufficient access rights for their published or subscribed events.
Discussion
This approach is similar to the Scopes Framework. In Scopes we also distribute the ac-
cess control decision making to the network, but we cannot limit this mechanism to a set
of trusted nodes, as for a sensor network every node is a potential publisher, subscriber
and/or broker node. Additionally introducing even a simple public-key infrastructure re-
sults in much higher load for network and computational resources. Especially the small
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network bandwidth and the lossy medium are huge bottlenecks in WSNs for central in-
frastructures. In contrast to WSNs the computer systems assumed here are server-sized,
this means that there are no resource problems to be expected from the hardware or the
network bandwidth.
5.4.2 On-Demand Multicast Groups
Yu et al. use a network of PC-sized nodes to form multicast groups with membership
anonymity [149]. To achieve anonymity they choose CP-ABE with a replacement access
structure. It uses unique IDs for each node. From these IDs single bits are used to
encode attributes. First, an ID is assigned to all nodes in the network, after that the
group controller (GC) can establish a new multicast network by creating a group with a
specific set of IDs, which relates to a set of attributes. To achieve anonymity the group
key is encrypted via the CP-ABE algorithm and distributed to all possible group members
(GM). If and only if a node id matches the group definition the GM can access the group
key to transceive messages. But the GM is not able to determine which attributes gave
him access. This is one key point to member anonymity, as only the GC knows the
definition of the group and thus no further information about the kind of group members
is known to others. Also the number of members of a group is kept anonymous.
Discussion
The general design is closely related to the Scopes Framework with the attribute-
based dynamic grouping of network nodes. But the way that attributes are implemented
would not work for a scope, as in the Scopes Framework a large number of attributes
are assumed due to the shared character of our design and its usage patterns. Here the
number of attributes is limited by the size of the id and it is not possible to enlarge this
number after deployment, unless every id in the network is replaced by a new, larger
one. Also the usage in a shared multi-domain scenario is restricted by the centralized
management of the attribute-space. In contrast our SecScope approach uses a hash value
of the attribute’s name to represent the attribute and the name can be chosen by a party
without interfering with other users of the network.
5.4.3 MundoMessage
The MundoMessage middleware [136] builds on top of the open TETRA standard,
which provides a communication system with end-to-end encryption. The middleware
supports one-to-many communication in an emergency scenario, and provides a tech-
nique to re-identify selected attributes of pseudonymous receivers and expressive logical
policies to address them.
MundoMessage uses an adapted CP-ABE algorithm to establish attribute-based mes-
saging (ABM). The attributes are used to address specific groups or single entities of
emergency response organizations that do not have to be known in advance, but can be
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identified by their role. The algorithm was extended by a location component, so that
a message may be decrypted only by personnel working in the specified area. With the
re-identification technique it is possible to, e.g., look for a specialist in a geographic area.
This is possible as location updates are sent regularly by each user of the system to the
headquarter. These updates are tagged by a pseudonym in a way that it is not possible
for unauthorized personnel to retrieve the identity. The pseudonym is calculated from
an unique ID with an associated set of properties, like the area of a specialization. With
the proposed mechanism one or some of the associated properties can be retrieved and
it can be checked, e.g. in an emergency scenario, if a required specialist maybe already
at the incident site or if one has to be requested by the headquarter.
Discussion
MundoMessage is proposed for a similar, but still resource richer scenario than Scopes
in WSNs. The here mentioned TETRA network is also a distributed network using wire-
less technology, but it is more related to a mobile phone network than a WSN. Also the
resources of the devices used in the network are on the scale of mobile phones. Beside
the scenario the approaches have the usage of the CP-ABE algorithm in common, but the
provided functionalities are different. Where for the Scopes Framework the attribute-
based grouping of unattended nodes is the core functionality, for MundoMessage the
anonymous, location-based addressing of groups or personnel for voice transmission
and the re-identification are the core functionalities.
5.5 Security in Wireless Sensor Networks
In this section we introduce different cryptographic libraries used in WSNs and why we
have chosen a specific one. Afterwards some frameworks related to the Scopes Frame-
work are discussed.
5.5.1 Cryptographic libraries
There is a wide variety of cryptographic libraries for WSNs available. From libraries
with just single algorithms to suites of basic cryptography and advanced algorithms. In
the beginning of cryptographic libraries for WSNs there were several different libraries
available and it was not quite clear, if RSA or ECC is the best choice for the restricted
hardware in WSNs. As it had to be expected ECC was the better choice and with the
publication of TinyECC [72] in 2008 there was proof and an efficient and portable solu-
tion was available. TinyECC was written for the TinyOS environment, but as most of it
is written in ANSI C and only some parts using nesC (a C extension used for TinyOS) it
is portable, as we have also shown in the scope of this thesis (we ported the library to
Contiki OS).
After the publication of TinyECC most of the newer libraries are based on TinyECC, as
long as the algorithms use elliptic curve cryptography. In this section we will first give
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an overview of TinyECC and after that show more advanced libraries that were possible
candidates to satisfy our needs in the Scopes Framework.
5.5.1.1 TinyECC
In [72] Liu et. al. publish an efficient and extensive library for elliptic curve cryptog-
raphy in WSNs. It includes several algorithms and provides encryption and decryption,
signature and verification, and a Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol based on ECC.
The algorithms are ECIES, ECDSA and ECDH.
TinyECC provides an implementation that is suited for 8-, 16- and 32-bit processor
architectures and can be configured to be used with different elliptic curve sizes. It
uses elliptic curves recommended by NIST [121] and allows special optimizations to
speed up processing. Additionally some parts of the library can use optimized assembler
implementations to additionally increase performance. The elliptic curve algorithms
are separated from the underlying math operations, which supports the reuse of these
operations in other algorithms.
Discussion
Possibly the first re-use of the TinyECC library was done by Kampanakis in [61] as he
implemented a pairing algorithm on top of TinyECC. The algorithm is still provided with
the TinyECC distribution, but only computes a compressed pairing [115]. As we ported
TinyECC for our use, we also extended the Tate-pairing to compute the full pairing.
The combined algorithms of the ECC library and the Tate-Pairing made it the optimal
choice for our Scopes Framework, as we do not need to include other libraries that may
duplicate some parts of the functionality. As the implementation of TinyECC is modular,
it is easy to exclude algorithms not used in our implementation from the framework’s
code-image.
5.5.1.2 TinyPairing
The TinyPairing Library [143, 144] claims to be the first library with bilinear pairing
functions available out-of-the-box. It not just provides the computation of a bilinear
pairing, but also algorithms for encryption/decryption and different signature schemes
based on pairings.
The provided performance is comparable to the performance provided by TinyECC
with better RAM utilization, as the space used is drastically smaller for the encryption
and signature algorithms. The pairing computation is highly optimized compared to the
Tate computation based on TinyECC. This shows that pairing computation is possible in
an efficient way, even on resource constrained systems like WSN nodes.
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Discussion
Unfortunately the library is written in nesC that is only used in TinyOS, so the library
is not easily portable to other operating systems used in WSNs and made it unavailable
as choice for our framework.
5.5.1.3 TinyTate
TinyTate [92] is a very early approach to compute a Tate pairing on WSN nodes. It is
also based on TinyECC as the library for elliptic curve operations. With its 30 seconds
per pairing computation on an 8-bit microcontroller it is slower than our implementation
which is also also based on TinyECC. Therefore, this approach is not an option for our
framework.
5.5.1.4 TinyPBC
The TinyPBC library [93] evolved from the TinyTate project and is based on RELIC [2].
RELIC provides the basic mathematical functions used by TinyPBC.
TinyPBC optimized the pairing computation to 5.5 seconds. This was achieved by us-
ing binary fields and super singular curves with an optimized binary field multiplication.
Discussion
This library is also implemented for TinyOS and has some dependencies that are hard
to fulfill. In our tests as a candidate for our framework we had a hard time to even get
the library running on our nodes. At the time of our evaluation this library was not in a
state that it could serve our purposes of a lean and efficient library for elliptic curve and
pairing calculations.
5.5.1.5 MoTE-ECC
MoTE-ECC [73] provides (ephemeral) ECDH on two specific elliptic curve types. These
are Montgomery and twisted Edwards curves. The library is highly optimized for 8-bit
AVR MCUs and allows four different key sizes, between 160 and 256 bit. Additionally
the library was hardened against simple power analysis attacks.
The optimized calculations on the selected curves allow the ECDH computation to
complete in 1.22 seconds, compared to 4.35 seconds of TinyECC in the same setting.
Additionally, the memory footprint of RAM and ROM is drastically reduced compared to
TinyECC.
Discussion
This library is also based on TinyOS and implemented in assembler for AVR MCUs.
As we are using MSP430 MCUs this library was not compatible with our sensor nodes.
Nonetheless, the results achieved are quite impressive.
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5.5.1.6 Cooperative Ciphertext-policy Attribute-based Encryption (C-CP-ABE)
The approach described in [128], cooperative CP-ABE, is not a complete security li-
brary. But, it evaluates an approach to allow the usage of CP-ABE even in the smallest
sensor nodes, that we were also thinking of, but we could not use it since it did not
match with the requirements of our Scopes Framework.
The idea of cooperative CP-ABE is to offload the expensive exponentiations of the
regular CP-AB from resource constrained nodes to assistant nodes that have no resource
constraint in the sense of limited power supply. The exponentiations are used in the key
generation and encryption steps. Where key generation is done at the attribute authority,
which uses a server outside the WSN to generate keys. Encryption is the costly operation
in the network that is optimized in this approach. When encrypting, the calculations are
spread over some assistant nodes, the authors propose 5 of them in the neighborhood of
the calculating node. The results are then incorporated into the encrypted message to
be sent.
The evaluation shows that the offloading works, the constrained node has to com-
pute only some multiplications and the assistant node computes the exponentiations
offloaded. But, the receiver of the encrypted message has to compute a high num-
ber of additional multiplications, which may cause additional load on other resource
constrained nodes. This depends on the messaging scheme in the network.
Discussion
As mentioned above the offloading scheme is a neat idea, but it would not be easy to
integrate it into the Scopes Framework, as the communication with the assistant node
is just one-to-one communication and the Scopes Framework is designed to use one-to-
many communication. An additional drawback for the use in Scopes are the additional
multiplications on the decrypting side, as these are always the child nodes in Scopes, the
encryption is done on the root node, which will mostly be a node with more capabilities
and resources, compared to the child nodes. So, this scheme is not feasible for the
Scopes Framework.
5.5.2 Security Frameworks
In this section we show frameworks that include security in their designs. These are
all approaches for WSNs and related to our Scopes Framework. We show a broad range
of frameworks, from peer-to-peer approaches to computationally demanding ABE ap-
proaches.
5.5.2.1 SMEPP Light
SMEPP Light [5, 129] is based on SMEPP [15] for embedded peer-to-peer networks.
The embedded components used in these networks are much more capable as the ones
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used in WSNs. That is why SMEPP Light is only a subset of SMEPP and provides basic
functionality including a replacement of XML self description with a bit vector technique.
The approach explained here is valid for SMEPP Light and also SMEPP, therefore we will
only speak of SMEPP from now on.
In SMEPP peers organize themselves into groups. Inside these groups nodes interact
via a publish/subscribe mechanism. A node can subscribe for events of another node
of the group. Relevant events are then automatically received and processed. Groups
can be open or closed. To join a closed group a node has to authenticate itself, a public
group can be joined by any node. The routing used is implemented using the directed
diffusion paradigm.
SMEPP Light provides security on two levels. First on network level and second on
group level. Both are secured via symmetric encryption. On network-level two keys
are used, one for encryption (confidentiality) and one to compute a MAC (integrity).
On group-level there are three keys. One is the so called masterKey, the other two are
session keys to again encrypt and compute a MAC for a message. The masterKey is used
as shared secret to join a closed group. When a node has joined a group it retrieves the
two session keys and can then send encrypted messages to its peers. The masterKey is
set at compile time and the session keys can be changed at runtime.
Discussion
Sharing the same principles with the Scopes Framework in its WSN section (group-
based communication and routing based on directed diffusion) SMEPP Light is different
from Scopes. Groups have to be planned at compile time, as secure, closed groups have
to get their shared secret at this stage. Furthermore, the communication paradigm inside
a group is quite different. SMEPP Light seems to allow node-to-node connections, where
scopes introduce the scope root to scope member communication. Single point-to-point
connections are possible, but expensive. As both approaches are based on the same
paradigms SMEPP Light may be expected to be less efficient because of the overhead of
the point-to-point connections.
Also if a node gets compromised the security measures of the Scopes Framework make
it possible to exclude single nodes from a group and the whole network. With the static
group keys this is not possible in SMEPP Light. But SMEPP allows to update the group’s
session keys, this at least enables backward secrecy.
5.5.2.2 Secure Group-based WSN Architecture
Garcia et. al. propose a secure group-based communication architecture in [35]. It
is self-organizing and creates distinct groups in a WSN. Node IDs are unique in a group
and contain the node position, that is acquired using GPS or similar. The node creating
a group selects the group ID which has to be network wide unique. A group has a center
node and border nodes. The center node manages the group key and has no other special
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function. The border nodes are at the border of a group and can communicate with other
groups. An event that occurs at a node is forwarded to all other group members.
In this approach, also two distinct security levels are defined: Network- and group-
level (or Inter- and Intra-group security). The network-based security is based on
symmetric encryption with a shared key. This key is obtained from another node in
the network after authenticating. Each group has its own group key. It is managed by
the center node. If a node is moved it may change its group membership, this includes
replacing the old group key with the one from the new group. The group key is not
distributed to the group members but calculated by each node. The center node stores a
logical tree structure of the group and based on the position in this tree and a correction
factor each node can compute its group key and each node knows the keys towards the
center node.
Discussion
The grouping approach proposed here has a huge difference to the scopes approach.
In the Scopes Framework a core element is the description of the group. In this approach
there is no description what node may join which group. It is only based on location of
the single node. Using GPS as source of location achieves a quite accurate localization,
but puts a big burden in terms of energy consumption on the sensor nodes. Also the
more or less random groups may not be an optimal choice depending on processing of an
event. From the security perspective the shared key for the inter-group communication
is a big drawback, as only one node has to be compromised and an adversary can join
his own malicious nodes to the network. Of course a compromised node in the Scopes
Framework allows cloning of a node, but after detection this node can be excluded
from the network. In this approach it is not possible to replace the shared key without
additional measures.
5.5.2.3 SM-Sens
SM-Sens [34] is a cluster-based WSN security scheme with so called Guardians as
observers of system security. Therefore, nodes in the WSN can fulfill four different roles:
regular, cluster-head, gateway or guardian node. Regular nodes execute the application
and transmit the results to their cluster-heads. Cluster-heads are responsible to acquire
data from their sensing/regular nodes, aggregate data and communicate with the base
station. They also distribute keys among cluster nodes. Gateway nodes are responsible
for building a network backbone and have at least two cluster-heads or the base station
in communication range. Guardians are responsible for observing the cluster-heads and
forward from time to time data they received from cluster/regular nodes around them
to the base station. The base station compares the data from the cluster-heads and the
guardian nodes and decides if a node is compromised and may be excluded from the
network.
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To secure the approach four different kinds of keys are available. Individual keys
that are used by regular cluster nodes. Cluster keys that are shared between a cluster-
head and its cluster-nodes. Cluster-head keys that are shared between all cluster-heads
and are used to communicate with the base station and region keys that are shared by
cluster-heads and the guardians of a region of the network. For example, the commu-
nication between the cluster-heads or guardians and the base station is secured by ECC
encryption. Another example is the distribution of a cluster key, where the cluster-head
uses one of the individual keys of the cluster nodes and sends the encrypted cluster key
to its nodes, one by one.
Discussion
SM-Sens is not providing any kind of grouping. It uses clustering to structure the
network, but only for the purpose of routing. Nevertheless SM-Sens provides a wide
variety of security measures to ensure different security goals. The system introduces
four roles, where the guardian role is used to provide a second data-route to the base-
station. With these two data-flows the base-station can ensure that the data is not altered
on its way towards it. Additionally there are a bunch of different cryptographic keys each
node has to store to be able to communicate with its peers. Depending on a node’s role
and what roles it is communicating to, different keys are used. This ensures that, when
a key is compromised, there is another channel to replace the compromised key only on
authorized nodes. On the other hand the large number of keys and the data that must
be stored consume a big part of the available memory. Also the guardian node forwards
a smaller number of messages compared to the real data stream. So, to compare the real
and the guardian data stream there have to be variations allowed in a defined range. If
the attacker knows these parameters he can alter data in an amount that may not be
detected because the predefined ranges are not violated. Nonetheless the guardian role
is a very interesting concept.
5.5.2.4 Fine-grained Distributed Data Access Control (FDAC)
Yu et. al. propose in [150] a fine-grained distributed access-control scheme for data
in WSNs, called FDAC. It uses Key policy - attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) [38] to
secure the data or more exactly the access to data inside the network. To achieve this
KP-ABE uses a reverse approach compared to CP-ABE. The private keys distributed to
the users of the network contain an access-structure where it is described what kind
of data they are allowed to decrypt. After generation of data at the nodes the data is
encrypted using the system’s public-key and a set of properties is connected to the data.
As in CP-ABE the access-structure is based on defined properties and defines via boolean
expressions what combinations of properties are needed to decrypt data with a given
private key. An extension to KP-ABE is a revocation mechanism, where all the keys of a
system can be updated to revoke a compromised key. The compromised key has to be
excluded from the update mechanism.
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Discussion
Following its name, FDAC does not provide a structured network or some kind of
grouping scheme. It uses KP-ABE and therefore works in the opposite way the Scopes
Framework does. Here the data is tagged with properties and the users have an ac-
cess structure in their private keys that limits their ability to decrypt data. In Scopes
the sensor nodes have a set of properties and the access-structure is embedded in the
scope creation message. In this sense the data (the scope) authenticates the user (the
sensor node). An additional assumption made in the FDAC approach is the use of time-
synchronization, which is not necessary for using scopes.
5.5.2.5 Ring-based Secure Group Communication Scheme (RiSeG)
In [18] Cheikhrouhou et. al. propose a secure grouping scheme, RiSeG, for WSNs
that are based on a ring topology for each group. In this approach three different kinds
of roles are present: the base station, a group controller and end devices. An end
device is just a group member. It has to store the node addresses that are located before
and after it in the ring topology and a set of cryptographic keys to authenticate itself or
encrypt/decrypt messages. A group member sends in regular intervals a HELLO message
to confirm its presence to the group controller. The group controller has knowledge
about all members of a group, it manages the group key and handles the members’
HELLO messages. The base station is used in grouping related operations and handles
authentication of a sensor node, blacklisting of (potential) compromised nodes, which
get excluded from the network, and allows creating new groups or joining of a node.
The ring topology was chosen because of scalability reasons. In this scheme the group
controller and members have only to send one message each for a message that has to be
sent to the whole group. In the pre-deployment phase all the nodes get preloaded with
the necessary keys for the different cryptographic operations, like pair-wise key estab-
lishment, computing a message authentication code (MAC) of a message and computing
an elliptic curve signature (ECDSA). The communication between two nodes is always
encrypted by symmetric encryption and the pair-wise keys. Therefore, if a message has
to be forwarded through different nodes it has to be re-encrypted for every connection.
To create a group a node sends a join request for this non-existing group to the base
station. Base station and node authenticate themselves to each other and the node re-
ceives a group-creation-invitation from the base station, if the authentication succeeded.
If the node accepts the invitation it becomes the group’s group controller. To join an ex-
isting group the same join-request is sent to the base station. If authentication went well
a join-inform is sent from the base station to the group controller and the further steps to
join are handed over to the group controller. The group controller sends then a join-key
message to the requesting node and includes it to the ring topology, by sending its new
previous node a ring-update. A new node is always appended at the end of the ring (the
group controller is assumed the head of the ring). After joining or leaving of a node
the group key is renewed to ensure forward- and backward-secrecy. A group controller
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can leave or switch. To do that the group-management-information is forwarded to the
next node in the ring and if it accepts it becomes the new group controller. If it does
not accept the information is forwarded to the next node in the ring. In case no node
accepts to be group controller the group is destroyed. To leave a group a node sends
a leave-request to the group controller which then updates the ring topology and the
group key.
Discussion
The basic idea of a ring topology for a group in WSNs seems easy, but gets quite
expensive in deployments with more than one-hop communication range. Especially as
in this approach new nodes are just appended to the end of the ring and a message
has to traverse many hops if the neighboring nodes in the ring are located at opposite
positions in the real sensor network. From a security point of view each step in the
group creation or join processes is secured, but with the base station included in this
process there is a single point of failure to prevent the network from even joining existing
groups. In contrast the Scopes Framework is still fully operable in networks that are
partitioned at runtime as long as the root of a scope is reachable. Also the HELLO
messages can introduce a considerable amount of load in a WSN, depending on their
frequency and network size. Scopes uses a similar approach with its refresh messages,
but as the messages are sent to the member node’s the scope root (group controller)
is unburdened from processing a large number of messages. The behavior observed in
RiSeG drains much energy from the group controller’s neighborhood, same as for the
base station. Beside the data messages also the HELLO messages are sent toward the
group controller, where a high number of messages in medium to large sensor networks
are accumulated very fast.
The RiSeG uses some assumptions that the Scopes Framework also uses, like overlap-
ping groups, a group controller or security to ensure only valid nodes can join or create
a group. But it uses a different notion of a group and bases the group parameters only
on the sensed data of a node. Scopes does not restrict the grouping parameters to the
type of sensed data, but leaves it to the user of the network and the scenario to define a
set of matching criteria. The security in RiSeG is centered around the base station and
the group controller, where in scopes the security is only based on the group controller,
still in both approaches the needed cryptographic keys are deployed in a bootstrap phase
before physical deployment, but can be managed after deployment in Scopes.
5.5.2.6 Di-Sec
With Di-Sec [130] the authors propose a novel distributed intrusion detection system
for WSNs. The system is designed to monitor the single sensor nodes in the background,
so that it is transparent to WSN applications or tasks.
It consists of a monitoring core (M-Core), a communication module (COMM), the
sensing module (Sense) and the detection and defense modules (DDMs). The M-Core
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provides all the functionality needed by the DDMs an also scans messages traversing
through the Sensing and COMM modules. COMM provides the communication interface
that has to be used in order to use Di-Sec in a system. All network messages, in or out,
are forwarded through this module to analyze, mark and send the (encrypted) data. The
Sense module is built analogously to the COMM module and scans all the data coming
from sensors and going to actuators to detect any irregularities. The DDMs provide
attack detection or defense mechanisms against specific threats. Therefore, there can be
several DDMs in the system and they can dynamically be exchanged.
To allow not only WSN experts to configure the system the M-Core Control Language
(MCL) is used to program the DDMs.
Discussion
The Scopes Framework only copes with its immediate threats and it protects the data
inside the scopes. But there are much more possible attacks and it can not be known
up-front which attacks an adversary will execute. Di-Sec may be a valuable addition
to many WSN-Frameworks, not only Scopes, to allow threat detection and countermea-
sures with the ability to retrofit new functions on a network-wide scope. Di-Sec aims
to be a general solution to security threats. It provides proxy like modules for every
nodes input/output and specific detection and countermeasures functionality for differ-
ent threats. As a general approach it can be used to secure a WSN against common
attacks, whereas the framework or protocol specific threats, like the one we cope within
SecScopes, will be covered by them. This approach is a valuable complement for WSNs
in general. Nevertheless, Di-Sec copes with security threats only, it is the WSN version of
a malware and intrusion detection program. It does not manage a WSN, like Scopes does
it with the support of partitioning of the network or the support of multiple concurrent
tasks.
5.5.2.7 Object Security Architecture (OSCAR)
In [133] Vucinic et. al. propose a new security architecture for WSNs using CoAP,
as the end-to-end paradigm of the standardized DTLS algorithm does not match the
many-to-many paradigm of CoAP itself. The new security architecture OSCAR intro-
duces Authorization Servers that authorize data producers and consumers to work with
each other. Therefore, DTLS is still in use for exchanging an access secret between au-
thorization server and producer or consumer. The data exchange between the latter two
is done through ECDSA and a symmetric encryption, e.g. AES128.
When a sensor node (producer) wants to provide data with its sensors, it subscribes
with the Authorization Servers and receives a resource access secret for the kind of data
it can provide. This is done through a DTLS channel. When a consumer wants to retrieve
data from a producer, it requests the kind of data at the Authorization Servers and
receives an access secret, if it is authorized. This is also done through a DTLS channel.
The request for the actual data is done by the consumer directly or via a cloud or proxy-
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server to one or more producer nodes. This request and the following data exchange is
encrypted using a session key that is derived from the matching access structures. This
way the data can only be decrypted, if the consumer has a matching access structure.
The producer also signs the data with its device certificate and the consumer can check
the signature to ensure, that the message originates from the correct producer.
Discussion
OSACR is a very new approach, but with a similar access control scheme as attribute-
based encryption. But, this is achieved using classic symmetric and asymmetric cryp-
tography and a central infrastructure, that has to be available at all times to keep the
network operational. With the Scopes Framework we intentionally designed our system
to work without fixed infrastructure, as this may not be easily possible, for example, in
our container harbor scenario, where producer nodes had to authorize their sensors on
every ship and in every harbor to the local authorization servers. This would introduce
high management effort before the journey of a container. As sensor node has to have
the allowance on every authorization server on its way to the destination to connect to
the different networks.
5.6 Summary
Wireless sensor networks and network security are two active research areas. This is
clearly illustrated by the variety of approaches we presented and discussed. The main
contributions of this thesis are a dynamic grouping mechanism for WSNs that is both
flexible and economical, the Scopes Framework, and a security mechanism based on
attribute-based encryption that works in WSNs and effectively supports the dynamic
grouping and structuring of the sensor network, SecScopes. It is this combination of
features that sets the research presented in this thesis apart from the many related
approaches. The Scopes Framework developed as part of this thesis is a grouping
mechanism that is flexible and can be tailored for many different application scenar-
ios. The secure extension of the Scopes Framework, SecScopes, incorporates security
mechanisms that were previously only known to work in a PC environment, to support
access control to a scope and enable continued security.
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With the Internet of Things (IoT) at our doors the problem of efficient and data-
oriented communication of hundreds of devices has reached every one of us. The step
towards interconnected WSNs used by multiple parties and for different purposes is
getting closer and makes the consideration of secure multi-purpose WSNs even more
important. With the Scopes Framework and SecScopes we provide a viable solution
for structuring multi-purpose WSNs and securing them in a way that supports their
data-oriented nature.
6.1 What we achieved
The major contribution of this work is the design and evaluation of the Scopes Frame-
work. It leverages an efficient grouping mechanism, called scopes, that can restrict
communication in a WSN to groups of nodes that satisfy a set of configurable prop-
erties. This relieves unrelated areas of the network from the load and saves network
resources. The framework also supports the management of concurrent tasks, where
concurrent means multiple installed and active tasks in a WSN. The Scopes Framework
also provides a high configurability to enable the use in many scenarios. Therefore,
it keeps scenario-related aspects configurable to archive this high degree of reusability.
Example scenarios we evaluated throughout this work are the container harbour sce-
nario [55] and TikiDB [57], a WSN wide database system similar to TinyDB [76]. But,
with a bigger focus on sensing and acting compared to the mostly sensing capabilities of
TinyDB.
Security was recognized as an important aspect from the beginning of this work. The
second important contribution of this work is the proposed security concept of the
Scopes Framework, called SecScopes. It utilizes attribute-based encryption to secure
the scoping process and allow access control and enable secure key exchange for the
light weight, symmetric transport encryption. It provides scope wide group-encryption
of messages, including secure key-exchange, and takes scenarios of a breach in the se-
curity chain into account, e.g., the exclusion of a malicious node in the WSN.
The two major properties that were achieved with the proposed framework are a
multi-purpose and secure WSN. To enable the multi-purpose property we enabled the
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framework to be highly configurable. Therefore, we modularized our implementation
and introduced defined interfaces to the modules surrounding scopes. This allows the
substitution of these modules with specialized versions that support a given scenario.
Additionally, we introduced scopes to enable efficient group communication that can be
easily configured to an application’s communication needs.
To enable a secure system we introduced not just symmetric encryption for encrypted
communication, but also a concept for access control to the system, secure key exchange
and rekeying in the running network. To achieve this, we introduced attribute-based
encryption in WSNs and enabled a scaled deployment of the attribute-based algorithms
depending on the role and resources of a sensor node. This makes this kind of encryption
possible also on very low-power nodes.
To ensure proper performance we did extensive evaluations with the different evolu-
tions of the Scopes Framework, as seen in the previous chapter. The Scopes Framework
proved efficient for low-power WSNs and results showed that it performs better in more
dense networks for reliable operation. SecScopes proved possible in low-power WSNs,
but can only be used efficiently in specific scenarios. In WSNs where the sensor nodes
are more powerful it is efficiently usable. The evaluations provide performance indica-
tors on the sensor nodes thenselves and in the network. We show computation times
for the different algorithms used and memory usage for RAM and ROM. To compare
the performance in the WSN we defined the performance indicators of nodes that join
in a scope over its lifetime and the goodput of periodic and bulk data traffic. Good-
put means percentage of possible messages delivered in a given evaluation setup. We
showed three evolutions of the Scopes Framework in our evaluation. Our first prototype
was based on the SOS operating system and was used for the first feasibility study. The
first evolution was then based on Contiki and contains the full feature-set of the Scopes
Framework. The last evolution is SecScopes, the security enabled incarnation of the
Scopes Framework.
The detailed evaluation showed the general feasibility of the scopes approach in wire-
less sensor networks. In sparsely populated networks the results show less stable scope
creation and, therefore, fewer delivered messages. Medium to dense networks are bet-
ter suited to our approach, as more alternative routing path are available to ensure
proper delivery of messages. The introduction of security in SecScopes led first to a
drastic drop in performance, because the additional data to be transferred resulted in
many more message collisions and consequently to message loss. We could improve
the performance to levels similar to insecure scopes only by introducing additional mea-
sures to detect and treat these situations by using CRC for integrity and fragmentation
management.
6.2 How this work can be enhanced in the future
The results obtained in this thesis can be improved in various areas.
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A further analysis of the SecScopes architecture showed a possible flaw in scope dele-
tion. Currently it cannot be checked if a scope deletion command is issued by the root
node. This may be possible by having the root node sign the deletion message. But this
would impose an additional signature algorithm and a scope public/private key pair. The
influence on the performance is equal to the one of scope creation; scope deletion would
be getting an expensive operation, but it would be executed only once. The impact of
this flaw is increasing the management overhead and a short interruption of message
transfer on the specific scope. As the root node does not accept a false deletion com-
mand, the next SR that is send for the scope will recreate the scope. Additionally, a false
deletion command can only affect the routing tree from the receiving scope member
node away from the root node, because of the routing direction.
The evaluation of the security enhancements showed clearly that more powerful nodes
are needed to use these algorithms to their full extent. Today’s ARM Cortex-M Family [3]
provides a multiple of performance, compared to, e.g., Tmotes. Of course this costs
more energy, but still a lifetime of one year and more for a sensor node is achievable
on batteries. This would allow a much faster processing of the crypto-algorithms used
and more memory space for scenario dependent adjustments and tasks. In-network the
performance and stability could be enhanced by introducing compression to reduce the
size of messages that was a major issue introducing security. Further optimization, for
example, of the CP-ABE access structure could lead to improved behavior. Aggregation
in a scope could be investigated for message transmission. However, this may cause
problems in the integration with the security mechanisms.
Another area of further research may be the support of the cryptographic algorithms
by dedicated co-processors, e.g., FPGAs with a specific implementation of the proposed
algorithms. Another way may be the use of the ARM Cortex-M’s DSP-library to accelerate
processing without additional hardware.
The introduction of further security measures is another area of enhancements. Cur-
rently the code inside a sensor node can potentially access all memory areas due to the
lack of the hardware to restrict access to certain areas. To achieve this hardware support
is mandatory and can be found in, e.g. ARMs TrustZone technology [4], this will be
available in the near future to smaller ARM-cores like the Cortex-M-family.
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